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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In most less developed countries, the agricultural sector's economic 
situation compared to other sectors of the economy, particularly the 
industrial sector, has been unfavorable. Its relative situation has been 
lowered in those countries as a result of a variety of government inter­
ventions. Some of these interventions are the instruments for applying a 
specific theory of development. Other interventions stem from a series 
of concerns and considerations, such as the simplicity of raising 
revenues from export taxes on agricultural products; the necessity to 
placate interest groups, particularly politically powerful urban ones 
which induces the government to keep the price of food and other agricul­
tural products low; the economic-social importance of assuring a stable 
supply of agricultural products; the argument that the infant industry 
has to be protected strongly; and the lack of consideration on the part 
of policymakers on the long-run effects of policy interventions. 
In simple terms, the development theory that has promoted the market 
intervention is the belief that productivity and its rate of growth are 
much higher in the industrial sector than in agriculture. Therefore, the 
development of the former sector would give more benefits to society, 
and, by doing so, resources like agricultural surplus and foreign 
exchange are used to finance the growth of the industrial sector. Two 
assumptions implicit in the theory are of importance: the assumption 
that the agricultural supply is price inelastic, that is, the farmers do 
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not respond to changes in output prices, which constitutes the perfect 
environment for taxing the agricultural output without altering the 
amount supplied. Second, the substitution of the market mechanism for 
the government bureaucrats in solving quantity and price determination. 
This theory, together with the concerns and considerations 
previously expressed, has really spread market interventions such as 
price controls, quantity controls, taxes, and subsidies, which, with the 
passage of time, tend to increase, maybe by the failure of the partial 
interventions to achieve the desired goals. However, there is hope. In 
recent years, a rethinking of these policies appears to have occurred, 
not a complete liberalization of the market price as a resource alloca­
tion device, but at least as a guide to the policy decision-makers. 
It is curious that so little attention has been paid to, or research 
undertaken, into the effects of agricultural price control, taxes, 
subsidies on the patterns of production, consumption, income distribu­
tion, and development in general, especially when the agricultural 
sector's relations with the social, economic and political structures are 
so interrelated. Little or no attempt has been made by the Costa Rican 
government to monitor and evaluate the effects of government interven­
tion. At the very heart of this issue are the economic quesions; Who 
gains and who loses from government involvement in the agricultural 
sector? What is the net benefit to society of that intervention? What 
are the appropriate measures of economic gains and losses? 
The major purpose of the study is to estimate the welfare effects of 
agricultural market invervention applied by the Costa Rican government. 
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However, some subsidiary objectives can be more specifically stated. 
The following objectives will unify the study and serve as a basis for 
organizing the contents. 
A) To provide a historical overview of the country's major develop­
ment strategies and its effects on the development of the agri­
cultural sector. Focusing primarily on the use of market prices 
and quantities as the major policy variables, it also will 
review the tax legislation relevant to the agricultural sector. 
B) TO develop a simple and normative model which permits us to 
estimate a system of demand and supply equations. For each side 
of the market, a theoretical model will be developed from which 
tractable and applicable results implied by the theory will be 
obtained. A general equilibrium model based on those results 
will be generated. 
C) To develop the theoretical backgrounds required for welfare 
analysis. Focus will be placed on the economic meaning of the 
areas enclosed between the general equilibrium demand and supply 
curves. Welfare measures of single policy interventions will be 
developed under this framework. 
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CHAPTER II. 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AND 
ITS RELATED POLICY VARIABLES 
This chapter presents the relevant characteristics and trends shown 
by the Costa Rican agricultural sector in the period 1960-1980. Mainly 
the evolution of factors such as the agricultural output, prices, 
development policies, and government market interventions are reviewed. 
Agricultural Sector: 
Its Importance in the Costa Rican Economy 
The agricultural sector was the most important sector in the 
evolution of the country's economic development during 1960-1980, 
although the industrial sector increased its share of the domestic 
national product (DNP) by the end of the period. About 56 percent of the 
population is located in the rural areas and approximately 60 percent of 
them depend directly on the income earned in agricultural activities 
(AID, 71). This situation indicates that whatever happens in agriculture 
has relevance to a very large segment of the country population. 
The composition of the domestic national product is presented in 
Table 2.1 for the key years of 1960, 1970, and 1980. The relative 
participation of the agricultural sector on the DNP has changed 
significantly since 1960, this sector held a relative share of 30.5 
percent, which put it in first place as the most important sector on the 
productive structure of the country. Agriculture's relevance has 
decreased since then. In 1970, its share fell to 22.5 percent, a trend 
5 
Table 2.1. Structure of the Domestic National Product in percentage 
terms and rate of growth for 1971-80^ 
Sector 1960 1970 1980 1971-80 
Agriculture and 
Livestock 30.5 22.5 17.4 2.6 
Manufacture 
Industries 13.1 18.3 19.6 7.6 
Utilities .96 1.7 1.8 7.8 
Construction 4.5 4.3 6.4 10.5 
Commerce 21.4 21 20 4.8 
Transportation and 
Communications 3.7 4.2 4.3 10.6 
Financial and 
Insurance Services 3.5 4.6 4.8 9 
Real Estate 9.9 7.6 5.9 4.1 
General Government 7.6 10,6 15.2 5.8 
Other Personal 
Services 5 5.2 4.6 4.6 
Total 100 100 100 5.7 
^Source: BCCR (4, 7). 
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that continued during the 19708. In 1980, its share was just 17.4 
percent of the DNP, and first place was surrendered to Lha commerce and 
industrial sector. The industrial sector has shown a rising trend during 
the same period. The industrial sector's relative participation 
increased from 13 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 1980. Looking at the 
annual average rate of growth (in constant monetary units) for the period 
1971-80, the primary sector presented the lowest rate of 2,6 percent, at 
the same time the industrial sector showed a 7.6 percent rate of growth. 
The highest rates belong to the construction and transport sectors with 
10.5 percent and 10.6 percent, respectively. The domestic national 
product increased at a 6 percent rate during the same 10 years. 
The structure of the agricultural sector in percentage terms is 
presented in Table 2.2. In 1960, the participation of coffee, bananas, 
and beef cattle on the total agricultural value^ is about 58 percent, 
which also corresponds to 83 percent of the total exports of the country 
(Table 2.3). This high degree of specialization on the productive 
structure of the country makes its economic development highly dependent 
on the international market. 
During this 20-year period, the agricultural sector's annual rate of 
growth has been 4 percent, which is lower than the 6 percent rate of 
growth for the DNP. This characteristic reflects the economic develop­
ment policy. First the policy was aimed at promoting the production of 
agricultural exports at high international prices. The policies became 
^Evaluated at constant colones (base 1966) . 
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Table 2.2. Structure of the agricultural sector in percentage terms and 
rates of growth* 
Product 1960 1970 
Annual Rates of Growth 
1980 60-70 70-80 
Coffee 
Bananas 
Sugarcane 
Cocoa 
Rice 
Corn 
Beans 
Others 
Beef 
Milk 
Pork 
Lumber 
Total 
28.3 
15.7 
4 
3.4 
6 
2 . 2  
1.9 
9.4 
13.6 
10 
2 
4 
100 
22.9 
27.3 
5.6 
. 6  
4 
1 . 8  
.7 
7.9 
13 
10.3 
1 . 1  
4.7 
100 
-Percent-
23.8 
23.5 
5.1 
. 6  
8 
1.4 
.5 
8.9 
9.7 
12.3 
2.3 
3.9 
100 
4.3 
14.3 
8 . 6  
-4.5 
5.4 
4 
1.5 
4.7 
5.4 
6.4 
4.5 
6 . 2  
6.4 
3.3 
.7 
1 . 8  
7.02 
13.3 
3.2 
2 . 8  
1 6 . 6  
. 1  
4.1 
10.1 
3.4 
2.7 
^Source: BCCR (5, 6). 
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Table 2.3. Total export value of some agricultural products as a 
percentage of the total exports (current dollars)* 
Product 1960 1970 1980 
•Percent 
Coffee 53.86 31.32 24.21 
Bananas 24.03 28.88 19.77 
Cocoa 6.94 .83 1.10 
Sugarcane 2.15 4.39 3.99 
Livestock Beef 5.07 7.78 6.22 
Industrial 4.1 25 34.7 
Other 3.9 1.8 10 
^Source: BCCR (5, 6). 
more industrial oriented during the early 1960s. This variation in the 
development policy is also reflected in the different rates of growth 
shown by the agricultural sector, 6.4 percent for the decade 1960-70 and 
2.7 percent for the rest of the period (Table 2.2). About this rapid 
deterioration of the agricultural production, particularly since 1972, 
Lizano (49) has pointed out that there are two main causes; the decrease 
in the absolute as well as in the relative profitability of agricultural 
activities. No conclusive data exist in absolute terms but it is 
reasonable to expect that this factor has played an important role 
(Salas, 62). The relative profitability indicates the economic situation 
between economic sectors, particularly between the agricultural and 
industrial sectors. An important trend has been the decrease in the rate 
9 
of investment in agriculture which has fallen by 50 percent between 1968-
1977 (Lizano, 49). This trend would indicate that the entrepreneurs have 
found it more convenient, due to Che more profitability and lower risk, 
to invest in the other sectors, \rtiich have been growing at a faster 
rate. 
As is the case in most of the developing countries, the agricultural 
sector is the primary source of foreign exchange. Total agricultural 
exports constituted 95.9 percent of the total exports of Costa Rica in 
1960 (Table 2.3) when coffee and bananas reported a share of 78 percent. 
By 1980, the export share of the agricultural sector had fallen to 55 
percent and at the same time the exports from the industrial sector had 
increased from 4 percent to 35 percent. Coffee and bananas remain the 
predominant export products. These figures reflect the still important 
place of agriculture as well as the increasing role of the industrial 
sector in the Costa Rican economy. 
As previously stated, the economic development of the different 
sectors was not a balanced process in which all the productive activities 
grew at a similar rate, but rather the development programs have signifi­
cantly changeed priorities during these 20 years. There have been two 
distinctive periods. The first one, where the industrialization 
objective had priority, covers most of the 1960s and mid-1970s. The 
second period includes the current period when a more balanced develop­
ment is the major objective. 
The high priority that the agricultural sector enjoyed in the late 
1950s was no longer granted. Industrialization came to the forefront 
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particularly with the introduction of Costa Rica into the Central 
American Common Market (CCM) in 1962. This event considerably influenced 
the industrial development because it opened the Central American markets 
to the manufactured products and made attracted investment in industry 
because of the heavily protective policies. 
The CCM did not present direct and relevant changes for the agricul­
tural sector because it did not include the free trade of agricultural 
products, except during the period 1966-1968 when the Costa Rican govern­
ment was forced to reduce basic grain support prices to be more in 
accordance with other CCM countries. After that, the regional trade of 
basic grain has been loaded with protectionist barriers that have 
eliminated any possibility of free trade between the countries. The 
country's participation in the CCM did have an indirect effect on the 
performance of the agricultural sector as a whole. That effect stems 
from the given relevance to the industrial development, which changed in 
an unfavorable way the relative importance of the primary sector. Even 
though this situation does not reduce significantly the support to the 
export activities such as coffee, bananas and beef cattle because they 
still constituted the primary source of foreign exchange. The same 
cannot be said with respect to those activities directly related with the 
domestic consumption, \rtiich was reduced significantly. The relevant 
elements of the development strategy proposed by the government programs 
in the period 1962-1975 for the agricultural sector, are the diversifica­
tion of export products to reduce the dependency on coffee and bananas 
exports, the self-sufficiency in some agricultural products to release 
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the balance of payment problems, and the promotion of the production of 
raw materials required by the industry (fiber, vegetable oil, tobacco). 
That strategy did not give the results expected. The diversification of 
exports did not show any significant changes in 1972 the value of exports 
from coffee and bananas represented 80 percent of the total value of 
exports from the sector. The self-sufficiency targets were not 
accomplished because grain imports have increased since 1965. The 
production of raw materials also did not show a significant improvement; 
in fact, the wool production suffered a sharp decrease (Salas, 62). 
Despite some variation in the annual production rate of the agricul­
tural sector, the average rate of growth was a satisfactory 6 percent 
(Table 2.2). Export activities, however moved in opposite directions 
with respect to those directed to domestic consumption. The amount of 
exports did not increase in the years 1962-1965 basically because of the 
sharp decrease in coffee production, but at the same time the production 
of commodities for the domestic market increased at an annual rate of 5.5 
percent. From 1965 to 1972, the quantity of exports increased at a rate 
of 12 percent primarily because of the expansion of the banana planta­
tions. The production directed to the domestic market only increased at 
a rate of 2 percent annually, which is lower than the population rate of 
growth, forcing increased amounts of imports to satisfy the domestic 
demand. The agricultural policy variables relevant to this period were 
the subsidized credit and to some extent price supports. Even though the 
share of the agricultural credit, as a percentage of the total credit 
given by the National Bank System, declined from 60 percent at the 
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beginning of the period to a 40 percent in 1972. The credit policy was 
oriented mainly toward the export crops with beef cattle and banana 
activities benefitting the most, a departure from the traditional leader 
of coffee production. By the end of this period, there was a significant 
improvement in the amount of credit available to small farmers mainly 
because of the existence of very favorable foreign credit. 
The price support policies were not utilized significantly during 
1960-1972, because for the most part the support price for basic grains 
held constant except for corn and beans, whose support levels were 
increased in the early 1970s when the production deficit was notorious. 
The efforts for a liberalization of the basic grain trade between the 
members of the CCM also affected the support level during a short period 
of time as previously explained. 
The decrease in the value of traditional agricultural exports, as 
well as the notorious decrease on the dynamic of the CCM which has 
reduced significantly the rate of growth of the industrial sector, has 
enhanced the necessity to restate the development strategy. Thus, in the 
past few years it has been necessary again to promote a strong diversifi­
cation of agricultural exports, to redirect the industrial sector toward 
more agriculture oriented (Agro-Industry), and to increase the efforts on 
the production for the domestic markets. The credit system of maximum 
quantity for activity (topes) was applied, even though the share of the 
agricultural sector decreased from 41 percent to 37 percent (1972-1978) 
of the total credit. Also, the percentage of credit directed to the 
small farmers recorded a sharp decrease in the same period, from 21 
13 
percent to 13 percent. Finally, in 1978 the credit policy was signifi­
cantly changed. Traditionally, the interest rate for agricultural 
activities has been subsidized but in that year that policy was reviewed 
and instead an interest rate was implemented based on the international 
money markets, which, of course, produced a significant decrease in the 
production of most agricultural commodities in the subsequent years. 
The difficulties caused by the deficits in basic grains hastened the 
use of price supports as a mechanism to increase domestic production. 
The level of support was double for rice and corn and triple for beans 
from 1973 to 1980. This new support price increased the production of 
those grains, particularly rice which has been exported. 
The inflation rate increased in the last half of the 1970s making 
more urgent the control of the maximum retail price of a series of 
essential food commodities (rice, beans, corn, popular cuts of beef, 
eggs, sugar, etc.). These price ceiling measurements have been applied 
since the early 1950s but not strictly enforced. Some institutions were 
created with the idea of reducing the marketing costs basically by 
reducing the number of intermediaries, a series of farmers' fairs were 
established at different market locations. 
In the agri-Industrial subsector, the production and participation 
of the private sector has been promoted through credit lines. The export 
of products of this subsector as well as the exports of nontraditional 
raw agricultural products has been supported by the mechanisms 
established in the Export Promotion Law of 1972. 
14 
Another type of policy has been the establishment of agricultural 
industries by the central government, especially in those cases where the 
initial costs are high enough to discourage private initiative. 
Price Determination 
This section will deal with the different characteristics that 
determine the relations between buyers and sellers in each of the 
commodity markets relevant in this study. We will analyze the institu­
tional and legal arrangements that promote or interfere with the 
consumer's preferences and the producers comparative advantages as they 
are reflected in a free market. We will focus our attention on the 
historical pattern, particularly the last decade, of producer and 
consumer prices and the government policies which have in some way or 
another determined that historical pattern. Lastly, we will also examine 
the major events occurring at the international markets and their effect 
on the domestic markets. 
Five agricultural commodities have been chosen in this study, they 
are rice, corn, sugar, coffee, and beef. Two (rice and corn) are 
produced mainly for domestic consumption and the rest are primarily 
export crops. These five agricultural products well-represent Costa 
Rican agricultural sector. The basic grains have been of major concern 
for the central government because they constitute the major source of 
foodstuffs for low-income families. The three agricultural export crops 
included in this analysis also are a good representation of the export 
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subsector. Those three products jointly with the banana exports will 
represent almost all of the Costa Rica agricultural exports. 
Basic Grains 
The institutions with greater influence on the price policy of agri­
cultural products are the Ministry of Economics, Industry, and Commerce 
(MEIC) and the Consejo Nacional de Produccion (CNP). The role of the 
MEIC on the price policies is based on its Organic Law No. 6054 of June 
14, 1977 and also the Consumer Protection Law No. 5665 of February 28, 
1975, which states in its article No. 1 that it is attribution of the 
MEIC to set the official prices for those goods and services necessary 
for the domestic production and consumption. This institution will have 
the faculty to a) set, modify, and control the maximum retail prices of 
the goods and services and b) set, modify, and control the marketing 
margins of the goods and services. 
The CNP's Organic Law No. 2035 of May 1965 authorizes intervention 
in the marketing of all commodities important in the average diet and all 
those raw materials used as inputs for domestic industries. The 
objectives of this law are the price stabilization of a group of 
commodities included in the law as well as to promote the production of 
them. The latter indicates that the CNP is responsible for setting the 
level of price support not just for the basic grains as it has been 
traditionally but also for those commodities needing production 
increases. 
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The principal objectives of the government policies in the last 
decade has been almost the same, in general terms they have been oriented 
to a) obtain the price stablization at the producer and consumer level, 
b) foster the agricultural production, and c) increase the farmers 
income. 
These objectives have been guiding the government policies primarily 
with respect to those commodities of importance in the national diet as 
the basic grains are. For the rest of the commodities, the major 
objective of the government policies have been to set and monitor the 
marketing margins. 
Grain is marketed through both private and government channels. The 
government buys grains at the support price established before planting 
and sells grain back into the market through wholesalers, retailers, and 
its own retail outlets. Domestic producers sell to private merchants 
when farm prices are above support price levels but deliver quantitites 
of grain to the government when the free-market prices fall below support 
levels. When domestic production falls short or is in excess, the 
government can import or export grains to maintain domestic prices. Most 
of the government efforts have been devoted to the direct intervention in 
the grain market. Regulatory and service functions such as grain inspec­
tion and grading, research, and education, market news are less developed 
or nonexistent (BID, 9). 
At the consumer level, the price of rice and corn has been fixed by 
law during the whole period covered. Even though it is important to 
note that the price set by the MEIC has been traditionally subsidized by 
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the government, particularly by not charging the storage cost with the 
objective of not increasing the cost of the basic food basket. Another 
important point is that the fixed maximum price correspond to a grain 
grade which is difficult to find at the private retail market. For 
example, the fixed retail price for rice corresponds to a quality of rice 
with 25 percent of grain broken, quality which is only found at the CNP 
outlets. The private market mainly offers a better quality whose price 
is not controlled. This situation is similar for corn (SEPSA, 66). 
The variability of the basic grain prices can be seen in Table 2.4, 
which presents the different groups of commodities and their annual 
change in the consume:; price index. The basic grain group is the one 
that presents the greater activity through the whole period, also the 
index of growth shown by this group was higher throughout the period than 
the index of growth of the consumer price index. 
The rice and corn price trends for the period 1960-1980 are shown in 
Figure 2.1. We have to mention that the price series used is the one 
gathered by the "Oficina de Estadistica y Censo," data used in the estim­
ation of the CPI and correspond to the nominal price paid by the 
consumers in the metropolitan area. Thus, they can be considered as the 
uncontrolled prices. From the same Figure 2.1, we see that the consumer 
price for both products was fairly stable during the decade of the 1960s, 
when a good supply reinforced by government imports helped to maintain 
normal increases in the price. In the early 1970s the country suffered a 
shortage of basic grain and its dependency on imports increased. Under 
this situation, the central government implemented the National Program 
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Table 2.4. Index of growth of the 
agricultural prices at 
consumer 
consumer 
price index 
level 1973-
and the 
80® 
ANO 1964=100 1973=100 
-Index 
Basic 
grain 
of Prices at 
Export 
crop 
Consumer Level-
Livestock 
1973 139.9 100 100 100 100 
1974 182.0 130 153 120 118 
1975 213.6 153 183 122 132 
1976 221.0 158 189 142 136 
1977 230.3 165 188 157 141 
1978 244.1 174 204 174 149 
1979 272.4 195 222 198 205 
1980 314.8 225 267 245 219 
^Source: SEPSA (66). 
of Basic Grain with the major objective of increasing the domestic 
production of this group of staple products with the goal of becoming 
self-sufficient. The principal policy instrument utilized was a 
substantial increase in the price support level, which also was reflected 
at the consumer level, when the price of rice paid by the consumers 
increased by 43 percent and 25 percent for corn relative to the 1974 
level. The basic grain program was satisfactory considering that the 
country attained self-sufficiency in rice and decreased substantially its 
imports of corn (see Table 2.7). Because of this success, the central 
government decided to reduce the price support level for rice in 1976, a 
Figure 2.1. Historical consumer price trends for rice and corn 1960-80, 
DGEC (28) 
RCP = Rice consumer price 
CCP = Corn consumer price 
33 
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change that resulted in a consumer price of 9.3 percent. During 1976-
1979, the price of rice was stable showing a moderate average increase of 
4 percent. By the end of 1979, the effects of a new policy of 
liberalization of prices is reflected at the consumer level by the 
drastic increase of about 50 percent. This increase may reflect a 
speculative purpose as well as adjustment to the international market 
price because rice is the only grain that has been exported since 1976. 
The response of corn to the National Basic Grain Program has not been 
that successful because the level of production has not been sustained. 
After a dramatic increase in the quantity produced (118 percent) in the 
crop year 1975-1976, the same level has been decreasing then after with 
the largest drop of 13 percent during the crop year 1977-1978. This 
variability in supply was also reflected by the consumer price, thus the 
decrease in price in 1976 of about 21 percent can be explained by the 
excess of supply, particularly in yellow corn. By the next year (1977), 
however, the retail price suddenly increased 34.4 percent reflecting the 
fall in supply. Since then the price of corn at the retail level has 
been increasing at the moderate rate of 8.7 percent. 
The price control at the producer level has been through price 
support policies, \rtiich assure the producer a minimum price for the 
product. This price support level varies for different qualities of 
grain at the farm gate and these differences are also reflected at the 
wholesale and retail level. The price support levels are adjusted for 
quality and for the cost of transporting the product to San Jose (the 
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capital). To assure reliability on the policy, the CNP does not reduce 
the support level during the crop year. 
The historical levels of domestic price support, producer price and 
the international price for rice and corn are presented in Figures 2.2 
and 2.3. 
The average producer prices are always below the support prices, 
because of the quality and transport cost adjustments. The simple 
correlation between the support price and the producer price is .96 for 
corn and .92 for rice. The average ratio of producer price to support 
price is .80 for corn and .81 for rice. 
Another general characteristic of both products, has been that the 
price support level has been established historically higher than the 
international price with minor exceptions for rice, particularly for the 
years 1973 and 1974. The price support level for corn during 1960-1971 
was on average U.S. $3.74 per hundredweight and for rice the average was 
U.S. $9.64 per hundredweight. During the same period, the average 
international price was $2.53 and $7.12, respectively. 
Because of the shortage of supply in both rice and corn and with the 
implementation of the National Basic Grain Program, the support level for 
corn was increased to $8.93/cwt (1974-1977), \rtiich represented an 
increase of 139 percent compared to the average level of the 1960s. For 
rice, the situation similar, the support level for 1975 was $16.27/cwt 
meaning an increase of 69 percent compared to the average support level 
during the previous decade. Due to the success obtained under this 
policy, the rice support level was reduced to an average of $15.13/cwt. 
Figure 2.2. Historical trends of the domestic support and world price^ 
of corn 1960-80, BCCR (3), FAG (29) 
CPP = Corn average producer price 
CSP = Corn support price 
CWP = Corn world price 
^Number 2 yellow corn, FOB, Gulf. 
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Figure 2.3. World price , support price, and producer price of rice , 
historical trend 1960-80, BCCR (3), FAG (29) 
RPP = Rice average producer rice 
RSP = Rice support price 
RWP = rice world price 
^White 5 percent broken, FOB, Bankgkok. 
^Paddy rice. 
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for the short period 1976-1978, while the corn support level remains the 
same. Both commodity support levels started to show a claiming tendency 
from 1979 reflecting the decline in corn production since 1976, the 
higher cost of production (inflation), and the government policy to 
encourage the production of basic grain, especially corn, beans, and 
sorghum. Thus, the rate of increase of the support levels for those two 
years (1979-1980) has been 31.5 percent for corn and 30 percent for 
rice. 
As mentioned previously, the CNP had the two basic objectives of 
stabilizing prices and stimulating production. Both objectives are 
stated quite broadly, a situation which has made program implementation 
difficult. The CNP has shown traditionally a preference for increasing 
production, as it is reflected by the higher support level than the 
international market. This emphasis on production has become stronger 
over the last decade. National self-sufficiency is the primary objective 
of the basic grain program implemented in 1975. As pointed out by Lizano 
(49), the central government in pursuing this type of policy has 
forgotten the comparative advantages of the country especially because 
Costa Rica is an active member of the CCM where the production of basic 
grain in the rest of the Central American countries appears to be more 
productive. 
A related and important point is the way that the support price is 
established. The principle that it should be possible to calculate the 
cost of producing a commodity and ensure producers that their costs will 
be covered by minimum price has served as a base for price support 
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levels. However, systematic information about the cost of production on 
different areas of the country, on different size farms, and with dif­
ferent levels of technology is not available. Without this information, 
it is difficult to determine if a price support level will encourage 
inefficient farmers or if the small or larger farmers are the most 
benefited. A good price support for stabilization purposes should be set 
along the free market trend so there is no discouraging the interest of 
buyers and suppliers. 
The CNP should be a marginal buyer. If farmers can get a better 
price, they will sell elsewhere. Government purchases are made through a 
network of purchasing agencies located in different producing areas and 
nearby cities where farmers come to sell their products. Buying stations 
are generally located in the Pacific coast area, where the majority of 
grains, rice in particular, is produced. The CNP purchase program 
probably has a limited impact on small farmers, because the CNP purchases 
mostly rice. The grain is produced primarily by larger farmers, and the 
CNP has located the majority of its buying agencies in those regions. 
Table 2.5 presents the quantity of rice and corn purchased by the 
CNP and how much those purchases mean in terms of total production. 
The quantity purchased by the CNP of rice varies but is far from 
being a marginal buyer. In the last half of the 1960s, the quantity of 
rice bought ranges from 18 to 48 percent with an average of 34 percent, 
decreasing to an average of 29 percent in the early 1970s. With the 
implementation of the basic grain policy and its high support levels, the 
participation of the CNP or the quantity marketed increased dramatically 
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Table 2.5. CNP's purchase of rice and corn in metric tons 1965-80' 
Rice^ Corn 
Year Quant. % Quant. 
1965/66 10,376 34.5 3,946 6.3 
1966/67 7,809 25.3 2,964 4.4 
1967/68 19,007 48 1,525 2.1 
1968/69 30,632 45.6 1,901 3.1 
1969/70 11,699 18.4 803 1.3 
1970/71 8,500 11.9 1,520 2.47 
1971/72 38,614 41.6 2,562 4 
1972/73 20,277 20.8 1,834 2.8 
1973/74 32,653 27.9 1,279 1.5 
1974/75 17,624 13.9 8,206 19.5 
1975/76 97,740 50 14,024 15.3 
1976/77 139,791 93 27,340 30.8 
1979/80 22,357 9.5 13,446 19 
^Source: CNP (20, 21, 22, 23). 
^Paddy rice. 
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to nearly the entire domestic productions (93 percent) in the crop year 
1976-1977. Since then, the purchase quantity has been decreasing. The 
CNP's participation in the corn market as a buyer can be considered a 
marginal one, particularly in the 19608 and early 1970s with an average 
of 3.1 percent of the total domestic production. This trend has changed 
since 1974 when the average quantity purchased constituted 21 percent of 
total production reaching its maximum in 1976 with 30 percent. This 
change can also be attributed to the high support levels induced by the 
grain program. 
A major problem with high support price for corn is their effect on 
the poultry industry. According to the information from the Food Balance 
Sheet the proportion of yellow corn relative to total domestic production 
of corn has increased since 1976 (Table 2.6). Before that year, the 
average was 16.7 percent and the country relied heavily on imports to 
satisfy the domestic demand of yellow corn. After 1976, the proportion 
of yellow corn domestically produced increased to an average of 42.6 
percent with a maximum of 63 percent for the year 1978. 
Government regulation of grain imports is another crucial component 
of the Costa Rican price support system. The CNP makes or authorizes all 
imports from outside Central America, which require approval by the MEIC. 
In fact, the CNP maintains its influence over intrazonal trade, closing 
the borders to rice imports from other Central American countries. Grain 
imports have been used as buffer stocks to influence wholesale and retail 
prices. The ability of the CNP to stabilize grain prices has probably 
depended more on its power to regulate grain imports than to buy and sell 
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Table 2.6. Production and imports trend 
relevant prices 1971-80* 
for yellow corn and their 
Year 
Percent 
yellow 
corn 
Percent 
imports^ 
Price 
support 
$/cwt 
World 
price 
$/cwt 
1971 23.7 202.5 4.41 2.4 
1972 15.5 179.2 4.41 7.89 
1973 15.8 467.5 4.70 5.58 
1974 11.6 495 4.52 5.81 
1975 17 124 6.55 5.22 
1976 31 14 8.93 5.13 
1977 52.8 0 8.93 4.31 
1978 63 0 8.93 4.59 
1979 33 0 9.76 5.22 
1980 33 268 11.7 5.72 
^Source: CP (15). 
^The proportion of domestic produced yellow corn on the total 
quantity of produced corn. 
^The proportion of imports of yellow corn to the quantity produced 
domestically. 
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domestic grain. Table 2.7 shows that Costa Rica was a net importer of 
both rice and corn in the 1960s and early 1970s. The imported quantity 
of rice has declined significantly since 1972 and the country became a 
rice exporter with the basic grain program. For corn, Costa Rica always 
has depended on imports to satisfy its internal demand, especially of 
yellow corn. With the basic grain program, the percentage of imports 
have shown a significant drop from 67 percent in 1973 to 3.7 percent in 
1977. This situation changed in 1980 when it was necessary to import 73 
percent of the total domestic production. 
The description of the basic grain market interventions above 
indicate that the key government policy has been the support price. By 
putting this policy in an analytical framework and recognizing the dif­
ferent results obtained for corn and rice, particularly in the last half 
of the seventies, we would be able to have a better understanding of the 
effects of such a policy. For corn, the tradition has been to set the 
support level higher than the world price even though the country needs 
to resort to imports to satisfy its domestic demand. These character­
istics of the corn market are represented in Figure 2.4. 
Under free trade, the domestic quantity supply at the world price 
(WP) is given by and the quantity demand will be Q2. At this price, 
the country's imports will be represented by the distance Q^-Qg. Once 
the support level (SP) is established the quantity supply will increase 
to and the amount demanded will decrease to Q^. Therefore, the corn 
imports will be reduced and they are given by the distance Q^-Q^. The 
effect of the corn price support policy can be explained by the areas 
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Table 2.7. Export and 
of rice and 
import as 
corn 1966 
a percentage of 
-80^ 
the domestic production 
Year 
-
Exp Imp Exp 
UUl LI 
Imp 
1966 .71 44.5 .14 4.8 
1967 4 28.4 1.1 4.7 
1968 5.3 21.6 2.6 15.4 
1969 11.8 .5 .08 26.6 
1970 .08 13.2 .7 51.8 
1971 0 34 .7 42.6 
1972 .01 2.3 .3 30.7 
1973 .2 .6 2.4 67 
1974 16.3 .4 0 40 
1975 4.8 .5 6.9 31 
1976 2.3 .06 0 4.31 
1977 35.5 .04 5.2 3.7 
1978 29.5 0.7 1.6 7.4 
1979 45.2 .11 0 5.3 
1980 25.8 .04 0 73.0 
^Source: BCCR (3, 8). 
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Figure 2.4. Support price of corn 
between the price lines. Thus, the consumer group would suffer a loss 
given by the sum of areas a, b, c, d. The producer, on the other hand, 
will gain a benefit described by area a. The government, by importing 
the required quantity and selling it at the domestic support level, will 
accrue an income benefit represented by c. Finally, the country as a 
whole will suffer a loss given by the areas b and d. 
For rice, the analytical framework is a little bit different because 
by implementing the same policy the country has become a rice exporter. 
Such a framework is given by Figure 2,5. 
The rice support price policy is biased in favor of the producers 
because they will accrue a benefit represented by areas a, b, c, d. At 
the same time, the domestic consumers will have a loss of a and b. The 
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Figure 2.5. Support price or rice 
government by following this type of policy will suffer a loss (foreign 
consumers subsidy) represented by b, c, d. The areas b and d also 
represent a loss to the country because no domestic group accounts for 
The institutional framework within the sugarcane industry has been 
developing is dominated by two major institutions. One private, the 
"Liga Agricola e Industrial de la Cana de Azucar" (LAICA) and one public 
institution, the "Ministerio de Economia Industria y Comercio" (MEIC) . 
LAICA took over the "Junta de Protecion de la Agricultura de la Cana" in 
1965 through the Law 3579 of November 1965. This private institution 
gathers all interested parties on the production and industrialization of 
the sugarcane. The Board of Directors consists of two representatives of 
Sugarcane 
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the central government, three members from the sugar mill group, and 
three members from the producers group. Among the several responsi­
bilities given to LAICA by this law and its modification in 1971 by the 
Law 4856 of September of that year, the most important attributions are: 
a) To maintain a system of relations between producers and 
processors of sugarcane that guarantees a fair economic participation to 
both groups. 
b) To set and allocate the quota for domestic consumption and 
exports among the sugar mills. 
c) To set the final price that the sugar mills have to pay to the 
producers of sugarcane according with the yield obtained, geographic 
regions, and sell prices. 
d) To control all the sale of sugar in both the domestic market and 
the foreign market, for it can participate in selling and buying in both 
markets. 
LAICA represents the producers and processors of sugarcane and the 
MEIC represents the domestic consumers by fixing the wholesale price and 
the marketing margin at the retail level. 
The producer price has been regulated throughout the whole period 
(1960-1980). The way that the producer price is set considers both 
prices, the domestic wholesale price is set by the MEIC and the inter­
national price. 
The economic participation of the producers on the final price has 
been increasing throughout the period covered. Thus, by the Executive 
Decree No. 2 of 1951 the sugarcane producer had a participation of 54 
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percent of the net value of sugar, which was also increased to 56 percent 
by agreement between producers and processors, this percentage lasted 
from 1951 to 1965. With the creation of LAICA in 1965, the percentage of 
the net value of sugar received by the producer increased to 57 percent. 
In 1971, the Law No. 4856 raised again the economic participation to 59 
percent, and finally in September of 1976 this participation was set at 
62.5 percent of the net value of sugar. 
The way that the net value of sugar and subproducts is estimated has 
been fixed and controlled by LAICA. The formula applied is the following 
(LAICA, 48). 
White Sugar 
Total Earnings 
Total Cost 
Net Income 
Row Sugar 
Total Earnings 
Total Cost 
Net Income 
Total Net income 
_ r total net income 
Income per ton of sugarcane = ? r 
tonnage of sugar cane processed 
Plus 
Earnings from subproducts/ton 
Equal 
Final price of sugarcane/ton 
Distribution 
Producers: Final price x .625 
Processors: Final price x .375 
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The total earnings from white sugar is the gross value of the 
quantity sold in the domestic market. The earnings from raw sugar is the 
total value (FOB) of the quantity exported. The total cost for both 
white and raw sugar represents the marketing costs, taxes, cost of 
quality control, administrative cost, and others which the LAICA incurs 
as an intermediary. If the sugar mill markets its own sugar, these costs 
are controlled by LAICA. 
The price at the domestic market (wholesale level) is fixed by the 
MEIC and since the quantity destined to the internal market is between 50 
to 60 percent of the total sugar produced (see Table 2.8), then this 
price has a great influence in the estimation of the final price. Figure 
2.6 presents the historical patterns for the average price received by 
producers, the wholesale price, and the international price (U.S. Sugar 
Price). 
The wholesale price level was pretty much the same through the 1960s 
and early 1970s. For most of the 1960s, the wholesale price was higher 
than the U.S. market price reflecting the policy of promoting this 
activity to obtain self-sufficiency and some exports. By Executive 
Decree No. 2 of 1951, the wholesale price was fixed at $7.65 per cwt, 
price that remained until 1963. This domestic price level was econom­
ically attractive since 15,000 new hectares were planted with sugarcane 
(Barboza et al., 10). In the same year, 1963, the price of sugar was 
reduced to $7.35 per cwt. (48.60 colones) a decrease of 4 percent. This 
happened with the inclusion of Costa Rica into the preferential U.S. 
sugar market, which expanded the export possibilities through the quota 
g b 
Figure 2.6. World, wholesale and producer prices of sugar, period 1960-
80, LAICA (47), BCCR (5, 6), FAO (29). 
SCWP = Sugarcane world price 
SCWhP = Sugarcane wholesale price 
SCPP = Sugarcane producer price 
^Raw sugar 96, New York, Spot, c.i.f. 
^Producer price in terms of white sugar 
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of about 27,000 short tons (LAICA, 46) at a higher price than the inter­
national spot market. This wholesale price ($7.35) remained effective 
until April 1974. Its relation with the U.S. price started to change in 
the late 1960s when the U.S. price was for the first time higher than the 
domestic price in that decade, a trend that has been increasing to the 
dramatic difference between both prices in 1974 and 1975. The increasing 
gap between the domestic and export prices discouraged the domestic 
production that became critical in the crop year 1973-1974. The central 
government then decided to increase the domestic price up to $7.88 per 
cwt, this increment represents a 36.4 percent in domestic currency, but 
considering the devaluation of the colon in 1974 (1:8.4) the increment in 
terms of dollars just represent 7.2 percent. Interesting is the fact 
that 1975 is the only year that the average price received by producers 
was higher than the wholesale price and this is because the alltime high 
record price occurring in the international market.^ With the sharp 
decrease of the world price beginning in 1976, the higher cost of inputs 
and the low price level of the domestic market, Costa Rica needed to 
import sugar at the end of 1975 to satisfy its domestic demand (LAICA, 
p. 47). Because of this the government agreed to increase the domestic 
price to $10.14 in October of 1975 and again in 1976 at $13.14/cwt, which 
was a 66.8 percent increase relative to the price of the early 1970s. 
For reasons of increasing costs, the domestic price was raised again in 
1978 at $15.52/cwt, which represented a 18.1 percent increase. Because 
^The U.S. preferential market and its quota assignment has been 
eliminated since 1974. 
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of these successive and substantial increases, the wholesale price shows 
a higher level than the international market in two years (1977-1978) 
before being caught again by the latter, which began an increasing trend 
in 1977. Finally, in February of 1980 the domestic price increased to 
$18.81/cwt. mainly induced by the new high world price which reached that 
level in 1975. In general and since the elimination of the preferential 
U.S. market, the Costa Rican wholesale price has shown a continuous 
increase with an average rate per year of 15.2 percent. Comparing the 
average wholesale price for the periods 1960-73 and 1974-80, the level of 
the latter period represents an increase of 74 percent over the price of 
the earlier one. 
Because of the high variability shown by the international price, 
especially in the last decade, and since for the most part the domestic 
policy was to fix the domestic price below the world price, then it is 
advisable to split the decade of the 1970s into short-term periods for 
comparison purposes. The first period covers the years 1967-1973 when 
the domestic wholesale price was set at a constant level of $7.13/cwt. 
The world price average was $8.36/cwt, which implies that the domestic 
price was 13 percent below the U.S. sugar market price. In the next 
period (1974-1976), the average wholesale price of sugar was fixed at 
$8.63/cwt, while the world price recorded its highest level with an 
average of $21.8/cwt, therefore the domestic sugar price was 60.4 percent 
below the world price. The next two years (1977-78) stand out from the 
rest of the periods because the wholesale price was set above the world 
price, a policy that was disregarded in the late 1960s. The average 
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percentage that the domestic price was fixed above the reference price 
was 15.2 percent. The last period (1979-1980) reflects the reimplementa­
tion of the old policy, that is the domestic price below the world price, 
with an average percentage of 11.7 percent. 
Before leaving the producer side of the sugar industry, we have to 
mention that unlike the basic grains there is not a price support for 
sugarcane but instead, the Sugar League (LAICA) determines the advance 
payment that the sugar mills have to advance to the producers at the 
beginning of the season. That price serves as a reference point for the 
final price that they will receive at the end of the crop year. 
At the consumer level, two policy variables are relevant, the retail 
price fixed through the marketing margins and the domestic consumption 
quota. The consumer price is governed by the controlled wholesale price 
to which the marketing margin for the wholesaler (4 percent) and the 
marketing margin for the retailer (12 percent) are added (LAICA, 45). 
Therefore, the consumer price should present the same pattern as the 
wholesale price and this can be seen in Figure 2.7 which plots the 
historical trends of the retail price and the export price (FOB). 
Comparing this figure with Figure 2.6, we see that the behavior of both 
the wholesale and retail prices are almost the same, relative to the 
foreign market prices. Again, we can distinguish four periods which are 
different just in the extent from those obtained in the last section, but 
the effect of the government policies in those periods is the same. 
The main objective of the domestic sugar policy since the creation 
of the "Junta de Protecion de la Agricultura de la Cana" in 1940 and 
Figure 2.7. Consumers and export^ prices of sugar, period 1960-80, LAICA 
(47), BCCR (3) 
SCEP = Sugarcane export price 
SCCP = Sugarcane consumer price 
^Costa Rica FOB prices. 
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later by the LAICA in 1965 is to ensure the domestic requirements of 
sugar before allowing exports. The instrument used by these institu­
tions, particularly the LAICA, is a quota system. The Sugar League 
assigns a determined quota of production to each sugar mill in such a way 
that satisfies both domestic consumption as well as foreign demand. The 
domestic consumption quota is obtained by forecasting both the human 
consumption and the industrial requirements according to their past 
tendencies. 
A time series data corresponding to the industrial demand are not 
available but from some studies made by LAICA and the high per capita 
consumption of sugar (64.8 kgs.) since the early 1970s it is reasonable 
to suppose that the industrial requirement has been increasing. LAICA 
(47) has estimated that the industrial consumption is about 25 percent of 
the domestic consumption in 1981. But in any case, the industrial sector 
buys the sugar at the price established by the MEIC, thus, enjoying an 
input factor subsidy. 
The proportions of the quantity consumed and the quantity exported 
in relation to total domestic production are presented in Table 2.8. 
From the same tables we can see that the proportion of sugar that is 
consumed at the domestic market has ranged between 40 to 67 percent of 
the total production. We can distinguish three periods, the beginning of 
the 1960s when Costa Rica had just entered into the U.S. preferential 
market, when the annual average percentage allocated to the domestic 
market was 57 percent and the average export was 40 percent (1961-1965). 
The second period is characterized by the growth in the sugar industry 
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Table 2.8. Proportion of domestic production of sugar designated for 
consumption and exports 1961-80^ 
Year Consumption Exports 
•Percent 
61/62 64 36 
62/63 54 41 
63/64 56 47 
64/65 55 35 
65/66 45 50 
66/67 46 53 
67/68 48 52 
68/69 50 41 
69/70 46 49 
70/71 48 57 
71/72 46 39 
72/73 52 55 
73/74 59 53 
74/75 59 38 
75/76 62 31 
76/77 59 47 
77/78 63 36 
78/79 63 35 
79/80 67 42 
^Source: LAICA (46), BCCR (3). 
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promoted by the U.S. sugar price and the domestic price, both of which 
were higher than the international spot price. The annual average 
proportion allocated to domestic consumption (1965-1972) was 47 percent 
and for exports (1965-1974) was 50 percent. The third period is 
dominated by two events; the elimination of the U.S. preferential market 
in 1974 and the establishment of a new industry which uses sugar as an 
input factor in the early 1970s encouraged by the CCM. Thus, the annual 
average domestic demand rose to 61 percent and exports declined to 38 
percent. 
The characteristics of the international market relevant to Costa 
Rica have been its introduction to the U.S. preferential market (1963-
1974) and becomes a member of the International Sugar Agreement in 1975. 
In the early 1960s and particularly with the broken relations between 
U.S. and Cuba, the U.S. allocated the Cuban quota to a series of 
countries, including Costa Rica. This new situation gave these selected 
countries the opportunity to take advantage of the U.S. domestic price 
support. The U.S. price was $3/cwt higher on average than the world 
price during the period 1964-1972 (Table 2.9); a period that was 
dominated by the assignment of quotas to the exported countries. From 
then on, the U.S. price has been pretty close to the world price and even 
in some years has been lower. Thus, by the end of 1973 the quota system 
was disregarded and substituted by the Generalized System of Tariff 
Preference (GNTP) under the Trade Act of 1974. This new system 
established preferential trade practices particularly with less developed 
countries. In general terms, the GNTP has four major characteristics 
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Table 2.9. Relation between the U.S. 
of sugar, 1960-80^ 
domestic price and the world price 
World 
price 
U.S. 
price 
$/cwt*^ 
Quota premium 
or discount/$ 
1960 4.09 6.30 2.21 
1961 3.85 6.30 2.45 
1962 3.87 6.45 2.58 
1963 9.41 
00 00 
-1.23 
1964 6.79 6.90 .11 
1965 3.07 6.75 3.68 
1966 2.82 6.99 4.17 
1967 2.95 7.28 4.33 
1968 2.96 7.52 4.56 
1969 4.32 7.75 3.38 
1970 4.88 8.07 3.19 
1971 5.65 8.52 2.82 
1972 8.54 9.09 .55 
1973 10.99 10.29 -.70 
1974 31.62 29.50 -2.12 
1975 21.92 22.47 .55 
1976 13.14 13.31 -.03 
1977 9.68 10.99 1.31 
1978 13.86 13.93 .07 
1979 15.72 15.73 .02 
1980 30.42 23.13 -7.29 
^Source: USDA (73). 
^The Caribbean Port Price at New York port. Includes transport, 
insurance and import fee. 
'^New York spot price, C.I.F. 
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(USDA, 73). The total U.S. quota of sugar imports was set at the 
nonrestricted level of 7 millions of short tons, since the average annual 
imports are about 5 million tons of raw sugar. An import fee, which has 
to be paid by all the sugar imported, was initially set at .625 
cents/pound and raised in 1978 to 2.7 cents. Since then, it decreased 
until it was eliminated in 1980. An import duty that has to be paid by 
the sugar imported from countries that are not current members of the 
GNTP system. This import duty was set at 1.875 cents/pound of raw sugar, 
but after 1977 was raised to 2.81 cents/pound, and finally in February of 
1980 was reduced to .625 cents/pound. The objective of these two import 
taxes is to protect the U.S. sugar price support program from the inter­
national market. For a country to be selected as a member of the GNTP 
system and therefore pay no import duty is not to export to the U.S. 
market over a certain monetary limit which is set and annually revised by 
the U.S. government. For example, the limit was set at $26.6 millions 
worth of sugar imports in 1975; in 1978, it was $33.4 million; and in 
1980, the level was $41.9 million. Costa Rica has never exported to the 
U.S. more than the limited value. Thus, for the period covered in this 
analysis, Costa Rica always has been a member of the GNTP list of 
countries. 
We have mentioned that Costa Rica has been a member of the 
International Sugar Agreement since 1975. The main purpose of this 
international organization is to stabilize the international price of 
sugar particularly for the type of variation that the sugar price 
presented in the early 1970s. The mechanisms used to stabilize the world 
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sugar price takes as a reference a free market price range which was set 
between 11 and 21 cents/pound. If the world sugar price hits the 21 
cents level or higher, a contingence stock of 2.5 million tons is 
released by the ISA, On the other hand, if the price of sugar reaches 15 
cents/pound a quota system of about 85 percent of the Basic Tonnage 
Export (BTE) assigned to each member enters into effect. Further, if the 
price of sugar reaches the 11 cents level, the quota restriction is 
increased to 75 percent of the BTE. Costa Rica has been assigned a BTE 
of 105.000 metric tons. With the 85 percent quota limit, the level is 
89.000 MT and at 75 percent the quota level is 86 MT (USDA, 73). In 
general, we can say the international quota system has not been restric­
tive to the Costa Rican sugar exports since according to the figures 
released by LAICA (46), Costa Rica has never exported its BTE, the 
maximum quantity exported took place in the crop year 1976/77 with 91.384 
MT. During the remaining years, the quantity exported has been even 
lower than the level of the quota at 75 percent or 86.000 MT. 
The wholesale ceiling price has been the traditional policy on the 
domestic sugar market, which in the last decade has been set below the 
world price, except for a couple of years. This characteristic of the 
sugar market is represented as in Figure 2.8. 
The implementation of the ceiling price on the sugar market can be 
analyzed with respect to the free trade price level. Under this 
circumstance, this policy will benefit the domestic consumers by the 
areas a and b. On the other hand, the sugarcane producers will suffer a 
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Figure 2.8. Wholesale ceiling price on the sugar market 
loss represented by the areas a, b, and c. The efficiency loss caused by 
this policy is then given by the triangle c. 
The coffee industry is the single most important activity in the 
Costa Rican economy. The production of coffee generates the most 
important source of rural employment. Because the production structure 
is dominated by small- and mediua-size farmers, the distribution of 
income generated by this activity is one of the most efficient (in terms 
of the scope and economic participation) within the country's economic 
system. In the foreign trade sector, the coffee exports represent the 
first if not the second activity of importance on the total value of the 
Coffee 
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country exports, thus being a key source of foreign exchange and a key 
figure in the country's balance of payment situation. 
Because of its relevance on the domestic economy, this agricultural 
activity was the first to be organized under the guidance of the central 
government. In 1933, by the Law No. 17, the "Institute de Defensa del 
Cafe" (IDC) was created with two main objectives. To regulate the 
economic relations between producers, processors, and exporters and to 
implement and encourage the adaptation of new technology. In 1948 by Law 
No. 74, the IDC was transformed into the "Oficina del Cafe" (OFICAFE), 
which took control of the economic relations between the different groups 
and the agricultural-related activities were transferred to the Ministry 
of Agriculture. In 1961, a legal framework was given to the economic 
relations through the Law No. 2762. With these two laws all the 
economic transactions are controlled by OFICAFE. This institution is 
managed by a board of directors composed of representatives from 
producers, processors, exporters, and the central government. 
The most relevant characteristic established by the legal framework 
is that the OFICAFE should maintain a policy such that the economic 
relations between the relevant groups ensures to them a fair economic 
participation on the total value of coffee. The task is accomplished by 
setting the price that the processors and exporters must pay to the 
producers. Price that is obtained under specific rules that consider the 
domestic and international price, processing and marketing costs as well 
as some taxes from this activity. This system was designed to protect 
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smaller farmers in their dealings with the few large buyers and the price 
set by OFICAFE must be paid to all farmers, large or small, for the same 
quality product. Further, the processors are required by law to purchase 
a certain proportion of their raw materials from independent producers, 
who in many cases are small farmers. The OFICAFE influences the 
marketing of this product, not by buying or selling it directly, but by 
setting producer price and administering production and export quotas. 
It requires that millers register all purchases and exporters all export 
contracts. The same law also fixes margins for the millers and exporters 
to ensure that all participants share equitably in the distribution of 
income generated by this activity. Finally, the law also requires that 
OFICAFE satisfy the domestic demand by administering the supply to the 
domestic market, for this office manages the coffee exchange where by law 
all the coffee for internal consumption is auctioned. Finally, the MEIC 
sets the maximum price that coffee can be sold at the retail level. 
The price received by the coffee producers is strongly tied to the 
export price. Figure 2.9 shows the historical trend of both the export 
price (FOB) and the final price or liquidation price received by the 
producers.^ From that figure, one can see how close the price received 
by coffee farmers follows the export price. The latter has shown a 
^The liquidation price is recorded in colones for double 
hectolitter of cherry coffee, thus to convert it to dollars per cwt. of 
green coffee use this formula. 
g / _ Final price 45.4 
^ ' Yield at coffee mill * Exchange rate 
â b 
Figure 2.9. Producers and export prices for green coffee, 1965-80, 
OFICAFE (55) 
CFEP = Coffee export price 
CFPP = Coffee producer price 
^Export price refers to FOB. 
^Liquidation price. 
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pattern more or less stable in the decade of the 1960s with a decreasing 
tendency in the last years of the same decade. By the early 1970s, the 
export price started to recuperate except for the crop year 1974-75 when 
it decreased from an excess supply. By the next crop year, the export 
price began to increase promoted by the cold temperatures occurring in 
Brazil in 1975 and their effect on the following two or three crop years. 
It is during this period that the export price as well as the producer 
price reached a record level. The former reached the $198.85/cwt. 
level. 
The final price that the producers received for their product is 
determined by the following method (Aguilar et al., 1). 
I. Total value of green coffee 
II. Less the cost of processing 
III. Net value 
IV. Less the Ad-Valorem tax 
V. Net value after tax 
VI. Less processor margin 
VII. Total value to be distributed 
VII 
VIII. Liquidation price = 
quantity received 
The total value of the quantity processed involves the export sales 
as well as the sales to the domestic market, including also what the 
coffee mill has in stock. A tax of $.004/cwt of cherry coffee received 
by the processor is deduced from the total value. The processor costs 
are specified by law and they refer mainly to handling and transport 
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costs as well as some insurance costs, these costs cannot be greater than 
a specified value ($1.79/cwt). The processor's margin is set also by the 
law which is 9 percent over the gross total value less the allowed 
processing cost. The application of the above method ensures the 
producers that the price received will reflect the price variation 
presented by the world market. Historically, the producers have received 
around 75 percent of the export price. 
The domestic market for coffee is regulated by two instutitions, the 
OF I CAFE at the wholesale level and the MEIC at the retail level. 
According to Law No. 2762, a function of OFICAFE is to establish a quota 
level that satisfies the domestic demand; this quota is then distributed 
among all coffee processors. All the coffee designated to the domestic 
market has to be auctioned at the coffee exchange, which is administered 
by OFICAFE. It is in this market that the objective of a lower domestic 
price is obtained by regulating the quantity supply, because OFICAFE has 
the power to call upon the assigned quotas to increase the supply. Table 
2.10 shows the relation between both the export price and the wholesale 
domestic market. The latter has shown a level that is about 66 percent 
of the export market price during the decade of the 1960s and early 
1970s. However, this proportion has been decreasing since the crop year 
1972-73 with the lowest figure in 1976-77 of 17 percent and the average 
is 34 percent of the export price. It is important to realize that the 
coffee for domestic consumption is of a lower quality and domestic 
consumers have been enjoying a price for this product is lower than its 
opportunity cost at the international market. 
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Table 2.10. Relationship between the export price and 
domestic price for green coffee in $/cwt® 
the wholesale 
Crop 
year 
Export 
price 
Domestic 
price 
Relation 
percent 
1960-70 39.6 26 66 
1970-71 41.31 29.3 71 
1971-72 39.93 26.52 66 
1972-73 57.66 26.50 46 
1973-74 63.56 29.30 46 
1974-75 52.21 26.56 51 
1975-76 92.16 27 29 
1976-77 198.85 33.51 17 
1977-78 159.81 37 23 
1978-79 122.13 38.3 31 
1979-80 152.54 47 31 
^Source: OFICAFE (57). 
The other institution that intervenes in the domestic coffee market 
(MEIC) accomplishes its objective of maintaining a low level for the 
retail price of ground coffee by setting the maximum price that ground 
coffee with 12 percent sugar can be sold to the consumers. Figure 2.10 
shows that both the ^olesale price and the consumer price were more or 
less stable during the 1960s and middle 1970s, but since 1975 both prices 
have increased, promoted by the sharp increase experienced by the export 
price as well as the d.omestic inflation that became severe in the last 
half of the 1970s. These two factors forced the MEIC to critically 
increase the maximum retail price of ground coffee. 
As previously mentioned, the coffee industry is one of the most 
important sources of foreign exchange for the country's economy, and this 
importance has been obtained by exporting a high percentage of the 
domestic production. The quantity exported during the 1960s represents a 
92 percent of the total production (Table 2.11), proportion that is 
decreased to 88.7 percent in the Seventies due to the increase in 
domestic consumption (11.3 percent). 
Since the beginning of the 1960s (1962), the international market 
has been controlled by the International Coffee Organization and its 
respective International Coffee Agreement to which Costa Rica has been a 
member. The main objective of this institution is to stabilize the 
international price of coffee at a level no lower than the level reached 
in the crop year 1961-62 ($38/60 kgs) . The mechanism used to accomplish 
this objective is the control of the world supply by assigning quotas to 
the country members and encouraging them to control the domestic 
Figure 2.10. Wholesale and retail domestic prices of coffee, 1960-80, 
OFICAFE (56), DGEC (28) 
CFCP = Coffee consumer price 
CFWhP = Coffee wholesale price 
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Table 2.11. Percentage of the domestic production that is domestic 
consumed and exported^ 
Crop Domestic 
year consumption Exported 
Percent 
1960-70 8 92 
1970-71 8.88 91.12 
1971-72 6.43 93.57 
1972-73 10.15 89.85 
1973-74 10.05 89.95 
1974-75 11.04 80.96 
1975-76 13.02 86.98 
1976-77 13.95 86.05 
1977-78 14.05 85.95 
1978-79 12.58 87.42 
1979-80 13.05 86.95 
^Source: BCCR (3). 
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the decade of the 1960s. Once the 1975 frost happened in Brazil, this 
latter policy has been somewhat disregarded. The 1962 agreement assigned 
to Costa Rica a basic quota of 57,000 m.t. of green coffee which 
corresponds to a 2 percent of the world supply; in 1968 a new agreement 
based on the 1962 one was signed by Costa Rica which was reassigned a 
basic quota of 66, 0 m.t. (Aguilar, et al.). Finally, in 1976 was signed 
the last and current international coffee agreement which set a quota of 
78,840 m.t. These basic levels are modified annually according with the 
situation of the world market as well as redistribution of quotas not 
satisfied by other country members. The effect of this quota system on 
the export capacity of the country has been somewhat moderate since 
significant levels of surplus have occurred only in the middle 1960s 
(Aguilar et al., 1) which were sold to nonmember countries at the spot 
prices which historically has been lower than the price accepted by the 
international organization. 
Beef Cattle 
The beef cattle industry, because of importance to both the domestic 
consumers as the primary source of animal protein and the foreign 
exchange earnings produced, also has been regulated by the central 
government. 
Unlike the other two export activities (coffee and sugarcane) the 
beef cattle industry does not have a semi-public institution that 
controls the relations between the different participant groups. The 
central government directs participation in this industry, started in 
65 
1954, by imposing an export quota system (Law No. 1754 of Beef Cattle 
Exports). The government worried that insufficient quantitites of beef 
would remain for domestic consumption. Under this law, representatives 
of the private sector, particularly producer associations, are called to 
advise on setting the export quota. The CNP implements this program, by 
setting officially the export quota and controlling the flow of cattle 
between the domestic and export market. The last modification made to 
the 1954 law was issued in 1978 (Law No. 6247 Beef Catle Law and 
Regulations). This law created the "Comision Asesora del Mercadeo de la 
Came", which is formed by representatives of both private groups as well 
as public institutions. The major function of this commission is to 
advise the CNP in the applications of the norms relative to the setting 
of the domestic and export quota. In the same year, the "Comision 
Reguladora de la Carne" was created, which is a private agreement between 
public institutions, export plants, and cattle producers. The principal 
functions assigned to this private association are to approve the final 
liquidation price for exported cattle, to set and monitor the quality of 
export beef, and to set the minimum acceptable export price. The law 
makes export plants also responsible for filling the domestic quota. 
Estimates of slaughter for domestic consumption (primarily slaughter of 
females) in nonexpert plants are subtracted from estimates of domestic 
consumption (a per capita consumption of 18 kgs is used) to determine how 
many animals have to be diverted from the export market to meet domestic 
consumption needs. Finally, the MEIC has been setting the ceiling price 
for beef at the retail level. 
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The beef cattle producer faces two markets for his product with a 
significant price differential—the export market, basically the U.S. 
market, and the domestic market. The beef cattle law explicitly states 
that the primary objective is to satisfy the domestic consumption, for a 
system of domestic quotas is established to ensure adequate spplies for 
the domestic market. This market is not as well-organized as the market 
for exports. A great deal of intermediaries, wholesalers, and distrib­
utors participate in the handling and process of beef from the farm to 
the retail level, which implies unnecessary marketing costs (SEPSA, 65). 
The price at the producer level as well as the price at the wholesale 
level are not explicitly intervened by any type of policy, they may 
reflect though the ceiling price policy at the retail level. The market 
for exports is much more well-organized where the transactions between 
producers, slaughters, and packing plants are controlled by a private 
agreement (Comision Reguladora de la Carne). The U.S. constitutes its 
principal market by buying 95 percent of the total exported by the 
country (SEPSA, 65). The producers are reassured that the price they 
received for their product will reflect the fluctuations of the U.S. 
market price, through a system of liquidation prices, similar to those 
applied for coffee and sugarcane, and which is controlled and approved by 
the "Comision Reguladora de la Carne." 
The average price (liveweight) received by the beef producers during 
1960-1980 is depicted in Figure 2.11 where it shows the same general 
fluctuations as the U.S. market price but with less dynamism. As 
previously mentioned, there is a price differential between both markets 
Figure 2.11. World^ and producers^ prices of beef cattle, BCCR (3, 
BWP = Beef world price 
BPP = Beef producer price 
^World price: frozen boneless caw beef, Chicago, The National 
Provisioner. 
'^Producer price: average live weight price. 
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where the price for export cattle is higher than the domestic market. 
This situation reflects two things, first the quality of the cattle for 
exports is better since just young steers are designated to this market 
unlike the domestic market which is satisfied by slaughtering cows, 
bulls, and oxes and in some instances where the domestic quota has not 
been fulfilled a proportion of the steers for export are diverted to the 
domestic market at the cow beef price. The second factor that could be 
reflected in this price differential is the policy of price ceiling at 
the retail level that to some degree could prevent the cattle for the 
domestic market from reaching comparable levels with those destined to 
the foreign market. The historical trend for both sets of prices is 
shown in Figure 2.12 from which shows generally that both prices have 
followed the fluctuations presented by the international price (see 
Figure 2.11). The export price (llveweight) paid to the beef cattle 
producers is on average 22 percent higher than the one received from the 
domestic market for the period 1960-1974. The next period, 1975-1978, 
the price differential was increased to 30 percent reflecting the 
enforcement of the Consumer Protection Law No. 5665 of 1975 and the 
decline of the export price. For the last two years (1979-1980), a 
liberalization of prices at the retail level was allowed reducing the 
price differential to 18 percent. 
We have mentioned that the price at the consumer level has been 
controlled by the government—first, by the Economic Defense Law No. 1208 
during the period 1950-1974 and, since then, by the Consumer Protection 
Law No. 5665 of 1975. These laws entitle the MEIC to set the maximum 
Figure 2.12. Average producer prices at the export^ and domestic markets 
of beef cattle, live weight, 1961-80, BCCR (5, 6). 
EBPP = Beef export market producer price 
DBPP = Beef domestic market producer price 
®FOB prices. 
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prices for the different beef cuts at the retail level. The effective­
ness of these laws as a price stablization device is questionable. 
Comparing the domestic retail price of beef (inside round)^ with the 
export price (FOB), the former has been historically higher. Even more, 
the domestic price has followed pretty well all the price fluctuations 
showing foreign demand (Figure 2.13). For the period 1961-1972, the 
internal price was 14.5 percent higher, margin that increased to 31.3 
percent for the period 1973-1979 even with the implementation of the 
consumer protection law and for 1980 this difference reached its all-time 
record of 67 percent. Figure 2.13 indicates that the effectiveness of 
this policy is far from expected. Maybe its enforcement is more evident 
on the popular cuts (bone soup, liver) whose price trends have been much 
less dynamic. Another point worth noting is the absence of quality 
standards for the different beef cuts which makes the control and 
enforcement of the law very difficult (SEPSA, 66). Comparing the retail 
price and Che wholesale price (carcass weight), the retail price has been 
historically higher by a substantial margin. For the period 1961-1979, 
that margin was on average 73 percent increasing to 90 percent in 1980. 
This significant difference between both prices could be explained in 
part by the deficient marketing channels that characterized the domestic 
market for beef. 
^The specific beef cut chosen is more comparable with the export 
beef beside it represents the second in importance on domestic 
consumption (DGEC, 27). 
Si b 
Figure 2.13. Historical trends of the consumer, wholesale and export 
prices of beef cattle, 1961-80, DGEC (28), BCCR (3), SEPSA 
(65). 
BCP = Beef consumer price 
BE? = Beef export price 
BWhP = Beef wholesale price 
^Carcass weight. 
^Boneless beef. 
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The export market has been increasing its share of the total beef 
quantity supplied. During 1960-1965, this market represented 27 percent 
of the total supply increasing to an average of 54 percent in the last 
decade (Table 2.12). The U.S. constitutes the principal buyer of the 
Costa Rica export beef, thus any import policy applied by that country 
will have an important impact on the performance of the beef cattle 
industry of Costa Rica. The U.S. import market has been controlled by 
the Meat Import Act of 1964 (PL88-482), which stated that a quota system 
will be put into effect if total imports of fresh, chilled, frozen beef 
would exceed a certain specified limit. But for the most part of the 
1960s and early 1970s, the procedure followed was a voluntary agreement 
with the major exporters to restrain their quantities shipped to the U.S. 
(USDA, 72). The restraint level has changed over time, for example in 
1971 it was 1.160 million pounds, in 1975 it was 1.180 million pounds and 
in 1979, 1.570 million pounds. Because of the quantity imported and the 
internal economic situation of the beef cattle producers in the U.S., 
this country implemented the quota system for the year 1975-1976, 
corresponding to Costa Rica's share of 53.7 million pounds. This caused 
some problems since in those two years the quantity exported was greater 
than the quota, forcing to hold the excess quantity in bond. As a result 
of the surplus, it was necessary to export 10,000 m.t. to Venezuela in 
1977 (SEPSA, 65). The voluntary restriction system was retained until 
1979 when the new Anticyclical Law (PL96-117) came into effect. This new 
legislation, like its predecessor, established a limit, which now is set 
according to the U.S. cow beef supply. That limit was increased for 
76 
Table 2.12. Percentage of beef cattle destined for the domestic market 
and to the export market* 
Domestic Export 
Year market market 
•Percent 
1960-65 73.2 26.8 
1966 66.5 33.5 
1967 63.9 36.1 
1968 61.8 38.2 
1969 52.7 47.3 
1970 54.2 45.8 
1971 52.8 47,2 
1972 46.6 53.4 
1973 49.4 50.6 
1974 45 55 
1975 44.2 55.8 
1976 45 55 
1977 46 54 
1978 46 54 
1979 48 52 
1980 53.5 46.5 
^Source: BCCR (5, 6). 
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1979-1980 and Costa Rica could not satisfy its share (SEPSA, 65). In 
addition to those years (1975-1977), the U.S. import quantity restric­
tion does not seem to have had a limiting effect on the development of 
the beef cattle industry. 
The Tax Framework 
The most stable and permanent source that a government has to 
finance its activities is the revenue obtained from the imposition of 
taxes, particularly in those products vAiich are mainly exported. As in 
any other market price intervention, the imposition of a tax will divert 
the market price from accomplishing its primary role and negative effects 
are possible on the expectations of those who look upon the market price 
as a guide for their investment decisions. 
It is of major importance to have a historical perspective of the 
tax structure that has been affecting the five products chosen, so that 
we will understand why they were created, their rate level, and in doing 
so completing all the information that we need to analyze the welfare 
effects of agricultural market intervention policies. To begin with, let 
us see what has been the participation of the agricultural sector in 
total tax revenue received by the central government (Table 2.13). 
During the whole period (1962-1979), the total tax revenue grew at an 
average rate of 5.1 percent annually, while the tax rate for agriculture 
was 6.5 percent, industry was 5.4 percent, and the commerce sector shows 
the lower rate 3 percent. The agricultural sector's share of the total 
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Table 2.13. Participation of the three major economic sectors on the 
composition of the total tax revenue of central government^ 
Year 
Total^ 
$ 
Agriculture 
$ % 
Industry 
$ % 
Commerce 
$ % 
1962-69 102 10 10 25 25 37 36 
1970 143 15 11 37 26 51 36 
1971 147 11 8 38 26 51 35 
1972 157 11 7 41 26 49 31 
1973 180 15 8.9 46 26 57 32 
1974 210 29 14 45 22 62 31 
1975 198 31 16 46 23 55 28 
1976 204 29 14 51 25 55 27 
1977 216 35 16 51 24 58 27 
1978 . 216 30 14 50 23 61 28 
1979 209 29 14 50 24 58 28 
^Source: SEPSA (66). 
^In millions of dollars (exchange rate 1:6.4). 
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central government tax revenue was 12 percent, the industry share, 25 
percent, and commerce, 31 percent. 
Since 1974, new taxes were imposed and substantial changes were made 
in the old ones which altered the composition of total revenue accrued by 
the government. For the period before 1974 (1962-1973), the total tax 
revenue grew at an annual rate of 6.5 percent; for agriculture, the tax 
rate was 3.9 percent; for the industry, 8.4 percent and for commerce, the 
annual rate was 4.3 percent. The shares of each of these sectors were 9 
percent, 26 percent, and 34 percent, respectively. After major changes 
on tax policy (1974-1979), those shares have changed to 15 percent for 
agriculture and 23 and 28 percent for the industry and commerce, 
respectively. The major effect has been on the growth rate, while the 
tax rate for the commerce sector just barely presents an increase (.5 
percent) and the industry sector enjoyed a reduction of .4 percent, the 
agricultural sector, particularly the export crops, registered an annual 
rate of growth of 12 percent in its taxes paid to the government. 
The agricultural activities that generate most of the tax paid are 
coffee and bananas. Both activities represent 67 percent of the total 
(SEPSA, 66). The coffee industry is the most heavily taxed and the taxes 
are imposed on all stages—production, processing, and export. The ad 
valorem tax on production implemented originally by the Law No. 1411 of 
January 19, 1952, which states that a tax of 5 percent on the liquidation 
price received by the producer will be charged. In 1961, the percentage 
was raised to 10 percent by Law No. 2802. After this, several changes 
have been made to the law, where the last one was made in 1974 by 
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Executive Decree D,E. 4093-MEIC. These modifications were mainly 
concerned with the tax base as well as with the tax rate which was tied 
to the export price (E.P.) Thus, the law ended up with four tax rate 
levels 
1. 10 percent if E.P. 2 $42.5/cwt. 
2. 7.5 percent if 40 _< E.P. < 42.5 
3. 5 percent if 37.5 ^  E.P. < 40 
4. 2.5 percent if E.P. < 37.5 
Another tax that affects directly the coffee producer is the tax on 
each double hectoliter of cherry coffee sold to the coffee processors. 
This is a fixed tax of $.03 cents and it was established by Law No. 200 
in 1948. The purpose of it was to finance the inspection services and 
later (1964) it was designated as a crop improvement program. 
The Law No. 3064 of 1962 established a fixed tax of $.45 cents per 
cwt. of coffee exported which is used to finance the administrative cost 
of OFICAFE and to pay the international obligations under the Coffee 
Agreement. The tax level was modified in 1979 where it was expressed 
that the level would not be inferior than one half of the 1 percent of 
the FOB price. 
Another tax on coffee that affects the quantity exported is the Ad 
Valorem Right on coffee exports, which was established by Law No. 5519 of 
1974 indicating that 13 percent of the FOB price will be charged in favor 
of the central government. This law has been changed several times, the 
original level just lasted eight months followed by a period of one year 
at 5 percent. Then the level was increased again to 8 percent for almost 
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three years and finally in 1980 it was increased to its original level, 
13 percent. 
The coffee, which is consumed at the domestic market, is also taxed 
by the Law No. 74 of 1948, which set a fixed tax of $.083 cents/cwt. of 
coffee auctioned at the Exchange Coffee. In 1962, the level was raised 
to $24 cents/cwt (2). This tax is in favor of OFICAFE to finance the 
administrative cost of the Exchange Coffee. 
The exports of raw sugar are also taxed, basically with two export 
taxes. The first is what is called export rights tax, which was 
established by Law No. 2802 of 1961 and modified in 1979. The tax rate 
for each cwt. of sugar exported depends on the level of FOB price, thus 
we have : 
1. 9 percent if FOB Price 2 $26.5/cwt. 
2. 7 percent if 21.5 < FOB P. < 26.5 
3. 5 percent if 16.5 ^  FOB P. < 21.5 
4. 3 percent if 11.5 FOB P. < 16.5 
5. 1 percent if FOB P. < 11.5 
This export rights tax was issued in favor of the central government 
to finance its operations. 
The second tax on exports is an ad valorem export right which was 
set by Law No. 5519 of 1974 in favor of the central government. After 
some modifications, the final version states that: 
1. 18 percent if FOB Price 2 $35/cwt. 
2. 13 percent if 28 ^  FOB P. < 35 
3. 8 percent if 23 ^  FOB P. < 28 
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4. 5 percent if 18 ^  FOB P. < 23 
5. 1 percent if FOB P. < 18 
There are also several specific taxes on the sugar exported, where 
the most relevant, in terms of quantity, are a fixed tax on the raw sugar 
exported of $1.43/Mt whose beneficiary is a local government (Puntarenas) 
where the relevant ports are located. Another fixed tax of $2/Mt) is 
imposed to finance the institution in charge of the port facilities 
(INCOP). The first tax is given by Law No. 5582 of 1974 and the second 
one is given by Law No. 3652 of 1974. 
The domestic consumption of sugar is taxed by Law No. 2719 of 1961. 
After several modifications, the final version establishes a total fixed 
tax of $.30 cents/cwt. The beneficiaries of this tax are the central 
government (.12 cents), the local governments (.13 cents) for improve­
ments on rural roads, and the difference goes to two other institutions. 
The beef cattle industry is the one with the less taxes out of the 
three export activities. The quantity of beef exported has to pay the 
ad valorem right to export, which was set by Law No. 3719-H of 1974 when 
the tax rate was specified at 13 percent. This rate only lasted eight 
months, because by Executive Decree No. 4431-H of 1974 the tax rate was 
lowered to 1 percent. The tax revenue goes to the central government 
without any specific purpose. Also, the exports of beef have a specific 
tax of $2.98/Mt that goes to the CNP to finance the refrigeration system 
as well as to improve the equipment of the CNP retail outlets. This 
specific tax was established by Law No. 5426 of 1973. 
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Each cattle head that is slaughtered also brings a tax of $1.19, of 
which 50 percent of the revenue goes to local governments to improve 
rural roads, 30 percent of the Education Board of the respective region, 
and the remaining 20 percent is counted as ordinary income by the local 
governments. This tax was set by Law No. 5259 of 1973. Finally, those 
steers that are designated to the export market, support another tax of 
$.004 cents/kgs of liveweight. The revenue is distributed among several 
institutions related to the beef cattle activity. This was established 
by Law No. 5426 of 1973. 
The effects of an export crop tax on the domestic economy can be 
represented as in Figure 2.14. 
An export tax is bias against producers who will suffer a loss in 
income given by the sum of areas a, b, c, d. The domestic consumer, on 
the other hand, will receive a benefit represented by area a. The 
country's exports will be sold at the world price, therefore, the 
government will accrue a tax revenue w^ich is measured by the rectangle 
c. The tax on export products will also leave the country with an 
efficiency loss which is equal to the sum of the triangles b and d. 
Figure 2.14. A tax on export products. 
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CHAPTER III. 
A MULTICOMMODITY EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
The literature on applied demand theory is very rich, as is 
exemplified by the surveys in this field made by Brown and Deaton (14), 
Barten (12), and Theil (69), among others. 
Johnson and Hasson (43) has classified the development of applied 
demand theory based mainly on the way that the parameters have been 
estimated, which reflects the development on the integration of applied 
work and the behavioral assumptions derived from economic theory. He has 
postulated four components: the "Statistical Approaches" is the first 
group, followed by "Statistical Approaches with Restrictions," 
"Statistical Approaches with Restriction on Estimation," and "Tractable 
Static Demand Systems." 
In the first category, the most notable work was done by Moore (53), 
who made a major attempt to combine economic theory and statistical 
techniques in the estimation of several agricultural demand parameters. 
Later, he also introduced the concept of flexibility of price defined as 
the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand. The distinctions of these 
early works were that they reflected a great step forward on the statis­
tical estimation, but with little guidance from the economic theory, no 
more than the price, quantity, and income are the relevant variables for 
estimating the demand function. 
The second category represents the first attempt to introduce some 
of the derived restrictions on the estimation procedure. The major work 
opening the way to these advances in demand analysis can be attributed to 
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Schultz (64), who presented an effort on the application of adjustments 
in the least-squares single-equation fitting of market models based as 
far as possible on the theoretical results of Slusky. 
The works of Wold and Jureen (79) on Paretian demand theory and of 
Stone (68) on the measurement of consumer expenditures consolidated the 
theoretical and empirical work on static demand models (Brown and Deaton, 
14). These two publications mark the beginning of the third generation 
on applied demand works, that is, the "statistical approach with restric­
tion on estimation." Some of the studies in this group start showing the 
idea of directly estimating demand systems, but the estimation methods 
and the restriction imposed to obtain the set of demands were limited. 
With the arrival of more sophisticated statistical techniques, particu­
larly those referring to simultaneous estimation of a set of equations, 
plus further development in economic theory, such as the specification of 
specialized utility functions, and the development and use of the 
separability concept, it was possible to formulate and estimate theoreti­
cally sound demand systems. Hence, we arrive at the fourth generation, 
namely "Tractable Static Demand Systems," where the idea is to estimate a 
system that will obey the restrictions on the consumer allocation problem 
and incorporate specialized behavioral assumptions. Some of the early 
studies on the applications of complete demand systems can be enumerated 
by beginning with the linear expenditure system, which satisfies various 
theoretical restrictions (Stone, 68); then, Frisch (30) developed a 
scheme for computing all price elasticities in a system context, 
Houthakker (40) studied the theoretical and empirical implications of 
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direct and indirect addivity; and Brandow (13) used Frisch's assumption 
of want independence to construct a matrix of price and income 
elasticities for 25 products at retail level. More recently, Caves and 
Christensen (16) and Christensen et al, (18) have proposed the flexible 
functional form vAiich by using the indirect translog function the model 
expands the empirical capabilities of the theory, because it can be 
useful in testing the assumption, such as the additivity of preferences. 
Another type of development that has taken place in the last decade or so 
is the specification of demand systems where the functional forms of the 
set of demand equations is explicitly specified. An example of this 
latter development is the Rotterdam Demand System (Barten, 11), which 
defines the demand system as a set of logarithmic differential equations 
and whose arguments are the set of prices and a measure of real income. 
Finally, the System of Additive Preferences proposed by Powell (59), 
which specifies the system as a set of n linear relations, where the per-
capita expenditure on one commodity is defined as a function of prices, 
total expenditure per-capita, and a variable that counts for changes in 
consumer tastes. These models satisfy some, if not all, of the modern 
behavioral restriction on demand. 
Most of the development found in the theory of applied demand 
systems have also been applied to the theory of production, where much of 
the effort has been aimed to the specification of the production function 
and its implications on the system of derived factor demands. Mundlak 
(54) , with the transcendental multiple-output production function, and 
Powell and Gruen (60) with the constant elasticity transformation 
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multiple output production function, are examples of the former. 
Griliches (32), Welch (78), and Thirsk (70) are examples of applied 
system of derived factor demands. The theory and applications of derived 
supply systems, particularly for the multiple product production 
function, are found in Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (17), and 
Hasenkamp (34). More recently, Clements (19) has made an attempt to 
apply the Rotterdam Model to the estimation of a supply system. 
General equilibrium models, which include demand and supply system 
of equations, can be found in the work of Johnson (41), who analyzed the 
effect of a tariff under self-sufficient policy objective; also, 
Hotelling (39) studies the effect of a tariff, but under different 
assumptions. DeMelo (26) estimated the cost of protection by applying 
the linear expenditure model to the Colombian economy. 
The Supply System 
The purpose of this section is to develop the theoretical framework 
from which a set of aggregate supplies can be derived. This will be 
accomplished by applying the theory of the multiple-output production 
function. Clements (19) has pointed out four major characteristics of 
this type of approach. First, the model allows for joint production, a 
characteristic of technology that cannot be captured by a single-output 
production function. The supply side of the market is represented as a 
system of equations, which will be a more flexible mean for testing and 
applying the different types of market interventions; third, the basic 
structure of the model is symmetric to the system of demand on the 
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consumer side of the market. Then, both systems can be put together, 
leading to a general equilibrium model. 
The model is based on the behavioral characteristics of a single 
firm, where these characteristics are assumed to be common for all the 
firms in the industry. If that industry is the agricultural sector where 
it is common to find farmers producing more than one type of crop, for 
reasons of cash flow, resource conservation, reduction of risk, and some 
others, then, it is not far from reality to assume a single farm 
producing n products and, in the production process, it hires m variable 
inputs, and has an endowment of z fixed or exogenous factor of 
production. The outputs and factor of production linkages can be 
represented by 
i = 1 n 
(3.1) h(Q., X., kJ  = 0 j = 1 m 
which is the implicit form that any type of smooth production technology 
can be represented. 
If one is willing to take no explicit difference between variable 
and fixed factors of production, then, by pooling all together as one 
composite factor of production, the technology representation can be 
rewritten as 
(3.2) g(x) = f[Q.). 
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The functions of g( ) and f( ) are scalar valued and are assumed"' to 
be differentiable of the required order. The function g( ) serves to 
aggregate the variable and fixed factors into a scalar index. Then, to 
simplify the notation, we denote the value of this index by X; then 
(3.3) X = f(Q.]. 
This relationship is a multiple-output production function, which 
gives the maximum feasible output combinations associated with the 
composite factor X. In the output space, given the level of the 
aggregate factor, the relationship (3.3) denotes a transformation 
surface, where, holding all outputs constant except one, this transforma­
tion surface gives the maximum amount that can be produced of the 
remaining output. The negative of the slope of this curve is called the 
marginal rate of transformation between a pair of products, which 
describes the ease that the resources used in the production of one can 
be transferred to the production of the other. This coefficient is given 
by 
(3-4) - 3q^ =-afTao: > ^ k = 1 n. 
Writing equation (3.1) in the form of (3.3) implies a strong separability 
assumption on the technology; that is, f(qu) is strongly separable from 
X, which means that all marginal rate of transformations [MRt. ) are 
L , K 
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independent of the level of X. Although the restrictions involved in 
this transformation do not represent the most general case, we will work 
with them mainly because it yields tractable results and the data 
requirements on quantities and prices of the factors of production are 
not generally available. 
The system of supply equations will be derived under the assumption 
that a competitive firm maximizes revenue given its transformation 
technology constraint. The microeconomic theory indicates that, in such 
a system, the price of outputs are given to the individual firm under the 
competitive market assumption, which implies that the firms know with 
certainty the set of prices that they will receive for their products, 
and also the theory implicitly indicates that firms react in a simulta­
neous way to the contemporary set of prices. But, in the real world, 
that is not always the case, especially in agricultural production, where 
prices are not so stable and the production process itself is constrained 
by biological factors. In view of this, we will assume that farmers 
react to expected prices instead of actual current prices, where the firm 
forms its expectations through an adaptive process. 
Keeping this in mind, the maximization problem can be formulated by 
using the Lagrangian technique 
(3.5) L = + PgQg + ... + + A[x-f(Qj] 
where 
P. = expected price of the ith output, 
= ith output, 
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A = Lagrangian coefficient, and 
X = composite factor. 
Solving the Lagrangian equation with respect to the exogenous 
variables (P^, X), one obtains the first order conditions (F.O.C.) for a 
maximization problem 
(3.6) - Xf^ = 0 
P^ - Xf^ = 0 
P - Xf =0 
n n 
X - f(Q.) = 0 
where f^ denotes the first derivative of f( ) with respect to the ith 
argument. 
The F.O.C. imply that in equilibrium, the marginal resource require­
ment must be proportional to the expected prices where the propor­
tionality factor is X. Also, from the F.O.C. we can obtain the condition 
that at equilibrium the MRT^ ^  is equal to the price ratio 
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The Lagrangian multiplier in this case represents the marginal 
revenue product of X, since, at equilibrium, 
(3.8) 
where R denotes the revenue function. 
The same marginal revenue product of X can be interpreted also as 
the shadow price of the composite factor, for we have from the F.O.C. 
By applying the inverse function rule, we know 
SQ; 1 
(3.10) —= -g— , i — 1 ... n. 
i 
Substituting 
3q aq 30 
(3.11) ^ = Pi -5x = ^2 ~5x " " ^n ~3x ' 
which says that the value of the marginal product of the composite factor 
(VMP^) must be equal to X. At the same time, we know from profit 
maximization that the firm will use the input factor up to the point 
where the VMP^ is equal to the factor price, thus leading to the 
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conclusion that X reflects the shadow price of that factor. Another 
interesting interpretation of X under the assumption of linear homoge­
neous production function, and for that matter, a long-run character­
istic, it is that A is also the average revenue product of the aggregate 
factor 
o . u ,  =  I  =  
By applying the F.O.C. and the Euler theorem, 
(3.13) 
Also, from the F.O.C. we can obtain the system of derived supplies and 
factor demand by applying the implicit function theorem; then, 
(3.14) = Q^(P^, PG, ... P^, X] 
"2 • QzO?!' 'z' ••• x) 
4. - '2- V ==) 
^2' "• ^n' 
These derived functions are homogeneous of zero degree in output prices 
(Silberberg, 67). 
Up to this point, the theory presented refers to a single firm 
supply; but for all practical purposes vrtiat we need is the market supply 
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for the different commodities. Following the lines of Just et al. (44), 
such a market supply is obtained by the horizontal summation of the 
individual firm supplies. By assuming perfect competition and the same 
technology for all firms, the change in producer surplus associated with 
a market supply curve has a willingness to pay interpretation. 
Following Thirsk (70) and Van de Wetering (74) in looking for a more 
explicit form of the system (3.14), we differentiate each of the implicit 
functions with respect to the parameters 
dQ, dP dP dP 
(3.15) + «12 ^  + ^In -r + ^IX "X 
% !!2. . dX 
Qg ®21 P^ ®22 ®2n P^ ®2X X 
" ®nl P^ ®n2 P^ ®nn P_ ®nX X 
n 
5. . ffn. dX 
P^ ®PX1 P^ ®PX2 P^ "• ®Pxn P^ ®PXX X 
where 
e.j = supply elasticity with respect to jth price (i, j=l ... n), 
e^^ = output factor elasticity (i=l ... n), 
= factor demand elasticity with respect to output prices 
(j=l ... n), and 
Bpxx = factor demand flexibility. 
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Letting the prices vary in turn and since the F.O.C. holds for any 
set of prices, then the effects on supply from these changes are obtained 
by total differentiation of the FOC. 
(3.16) 
0 f. 
f, f 
1 11 12 
^2 ^21 ^22 
^n ^nl ^n2 
"In 
2n 
nn 
dP, 
dQ^ 
dP, 
dP, 
5  
dP„ 
dQ2 
dP„ 
dP„ 
1 1 
5 
dP 
dP 
dP 
dQ, 
dQ. 
dQ 
0  0  . . .  0  0  
1/P^ 0 ... 0 Q 
0 1/P% ... 0 0 
0 0 . . . 1/P^ 0 
If the second order conditions (SOC) are satisfied, then the 
principal minors of the bordered Hessian (BH) matrix alternate in signs 
(Henderson and Quandt, 36). 
97 
Following Allen (2), we define 
F = determinant of the BH matrix, 
FQ = cofactor of the element 0 in F, 
F.. = cofactor of the element f.. in F, and 
FQ. = cofactor of the element j. 
Then, the partial elasticity of substitution 
.1 ^i^i F.. 
(3-17) ^ij ''ji ^=1 ••• 
equation (3.17) can be interpreted in the following way (Thirsk, 70). If 
CJ^^>1, then a one percent increase in the output price ratio (P^/P.) will 
cause a larger than one percent increase in the ratio of output j to 
output i, and the share of output j on total income will rise. 
Holding the level of prices and the composite factor constant, 
except for one price, then the system (3.16) can be solved by applying 
Cramer's rule 
8Q. P. 
(3.18) e. . = * ?r^ = k. a.. (ifj=l ... n). 
i j  Or^  J  I J  
In the case of own price elasticity, the (3.18) becomes 
(3.19) e.. = -k.a.., 
11 1 11 
since, by  SOC, the term is negative (Allen, 2), 
98 
In the last two equations, the term stands for the share of the 
ith output in total income; that is 
P,Qi 
(3.20) k. = 
1 K. 
i = 1 ... n, 
such as 
n 
(3.21) I k. = 1, 
i=l 
which is true in the long-run scenario or under the assumption of linear 
homogeneity (Vazquez and Pau, 77; Allen, 2). We already know that = 
P/X = X which also implies 
Equation (3.18) indicates that the partial price elasticity of the 
derived supply is proportional to the partial elasticity of substitution, 
where the proportionality factor is the share of the ith output on total 
income. Therefore, the product whose price increased it becomes more 
profitable than the others and it pays to substitute it for the others in 
(3.22) E . PjX . + ... * 
Therefore, we can rewrite (2.20) as 
f.Q. 
(3.23) kj, = (i = 1 ... n). 
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production The effect on the supply of the other outputs will 
depend on the sign of the cross partial elasticity of substitution (ouj); 
hence, we have two possibilities. First, if > 0, then the supply of 
the ith product will increase, which implies that the pair of products 
are complementary in production. On the other hand, if < 0, the 
supply of the ith output will decrease; thus, the jth commodity is a 
substitute for the ith product on production. 
The partial elasticities of substitution are not independent from 
each other, in fact, there is a series of interesting relationships that 
set a series of constraints or restrictions on them. Allen (2) has 
demonstrated that 
( 3 . 2 4 )  K J O . .  -
n 
But, also note that T f.F.. = 0, since it is the product of f. by an 
J ij ' J 
Allen cofactor. Thus, by adding (3.24) throughout the set of 
commodities, we have 
n 
(3.25) I k.a.. = 0, 
j=l ^ 
which indicates that the weighted sum of the partial elasticities of 
substitution for the ith quantity supply is equal to zero, in other words 
the homogeneity assumption. By applying (3.18) and (3.19) we can express 
(3.25) in terms of elasticities 
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n 
(3.26) I e. . = 0 i,j=l ... n. 
j=l 
Since e.. < 0, then we have 
11 
n 
(3.27) I e.. > G ifj=l ... n, 
j=l 
which implies that the cross price elasticities of supply could be 
positive or negative, but not all can be negative. In other words, not 
all products can be substituted on production. 
Another interesting restriction comes from the symmetric condition 
of the partial elasticities of substitution. From (3.17), we know that 
by using (3.18) and multipling by the shares of the products 
in question then 
(3.28) k.e.. = k.e.. i^i=l ... n, 
1 J 
which is known as the symmetric condition. Substituting equality (3.28) 
into equality (3.26) and multipling by k^, we get another set of 
restrictions : 
m 
(3.29) 5] k.e.. = 0 j=l ... n. 
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So, for a given commodity, the weighted sum of the own effect and the 
effects caused on the other commodities by a change in its price should 
be equal to zero. 
The output-factor elasticity, or the percentage change in the supply 
of the ith commodity resulting from one percentage change in the 
composite factor, holding the set of output prices constant is given by 
(3.30) e.^ =< 0. 
The see does not determine the sign of this elasticity. But, if we 
apply the same definition that Hicks (38) used to classify the factor of 
production, then we may say that an output is inferior if its output 
supply decreases when factor usage increases at constant output prices. 
In other words, outputs can be classified as normal or inferior, 
according to vrtiether their factor elasticity of supply is positive or 
negative. Even though, from (3.23) and (3.30), we obtain 
(3.31) kj,e^^ = f^ —^ i=l ... n. 
n 
but, since % ~ then we get the aggregation condition 
i=l ^ 
n 
(3.32) I k.e. = 1 (i=l ... n) 
i=l ^ 
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Equation (3.30) has a specific value under the assumption of linear 
homogeneity, since under this assumption one can show by using Allen 
methodology 
(3.33) F„. =f-k.. 
1 
which, by applying above equation on (3.30) jointly with (3.23), we get 
(3.34) e^^ = 1 i=l ... n. 
The above equation states that a percentage increase in the level of the 
aggregate factor will increase the output supply of each of the 
commodities in the same proportion. So, this condition rules out the 
possibility of inferior goods. 
The output price elasticity of the factor demand can be estimated by 
using Cramer's rule on the system (3.16); then. 
(3.35) ^  ^ i-l ... n. 
i X X 
But, since F._ = Q.F, then 
lO 1 
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In elasticity form and by applying (3.22), then (3.36) can be rewritten 
aPx Pi 
(3.37) — ' •^= 'k. i=l ... n, 
i X ^ 
which says that one percent increase in any commodity price will increase 
its corresponding revenue share by the same percent. 
The effect on the shadow price of the aggregate factor of one 
percent increase on the level of the same factor is given by 
(3.38) 
It is equal to zero by the assumption of linear homogenous production 
function. This also implies that the price elasticity of the composite 
factor is perfectly elastic; thus, 
(3.39) = X "• 
Now, we are in a position to rewrite the system (3.16) in a more 
tractable way by applying the equations and identities defined in this 
section. So, we have 
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dQ dP^ dP 
= -kl*ll ^  " ^2*12 + • 
dP^ 
• • + ~ + IT 
n 
dQ, dP dP^ 
-Qj = ^ 1^21 -P7 - ^ 2°22^ •• • " \°2n -f- + f 
n 
(3.40) 
dPi dP dP 
Q- ^ ^l®nl -P: + ^2"'n2 ^  ^ " ^n°nn ~ * T 
n 1 2 n 
dP dP dP dP 
' .F 
since the system of derived supply equations has been established in 
a tractable empirical way, then our interest turns to the development of 
the demand system, so we can form a general equilibrium model. 
The Demand System 
The system of demand equations is deduced by applying the theory of 
consumer behavior which jointly with the theoretical assumptions 
specialize the structure of the problem. These assumptions are in 
general used for empirical purposes. That is, they are thought to be a 
plausible set of restrictions which, when imposed, result in a demand 
system that can be estimated using time series data in prices and income 
and consumption levels. To understand the behavioral implications as 
well as empirical implications of the restrictions, it is important to 
know the basics of the consumer theory. 
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This section presents a general review of the consumer theory 
following the lines of Hassan and Johnson (35) and Goldberger (31), with 
the main purpose of deriving the standard testable assumptions from the 
theory, since they will be used to verify if the demand system is in 
accordance with the theoretical model. 
The assumptions about the consumer behavior are introduced into the 
theory of consumer demand through the specification of a utility 
function, which represents the level of satisfaction that an individual 
receives as a result of consuming a bundle of goods and services per unit 
of time. The utility function is denoted by 
(3.41) U = U(q) 
where q = [q^ ] denotes a vector of n-elements representing the quantity 
purchased of the ith commodity per unit of time. The standard 
assumptions about the utility function such as strictly increasing, 
strictly quasi-concave and twice differentiable are also assumed in this 
study. 
The utility function is maximized subject to a budget constraint 
(3.42) Y = p'q. 
where p is an n-column vector of givea prices and y is the given consumer 
income; this constraint states that all the available income is spent on 
the commodities chosen by the individual. 
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The constrained maximization of U=U(q) subject to y=p'q may be 
carried out with the aid of the Lagrangian multiplier. Thus, it can be 
formulated as 
(3.43) U(q, A) = U(q) - ^(p'q-y), 
where X is the Lagrangian multiplier. Differentiating this equation with 
respect to the arguments (q, X), we obtain the FCC 
3n (3.44) Û = "â— = Uq - Ap = 0 q 3q 
9Û 
=-9L = P 4-y = 0, 
which represent the set of n+1 FOC in N+1 unknown parameters (p, X). 
These conditions ensure a global maximum by the negative definite of the 
Hessian matrix (U) 
"ll "l2 "in 
(3.45) U = 
"21 "22 "2n 
i=j=l ... n 
"nl 
CM U 
nn 
3Ui 
where U.. = represents the rate of change of the marginal utility of 
the ith commodity with respect to changes in the quantity consumed of the 
jth good. By applying the implicit function theorem, the system (3.44) 
can be solved uniquely for the q^ and A; then, 
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(3.46) = q^(p^ ... p^, y) 
X = X[p^ ... p^, y). 
The demand function (3.46) denotes the quantity demanded of the ith 
good as a function of all prices and income. Showing as well that the 
marginal utility of income (X), how the consumer evaluates changes on 
income, is governed by the set of commodity prices and the existing 
income level. 
When a particular functional form is specified for the utility 
function, then one may be able to obtain an explicit functional form for 
the set of demand functions. However, general features can be identified 
regardless of the specific functional form of the utility function. 
Those features can be obtained by considering the consequences of 
parametric shifts in the FOC. Since we are mainly concerned with the 
theoretical restrictions on the elasticities of demand, these general 
features will be presented directly in elasticity form. Let us define 
first 
(3.47) H = q ^QpP 
be an nxn matrix of direction cross price elasticities of demand, and q, 
p are nxn diagonal matrix of quantitites and prices, respectively; and, 
finally, is an nxn matrix with the ith row given by the derivatives of 
the demand function for the ith commodity with respect to each of the n 
prices. In scalar terras, equation (3.47) would be 
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Sq. P: 
(3.48) T),, - -T— • —^ i,j=l ... n. ij 3p; q,-
J 1 
The income elasticity of demand will be represented by an n-column vector 
of the form 
(3.49) n = yq . y y 
is an n-component vector with elements defined as the partial 
derivatives of the n-deraand functions with respect to income. In more 
familiar terms, the income elasticity is given 
\ V (3.50) n. = . 
ly 3y q^ 
Another useful expression that we will need in subsequent derivations is 
the expenditure proportion, or the proportion of income that the consume: 
spent on each commodity. This expenditure share is represented by an n-
elements column vector 
- 1 - 1  (3.51) w = y pq = y qp. 
for a specific commodity (3.51) is then 
-1 P q. 
(3.52) w. = y (p.q.) = ^ ^ i=l ... n. 
1 y 
109 
Since the budget shares should sum to one then it is useful to define an 
n-elements column vector of ones 
(3.53) V = [1 ... 1]. 
With these definitions on hand, we can obtain the behavioral 
restrictions of the demand function. The Engel aggregation condition may 
be obtained by differentiating budget constraint with respect to income, 
which can be expressed in matrix-elasticity form as 
(3.54) w'Tiy = (y S'q)(yq ^Qy) 
P'Q„ 
= 1 
or 
I w. n = 1, 
i=l 1 ly 
The Engel aggregation condition states that the weighted sum of the 
income elasticities should be equal to one. This condition just imposes 
one constraint on the system. 
The second restraint is the Cournot condition, which is also 
obtained by differentiating the budget constraint with respect to the ith 
price. 
or 
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(3.55) H'w = (pQp q ^)[y ^qp) 
- 1  
= y PQpP 
= y ^p(-q) 
= -w 
n 
I w. n.. = -w. (j=l ... n) 
i=l 1 ij J 
In the most common notation, the Cournot condition states that the 
weighted sum of the own and cross price elasticities with respect to a 
change in the jth price should be equal to the negative of the 
expenditure share on the same jth commodity. This condition imposes n-
constraints on the system, one for each price. 
The homogeneity condition may be derived by differentiating the 
demand equation with respect to its arguments; then. 
(3.56) = q IpppA 
= q'^QpP 
q ^(-Q„y) 
= -n 
y 
or 
n 
I n.. = -n. (j=l ... n) 
j = l ^ ' 
Ill 
This condition implies that the consumer does not present money illusion; 
that is, the purchase decisions are made on the basis of relative prices 
and income. Another way of explaining the homogeneity conditions which 
is one of the most common in the economic literature is that the demand 
function is homogenous of degree zero in prices and income. It is safe 
to say that, for an equal proportional increase in all prices and income, 
the quantities consumed will remain unchanged. This condition by itself 
imposes n-restrictions on the model, one for each equation. 
The last condition implicit in the FOC that will be obtained is the 
symmetric condition, which is based on the symmetric characteristics of 
the Hessian matrix (U). In matrix-elasticity notation, we have 
(3.57) w[H+n w') = [H'+wn' )w 
y y 
= [pQpq ^ + (y ^pq](yQyq ^}]y \p 
= y ^P(Q' + qQ')p 
r J 
= y ^p(Qp + Qyq' )P 
W(H + T1 w' ) y 
or 
w. (n.. + n. w.] = w.(n.. + n. w.1 (ifj=i ... n). 1 ij ly J ] jy 1 
Note that w stands for an nxn diagonal matrix of expenditure shares. 
This condition indicates that the compensated cross price elasticities 
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should be the same. The number of restrictions implied by this condition 
are (n^-n)/2 one for each combination of two commodities. 
By total differentiation of the demand equations (3.46), we have 
(3.58) dq = Qydy + Q^dp, 
which can be rewritten in terms of logarithmic differentials and 
elasticities as 
(3.59) d log q = n^[d log y) + H(d log p). 
By premultiplying (3.58) by q \ then 
(3.60) q ^dq = q ^Q^dy + q ^Q^dp 
= (q ^Qyy) * (y ^dy) + (q ^QPP) *  (P ^^P),  
which is exactly the same as (3.59). Thus, (3.60) in scalar terms would 
be 
dq. , n dp. 
(3.61) = T). —^ + J n.. —— (i, j=l ... n). 
QI ly y IJ PJ 
We can see from (3.61) that the general type of demand functions may be 
expressed in a more explicit way by using the concept of elasticity. 
As was the case for the supply side, we have to move from the 
individual level to the market level. This movement can be done by 
defining the market demand of a commodity as the horizontal summation of 
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the individual consumer demands, who face the same market price. The 
aggregation also assumes identical and homothetic preferences, which 
leads to equal weights for welfare purpose (Just et al., 44). 
Silberberg (67) has expressed that Slusky equation in elasticity 
form as 
where m denotes the Marshallian type of price elasticity (money income 
held constant) and c stands for the compensated or Hicks price elasticity 
(real income held constant). Further, it is well-recognized (Currie et 
al., 25) that for welfare analysis the proper demand function to be 
defined is the Hicks-compensated one. Therefore, and by applying this 
relationship between elasticities to the ordinary demand (3.61), we are 
able to obtain the Hicks-compensated demand equation. For example, let 
us take just one commodity then 
(3 .62)  r i .T  =  n .?  -  w.  n .  
J ly 
In n ly-' P 
n 
dP 
c n 
• -FJ ^y 
dP 
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where the last terra of the right hand side is equal to zero by the 
definition of the budget constraint. Thus, the set of compensated demand 
equations would be represented by 
This is the type of demand that we will carry out throughout the analysis 
on this research. 
Having described the system of demand and supply equations, then the 
multicommodity equilibrium model is almost complete; what we need to 
define is the supply of the composite factor. For our purpose, the 
supply of the aggregate factor of production will be considered as 
perfect inelastic, implying that it does not react to changes of its own 
price. This assumption is justified on the grounds of lack of informa­
tion to be able to estimate it. At the same time, we recognize the 
shortages imposed by this assumption. Van de Metering (74) has indicated 
that this type of assumption is not a satisfactory one, since it 
implicitly assumes that production and consumption react more quickly to 
changes in the system than the factor supply. Also, the lack of respon­
siveness of the factor supply does not eliminate the possibility of 
shifting it by changes in commodity prices and factor income. Finally, 
we also are aware that the welfare results will be different under more 
price-responsiveness of the factor supply. 
( 3 . 6 4 )  — I  n . ?  ( i , j = l  . . .  n ) .  
9: ;-i *^4 
dq. n dP. 
1 V _ c 1 
i j=l "J J 
The Multicommodity Equilibrium System 
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Another point to mention is the relationship between expected and 
the actual prices. The multiproduct equilibrium model to be developed in 
this section assumes complete certainty by all the economic units 
involved. The role that the expected prices account for is the short-run 
inflexibilities on production or technology, and it is asumed that on 
average the expected prices are equal to the actual prices. 
With these two points in mind and assuming equilibrium in any of the 
markets, we can pull together the demand and supply systems and build a 
multicommodity equilibrium model with n+1 equations and n+1 unknowns 
(P^,P^), which in a matrix form would be 
(3.65) 
4?! dP 
n dX 
?! 
^2 • ^x 
X 
(rill ^ h°ll^ (ni2 - • • ("i. - "n-iJ 0 1 
(ri2i - kiOgi) ^^22 ^2°22^' * • ("2n - 0 1 
1 
•
 
•
 
• (v."..) 0 1 
->^2 . . . -k n 
1 0 
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The determinant of the endogenous variables is not singular, since, 
by a property of them (Pasinetti, 58), we know 
(3.66) | n _-e_ \ *  | n .j H e -  I -
Besides knowing that the determinant of each individual system of 
compensated function are singular by the homogeneity assumption, this 
nonsingularity property allows us to analyze the effects of market 
distortions on the system by using absolute prices instead of relative 
ones. These types of models have been used by Johnson (41) and Hotelling 
(39) in analyzing the effects of market distortions. 
Some market interventions will break the equilibrium conditions. 
Such is the case of controlled price policies. In this case, one of the 
equations describing the market in consideration has to be deleted from 
Che system (3.65). That equation will depend on the type of policy 
intervention, if the price paid by consumers is the controlled variable, 
then the equation to be disregarded would be the demand for such a 
product. On the other hand, if the price received by farmers is the 
policy variable, then the supply equation is the one to be eliminated. 
Other types of policy intervention do not prevent the equilibrium 
condition to hold, such as the case of taxes, even though transformation 
in some of the variables is required. The model allows us to estimate 
the effects on the rest of the endogenous variables by a change in the 
policy variable, but carefully keeping in mind that it is held constant. 
These estimates will be called total elasticities coefficients (Van de 
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Watering, 75), since they reflect all the market adjustment after the 
change in the policy variable. For example, if one of the n+1 endogenous 
variables (z^) is selected as a policy variable [z^), then, by applying 
Cramer's Rule on the system (3.65), we can obtain the total elasticity 
coefficient : 
|z. 1 
(3.67) E = (ifj=l ... n+1), 
z.z. Û 
1 J 
where |z^ | stands for the cofactor of the target variable and A is the 
determinant of the resulting matrix of endogenous variables. 
Furthermore, by taking an additional variable as exogenous (z^j, we can 
obtain the following elasticities. 
(3.68) E 
=i=j A 
z 
... n+1) 
:  - " i  
A 
z. 
The determinants in (3.67) and (3.68) are not the same, since different 
variables are held constant. The above elasticities may be called 
partial total elasticities, since they rule out a market induced 
adjustment in what was initially an endogenous variable. 
The last point, but not the least important, that we want to mention 
is the model stability of equilibrium. Allen (2) has worked out the 
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conditions of stability for a closed general market equilibrium. In our 
case, those conditions should be taken as guidelines since we do not have 
a closed system. Nevertheless, we think that they will provide useful 
results in considering the stability of the model. 
Consider the case of n commodities markets, with the last one being 
numeraire [p^=l) and the rest of the prices are determined in market 
equilibirum by the excess supply equations (n-1) of the form 
(3.69) S. - D. = y. - (X.-X. ) = 0 i=l ... n-1 
1 1 •' L 1 l' 
where S^=y^ stands for the net quantity produced by the economy of the 
ith commodity. = (X^-X^) represents the net demand of the ith 
product. Here, y^ and are functions of all prices and X^ is the 
initial endowment which is given. 
The equilibrium is stable if all prices, once disturbed, tend to 
return to their equilibrium values over time. Therefore, the stability 
condition can only be expressed in terms of a specified dynamic model of 
interrelated markets. Allen (2), taking from Samuelson (63), has 
indicated that the dynamic model for a system of interrelated marked 
follows the Walrasian dynamic condition, vrtiich can be expressed as 
dP. 
(3.70) -u. [Sj^ - Dj, ] i=l ... n-1 
where u^ indicates the speed of adjustment on the several markets and 
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is given by (3.60). Writing and as linear functions in all 
prices then (3.69) can be restated as 
n-1 
(3.71) S .  -  D .  = a. + ^ a..P. i, i=l ... n-1 
1  1  ^  i j  J  
In the above equation, ct. is the constant term and the coefficients a.. 
10 ij 
represent the equilibrium value of the excess supply equation which can 
be expressed as follows 
g 3Y. 9X. 
(3.72) a 
J J J 
The dynamic condition (3.70) then can be rewritten as 
dP. 
(3.73) = -u^ I Pj i, j=l ... n-1 
Assuming that all the speed of adjustment are equal to one, then we 
have 
dP. 
(3.74) --^+ I a.. P. = 0 i, j=l ... n-1 
j 
These equations are to be solved for the paths of P^ over time, which is 
given by 
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n-1 X.t 
(3.75) P. = 1 A., i=l ... n-1 
1 j=l 
where X is a constant to be found and the A's are also constant but given 
by the initial disturbance. Substitute in (3.74) we have 
(3.76) )^(a..-X6..] = |a..-X6.. 
j ij ij ' iJ iJ 
aii-X a^2 ln-1 
21 
^22 ^ *2n-l 
^n-1,1 ^n-1,2 ^n-1,n-l ^ 
where 6^. is the kronecker delta. This system of homogenous equations 
must be satisfied by some nonzero set of A's so that (3.75) holds. 
The value of the X's are given by (3.75) which are the same as the 
characteristic roots of the matrix A = [a^^]. 
The equilibrium condition (3.69) is stable on the dynamic model 
(3.70) if the path of each price, given by (3.75), is such that 
P^—> 0 as t —> This is possible only if all the characteristic roots 
(Xj) are positives. A negative and real X introduces a steadily 
explosive terra. A particular case arises when the matrix A = [a^^ ] is 
symmetricUnder these characteristics, all the principal minors of A 
will have a real latent root and the symmetric discriminant A=|a^j | is 
^A symmetric matrix can be obtained by using compensated slopes or 
by neglecting the income effect as Hicks assumed. 
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positive definite, thus all the principal minors are also positive. It 
is under this specific circumstance that the Walrasian stability 
condition (all characteristic roots being positive) is the same as the 
Hicks stability condition (all principal minors are positive). If 
symmetry is lacking all that one can say about stability is that the 
roots (X) must be all positives. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR APPLIED WELFARE ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we are going to define the different concepts that 
are used in the welfare analysis of the different market interventions, 
basically concepts such as consumer and producer surplus. Even though 
the main focus of this discussion will be placed on the relationship 
between the different definitions of those concepts, and the market 
demand and supply functions. 
The Consumer Surplus 
Consumers' surplus is the mean used in applied empirical work to 
measure the consumer welfare and it is defined as the area under the 
demand curve and above the price line. There are at least two reasons 
why the change in consumer surplus is a good approximation to the change 
in the consumer welfare (Currie et al., 25): it represents the sum of 
cost differences as the price of the commodity is reduced (Hicks 
approach) and second, it also represents the change between what the 
consumer is willing to pay and what he actually paid (Dupuit approach). 
But, what this area really means has been the focus of a great discussion 
in the economic literature. The consumer surplus as an income-equivalent 
measure presents the problem that is not unique when we have simultaneous 
price-income or multiple price changes because of the path-dependent 
problem (Just et al., 44). That is, the change in surplus from the 
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sequence price-income is not the same as the change from the income-price 
sequence. 
The consumer surplus measure may be unique under strong restrictions 
on the consumer preferences. In the case of price-income sequence, the 
change in surplus will be unique only if the income effect is null, and, 
in the case of multiple price change, the uniqueness condition is 
satisfied under the restriction that all income elasticities are equal to 
one. However, for a change in a subset of prices, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the change in consumer's surplus being unique is 
that all the income elasticities must be equal, but not necessarily equal 
to one (Just et al., 44). Another important restriction on the consumer 
surplus as an income-equivalent measure is that it does not measure the 
true change in utility or standard of living of the consumer, just in the 
case when the marginal utility of income is constant. We want to 
emphasize that, in order to have a meaningful measure of the change in 
utility by using the concept of consumer's surplus, the latter condition 
should be satisfied, which also implies uniqueness. This relationship 
between these two problems is unidirectional, since uniqueness does not 
imply constancy of the marginal utility.^ 
The economists, for all the above restrictions imposed on the 
consumer behavior, have developed alternative measures, which are not so 
stringent. Hicks (37) was one of the first to come up with such alterna­
tives. He developed two concepts that are unique (path-independence) and 
^For mathematical proof, see Appendix B in Just et al. (44). 
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ordinarily related to utility (Just et al., 44). The first one is the 
compensating variation, which is the amount of income that must be taken 
away from the consumer after a price change such as the consumer is left 
in the original utility level. Equivalent variation is the second 
concept; it is the amount of income that must be given to the consumer in 
view of a price change, such as the individual is as well off as with the 
price change. 
In order to apply these two concepts in empirical work, we have to 
define the differences between the Marshallian (ordinary) demand and the 
Hicksian (compensated) demand curve. The former gives the relation 
between quantities demanded and different levels of price, holding money 
income constant by varying the level of utility or real income. On the 
other hand, the Hicksian demand gives the same relationship, but holding 
constant the levels of utility by allowing the money income to change. 
The relationship between these two demand curves and the welfare 
mesurement related to them are described in Figure 4.1. 
At the initial peint [p^, both curves the Marshallian demand 
[D'") and the compensated demand [D^) cross to each other. For a price 
decrease, the lies below and to the left of the ordinary demand curve, 
and for a price increase, the reverse is true. If the market price is 
reduced to P^, the quantity demanded according with would be Q^, which 
implicitly accounts for the income effect making the consumer able to 
obtain a higher utility level or standard of living. This change is 
represented by the areas a+b, which is called the ordinary consumer's 
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P 2 
Q Q 
Figure 4.1. Relationship between the Marshallian and Hicksian demand 
curves 
surplus change. For the same reduction in price, the quantity demanded 
along is , which is lower than , reflecting the adjustment in 
money income (in this case taking away from the consumer) so that the 
consumer is left at the original utility level represented by . Thus, 
the change in the Hicksian consumer's surplus or compensated variation is 
given by the area a. 
The third measure or equivalent variation indicates how much income 
the consumer is willing to accept for not taking a price decrease but 
which will allow him to reach the same utility level as it would be by 
letting the price fall. This measure is represented by the areas a+b+c 
under the compensated demand 
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The ordinary consumer's surplus is bounded from the left by the 
compensating variation and from the right by the equivalent variation for 
a price decrease as it is deducted from Figure 4.1. To this respect, 
Hicks (37) indicated that, in some circumstances, we can accept the 
Marshallian measure of the consumer welfare as a good approximation for 
the true change in welfare. This can be done when the income share of 
the good in question is small or what is the same as low income elas­
ticity. Therefore, areas b or c could be omitted under this particular 
assumption. 
The Producer's Surplus 
The most immediately appealing measure of producer welfare under 
profits maximization is the profit itself, where profits is defined as 
total revenue minus total cost. The problem with this type of measure is 
the lack of symmetry in the sense that it will not measure the true 
welfare change of a forced shutdown of a firm by a price decrease (Just 
et al., 44). Alfred Marshall (50) defined the producer surplus as 
. . . the excess of the gross receipts which a producer gets for any 
of his commodities over their prime cost, that is over the extra 
cost which he incurs in order to produce those things and which he 
could have escaped if he had not produced them. 
He also indicates that the measurement of this surplus is the area above 
the supply curve and below the price line. But, further developments in 
this field have shown that careful consideration has to be taken on the 
economic meaning of the area described by Marshall as producer surplus. 
For two points have to be clearly defined, what producer means and the 
time horizon. If producers are defined as the owner of the firm, where 
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firms stand for units producing intermediate or final goods, then the 
short-run supply of a profit maximization firm will be that portion of 
its marginal curve which is above its average cost curve. Then, by 
definition of short-run, one or more factors of production are fixed to 
the firm and by the assumption of competitive markets in both inputs and 
outputs, the area described by Marshall will, in fact, measure the 
producer welfare as measured by the producer's surplus or quasi-rent^ 
since they reflect the rent accruing to them as the owners of those fixed 
factors and under this characteristic the producer's surplus or quasi-
rent measurement are exactly the same to both the compensating variation 
and equivalent variation as willingness to pay measurements (Just et al., 
44). 
The short-run industry supply, which is the horizontal summation of 
the individual firm's supplies, the area above such a curve and below the 
price line reflects the aggregate quasi-rent received by the firms only 
in the case when the supplies of the variable factors of production are 
considered perfect elastic; in other words, the industry itself is 
considered a price taker in the variable input markets. In the long-run, 
the industry supply represents the locus of minimum average cost, since 
each firm in the industry is producing at its minimum average cost; thus, 
total revenue equals total expenses, meaning that the quasi-rent variable 
vanishes in the long run. Therefore, the relevant area under the long-
run industry supply does not have any meaning in economic welfare (Currie 
^Quasi-rent is defined as total revenue less total variable cost. 
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et al., 25) so, the producer surplus concept under the definition of a 
producer as the owner of the firm is pretty much a short-run concept. 
If the producer is defined as the owner of factor of production, 
then the relevant area above the long-run industry supply would have 
meaning in terms of producer welfare, only if this supply curve 
represents an average cost including economic rent^ and, at the same 
time, reflects a marginal cost curve excluding the economic rent (Mishan, 
52). He also has pointed out that these characteristics are possible 
only in those cases where the rent is accrued only by a fixed single 
factor and the rest of them have a perfect elastic supply. Some examples 
indicated by them where the required characteristics of the long-run 
industry supply are met are the Ricardian model of economic rent to land. 
Another is drawn from Robinson (61), where a necessary input is 
considered almost price inelastic and the rest of factors of production 
are price elastic. In these cases, the area above the industry supply 
represents the rent to the owners of the fixed factor. Finally, Just et 
al. (44) have analyzed in detail the case of consumer-resource owners, 
where the individual maximizes his utility given the set of prices for 
his initial endowment and the set of prices of the consumption 
commodities; and, in this case also, the relevant area above the long-run 
industry supply has economic meaning, 
^The classical definition of economic rent is the payment of a 
factor of production over and above the minimum necessary to induce it to 
do its work (Currie et al., 25). 
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Multicommodity Equilibrium and Welfare Measurements 
Under this section, we will analyze the relationship between the 
ordinary or compensated market demand and supply curves with the 
multicommodity equilibrium demand and supply schedules, as well as the 
relation and economic meaning of the areas behind those curves. 
The market demand (supply) curve gives the different quantities 
demanded (supplied) at different prices holding all other prices 
constant. This is true whenever we are talking about ordinary or 
compensated market curves. On the other hand, the derived equilibrium 
demand (supply) gives the quantity demanded (supplied) at different 
levels of its own price, but after allowing equilibrium adjustment in all 
other related markets. 
Before going on, we have to mention that the theoretical analysis 
that will be presented, pretty much follows the exposition made by Van de 
Metering (76), where he proved the interesting conclusion that the net 
social welfare effect over the economy as a whole of an intervention in 
any single market can be measured completely in that market using 
equilibrium supply and demand curves of sufficient generality. In those 
instances where the welfare economist is more interested with overall 
effects, this conclusion saves him a lot of time and resources, since he 
does not have to go through all related markets measuring the welfare 
effects caused by a single market distortion. 
The way that we are going to pursue the analysis will be to divide 
the economy in its two major components, the demand side and the supply 
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side. For each one, we will establish the required theoretical 
background necessary to prove the relations between the areas enclosed by 
the demand and supply curves. Once the analysis has been carried out for 
both sides of the economy, we will pull them together and obtain the 
relationship between areas under a general equilibrium framework. 
The Welfare Analysis of the Producer Side 
We will restate the firm maximization problem developed in 
Chapter 3, with the idea of formally developing the willingness to pay 
measurements and their relations among the different markets. For we are 
most interested in the dual properties of the model. 
We will carry on all the basic assumptions of the model; that is, a 
revenue maximization firm which uses in the production process a single 
aggregate input and which is constrained by the technology represented by 
the implicit production function which is assumed to be linear 
homogenous. 
For simplicity in the mathematical exposition, we will assume that 
the firm produces just two commodities where the results so obtained are 
readily applicable to the n-commodity case. The derived supplies (3.14) 
obtained from the revenue maximization problem can be applied to the 
total revenue equations (3.22) to obtain the indirect revenue function. 
(4.1) R*(P^, X) = P^Q*(PJ, PG, X] + PGQ*(P^, P^, X). 
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By the envelop theorem, we have 
(4-2) H: " HT " ^2' 
1 1 
||_ = ||_ = X = X*(P^ , PG, X). 
Partial differentiation of the indirect revenue function with 
* 
respect to output prices P^ yields the compensated output supplies Q^, 
compensated since the firm is restricted to make the price adjustments 
along the same transformation curve. Partial differentiation of R with 
respect to the aggregate factor X yields the marginal revenue function 
for the composite factor. 
We have shown in (3.8) and (3.12) that under the assumption of 
linear homogenous transformation function, X is equal to the marginal 
revenue as well as the average revenue. 
(4.3) X = ^  = ^ . 
Upon rearrangement of (4.3), we obtain an equality between two 
partial differential equations 
(4.4, 
R (P^PgXj 
132 
Integration of both sides, with output prices held constant, we get 
the raultiplicatively separable indirect revenue function (Silberberg, 
67). 
(4.5) R* = X • HIP^P^]. 
Applying the envelop theorem to (4.5), we have two raultiplicatively 
separable output supply function. 
(4.6) 
Differentiating (4.1) with respect to aggregate factor, we obtain a 
marginal revenue function which is input (scale) independent. 
for a competitive industry, marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
(4.8) 
* * 
, Qg and H characterize the revenue maximization behavior of the 
joint product firm. In order to determine the competitive equilibrium of 
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Che industry, it is necessary to introduce three additional 
relationships. The commodity supply equations must each be complemented 
by a commodity demand equation. The implicit factor demand equation must 
be complemented by a factor supply equation. 
This system of six equations is represented in Figure 4.2. 
P 2 
Q2 
P 
1 
P, 
X 
'S(X) 
D (X) 
X 
Figure 4.2. Basic geometric properties of the 2x1 model 
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Each of the three markets contains an exogenously given, unstarred, 
relationship and a counterpart endogenously derived, starred, relation­
ship. The derived commodity supply function S*[Q^) is written as 
(4.9) Q. = qJp., Pj(Pi), Px^Pi]] i,j=l,2, 
so as to emphasize that along the general equilibrium supply S*( ), the 
remaining commodity markets and the factor market are in continuous 
equilibrium. This implies that the equilibrium prices in those markets 
are subject to change when moving along S*( ). Similar interpretation is 
to be given to the derived factor demand D*(X). 
In what follows, it is assumed that the exogenously specified 
commodity demand curves D(QJ^) and the factor supply curve S(X) are 
specified such that the areas under (or above) these curves represent 
willingness to pay measures. This implies that the demand curves should 
be compensated demands for the case of final goods, or they could be 
ordinary demands if the commodity is an intermediate output, since the 
area below the demand will represent quasi-rent for the consumer 
industry. The factor supply should be a compensated supply for the case 
of consumer-resource supplier or an ordinary supply if the input is 
considered an intermediate factor of production; in both cases, the area 
above the supply will represent factor rents for the supplier industry. 
Finally, it is assumed that the commodity demands and the factor supply 
are just functions of their respective prices. 
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(4.10) D(Q.)  = QJP^] i=l,2 
S(X) = x[p^) 
Let the symbol M represent the sum of areas a, c (consumer's 
surplus) and f (factor rents). 
(4.11) = a+c+f. 
The money measure M is a function of outputs and because the 
choice of the latter dictates factor demand X. Given output and factor 
levels, the corresponding equilibrium prices P^, P^, P^, as well as 
triangles a, c, and f, are determined. Given linear homogeneity and 
revenue maximization, Van de Wetering (76) has demonstrated that the 
competitive equilibrium of the industry maximizes the money measure M. 
Conversely, if an auctioneer or planning authority wants to maximize 
should set price P^ and P^ such that the dual set of 
efficiency conditions (4.6) and (4.7) are satisfied. 
The following geometric properties of the 2x1 model will be proved 
following the Van de Wetering procedure. 
1) The area above the derived supply curve (and below the price 
line) equals the sum of consumers' surplus and factor rents in 
the related markets. 
2) The area below the derived factor demand (and above the price 
line) equals the sum of consumers' surpluses in related 
markets. 
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The first proposition implies that the sum of willingness to pay 
measures M can be measured as the area enclosed between a commodity 
demand and derived supply in Figure 4.2. Thus, 
1.1) If b = c+f, then M = a+b; 
1.2) If d = a+f, then M = c+d. 
The second proposition also indicates that M can also be measured in 
the factor market as the area enclosed between the factor supply and 
derived factor demand. 
2.1) If e = a+c, then M = e+f. 
What these two propositions are stating is that the welfare position 
of all the consumers as well as of all the producers are captured in any 
one of the interrelated markets. 
The assumed equality b = c+f can also be expressed using integral 
notation. 
(4.12) FIL '2 FI  FX FL • -  5 ' ' '  9% '2  ^ 2 
1 2 
?! 
+ - ^ "x ^X 
X 
The limits of and P^ represent the constant intercepts of D and 
S(X) with their respective price axes. Substituting these values in the 
marginal revenue function P^, = H P^Pg , we can obtain the corresponding 
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lower limit of the left-hand side integral. The integral of area c is 
preceded by a negative sign because of the interchange of P^, which 
appears as an upper limit in Figure 4.2, to a lower limit in the 
corresponding integral. The upper limits are considered a function of 
P^. In Chapter 3, the multicommodity equilibrium model (3.65) can be 
used to obtain analytical expressions which can be used to determine 
those upper limits. Of course, the output demands have to be considered 
as given. 
Differentiation of the left and right hand side integrals with 
1 
respect to upper limit P^ yields 
D S (4.13) P^P^ 
Rewriting this, we obtain 
(4.14) Q^^dP^ + Q2%2 " X^dp^. 
By differentiating the competitive equilibrium condition for the 
industry (4.8), we have 
(4,15) d,,. 
Premultiplicaton by and using (4.6) yields 
^The superscripts D and S are used to discriminate between 
quantities demanded or supplied. 
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(4.16) X°dP^ = + Qg^dP^. 
But, by the assumption, all markets are in continuous equilibrium, 
= Q*^, X*® = then upon substitution on (4.16), 
(4.17) sfdPx = Q^^dP^ + Qg^dpg, 
which is exactly the same as (4.14), which was obtained by integrating 
the areas b = c+f. 
The quality e = a+c in Figure 4.2 using integral notation appears as 
(4.18) /'=' X[P^(P^)P2(P^)PJ dP^ - - L' Qj(Pj)dPj 
X 1 
P [p 1 
- /J ^ QzlPzjdP,. 
P, 
The lower limits Pj^, P^ are the constant intercepts of d(q^) and 
in their respective price taxes. Substitution of these values in 
P^ = will yield the lower limit P^. The upper limits are defined 
as functions of P^; analytical expression for them can be obtained from 
(3.65). 
Differentiating (4.18) with respect to P^, we have 
(4.19) X°[p^)dp^ = Qj^°(pJdp^ + 
139 
Again, by using the revenue maximization conditions (4.6), we can obtain 
(4.16), which jointly with the assumption of competitive equilibrium in 
all markets, we ended up with two differential equations (4.19) and 
(4.16), which must hold simultaneously. 
Based on the relations among the relevant areas of a system of 
interrelated markets, then the next step is to analyze those 
relationships under the effect of a market policy measure. Let us assume 
that a unit tax on joint product in Figure 4.3 is established. In a 
two-goods world, the supply of will shift to the right and the derived 
factor demand will decrease. 
By proposition (1), the change M can be measured most conveniently 
in the distorted market as 
(4.20) AM = [Cg+Cg] + [d^+d^). 
But, M also measures the area enclosed between the demand and supply 
curves in the remaining markets. Then, 
(4.21) AM = b^+b^ 
AM = Bg+fg. 
According to the definition of M in (4.11), it can be restated to 
include the areas of Figure 4.3 before tax as follows: 
(4.22) = a+(cj^+c^+c^ ) + (f^+fg+f^). 
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Figure 4.3. Welfare effect of a tax on a joint product 
After tax, we have 
(4.23) + c^ + f^. 
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The effect of the tax policy on the money measure M is then obtained 
by subtraction. 
(4.24) AM = - (c^+c^) - (fj^+f^)-
The measure M indicates the presence of three components. A gain 
in consumers' surplus by the users of given by [b^+bg]. A loss in 
consumers' surplus by the users of the taxed commodity represented by 
the areas (c +C ) and, lastly, the loss in factor rents by the suppliers 
of X; loss represented by (f^+f^). 
The loss in factor rents on the input markets X, as well as the loss 
in consumers' surplus on the taxed commodity Q^, can be measured in any 
of the markets. In the commodity market for , the factor rents before 
taxes is obtained by apply proposition (1). 
(4.25) (b,+b,] = [c,+c +c ) + (f,+f +f,). 
1.  ^
After the imposition of the tax, 
(4.26) [bg+b^) = c^ + f^. 
By subtracting (4.25) from (4.26), 
(4.27) = -(c^+c^] - (f^^+f^j-
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The change in area under the derived supply is equal to the 
sum of the change in consumers' surplus in the taxed commodity plus the 
change in factor rents on the factor market. 
On the factor market X and by applying the second proposition, the 
consumers' surplus area before taxes is given by 
(4.28) (e^+e2) = a + (c^+c^+Cgj. 
After tax, we have 
(4.29) (e^+f^] = (a+b^+b^] + Cj^. 
Subtracting (4.28) from (4.29), 
(4.30) = (b^+b^) - (c^+c^). 
Therefore, the change in area of the triangle under the derived factor 
demand curve D*(X) equals the sum of the changes in consumers' surpluses 
of related markets. 
The economic meaning of the areas between demand and supply curves 
in the distorted market can also be analyzed by applying proposition 1. 
Thus, the factor rents before taxes is as 
(4.31) (di+dg+dg) = a + 
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After tax, 
(4.32) = (a+b^+b^) + ty 
By subtraction, we have 
(4.33) -(d^+dg] = (b^+bg) - (f^+fg]. 
The change in the area above the derived supply is equal to the 
sura of the change in consumers' surplus in the commodity market plus 
the change in factor rents in the input market X. This indicates that 
all the private welfare effects are captured in the distorted market. 
Such a private welfare effect constitutes a loss given by (3.20). The 
revenue is accrued by the government ; such a revenue is represented by 
the area 
(4.34) tR = Cg+d^. 
If we subtract the tax revenue from the private welfare loss, we obtain 
the social efficiency loss 
(4.35) w = Cg+dg. 
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The Welfare Analysis of the Consumer Side 
On this side of the model, the relevant functions are obtained by 
making use of the dual properties of the model presented in Chapter 2. 
That is by differentiating the indirect expenditure function with respect 
to commodities prices and factor prices, we obtain the compensated 
commodities demands and the compensated factor supply (Mishan, 52). 
Due to the parallelism of the consumer model with the one presented 
for the producers, we are going to skip the mathematical background and 
focus our attention to the geometric properties. 
The derived commodity demands and factor supply have to be matched 
with their corresponding commodities supplies and factor demand to be 
able to reach the industry competitive equilibrium. Again, it is assumed 
that the last two functional relationships are given and sole function of 
their respective prices. For a two commodities world, we have the 
following system of equation. 
(4.36) D*[Qj) = 
S*(x] = 
s[Qi] = Qi(Pi) 
s(Qi] = 
D(X) = X(P^]. 
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The superscript, starred, functions denote multicommodity equi­
librium equations which allow for adjustments in all related markets. In 
this case, the symbol "X" denotes the factor of production supplied by 
the consumers. 
The system (4.36) is represented in Figure 4.4. 
P 1 P 2 
(X) 
^4/f 
(X) 
X 
Figure 4.4. Welfare effects of a commodity tax in a system of 
interrelated markets. 
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The triangle (e^+e^+e^ ) will represent a money measure of welfare, 
since that area expresses the factor rents of the industry demanding the 
input X. 
may be thought of as an output produced by firms having one or 
more fixed factors of production with all other factors required in the 
production of Q. available at constant prices. The commodity supply S( ) 
then represents an ordinary supply curve for the industry producing 
and the area above this supply represents quasi-rent accruing to the 
fixed factors. If the variable inputs used on production are available 
only at increasing cost, then the commodity supply S( ) will represent 
the derived supply curve S*( ) for the industry producing Q^. The area 
above this curve will measure not only quasi-rents accruing to firms 
producing Q^, but also quasi-rents accruing to the firms producing the 
variable inputs used in producing (Van de Wetering, 76). 
Applying the same procedure presented in the last section, one can 
demonstrate the following propositions. 
1) The area below the derived commodity demand (and above the price 
line) equals the sum of consumers' surplus and factor rents in 
the related markets. 
2) The area above the derived factor supply (and below the price 
line) equals the sum of factor rents in the related markets. 
The first proposition implies that, in Figure 4.4, the sum of the 
willingness to pay measures M = [e^+e^+e^) + [d^+dg+d^] + b^ can be 
measured as the area enclosed between a derived commodity demand and the 
supply curve. 
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1.1) If (a^+a^) = (e^+e^+e^) + [d^+d^+d^) 
then M = (a^+a^) + b^. 
1.2) If (c^+c^+Cg) = (e^+e^+e^) + b^ 
then M = (cj^+c^+c^) + (d^+d^+d^). 
The second proposition implies that M can also be measured in the factor 
market as the area enclosed between the derived factor supply curve and 
the factor demand curve. 
2.1) If (f^+fg] = b^ + (d^+dg+dg] 
then M = (e^+e^+e^ ) + (f^+f^). 
Knowing the relation between the areas in Figure 4.3, we want to 
analyze the effects on those areas by the imposition of a market policy. 
Let us consider the introduction of a tax per unit of supplied. In 
Figure 4.3, the derived factor supply will shift to the left, since the 
effective price for the consumers is the equilibrium price plus the 
corresponding share of the tax, making the price of the factor supplied 
by them to increase. If the sum of the elasticity of commodity 
substitution and the price elasticity of demand for the factor of 
production X is positive, then the derived demand curve will shift 
to the right (Van de Wetering, 74). 
The change in the money measure, AM, in the distorted market (q^) is 
given by 
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(4.37) AM = (c2+ C3) + [d^+d^). 
The same measure, but in market one [Q J^ ) 
(4.38) AM = a^+a^. 
In the factor market, we have 
(4.39) AM=e^+f^. 
We have defined M^ (before tax) as 
(4.40) M^ = (e^+e^+e^ ) + [d^+dg+d^] + b^. 
The same money measure, but after tax, is given by 
(4.41) M^ = e + d + (a +a,) + b . 
3 3 3 4 5 
The effect of tax on M is then obtained by subtracting M^ from M^. 
(4.42) AM = M^-M^ = -[e^+e^) - (d^+dg) + (a^+a^). 
From this equality, we see that the effect of a tax on the money 
measure M which may serve as a social benefit indicator of the changes 
resource allocation induced by the distortion, it is formed by three 
elements; the user of the factor of production X suffers a decrease in 
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the willingness to pay measure of consumers' surplus given by [e^+e^). 
The producer of the taxed commodity (Qg) also suffers a loss in the 
factor rents given by (d^+d^] and, finally, the procedures of commodity 
Q^registered a gain in factor rents represented by (a^+a^). 
The consumers' surplus loss on factor X and producers' surplus loss 
on commodity can be captured in any of the other markets. In the 
commodity market the consumers' surplus before tax is given by (1.1), 
the same measure but after tax is then 
(4.43) (a^+a^) = ey + d^. 
By subtraction, we have 
(4.44) (a^-a^) = -[e^+e^) - (d^+d^). 
Thus, the change in the area under the derived commodity demand equals 
the sum of the change in consumers' surplus on the factor market X plus 
the change in factor rents on commodity market Q^. 
On the factor market X, the producers' surplus before tax was 
defined in (2.1). After tax, this area is equal to 
(4.45) (e^+f^) = dg + (a^+a^) + b^. 
By subtraction, then, we have 
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(4.46) = -(d^+d^] + Ug+a^)-
Therefore, the change in the area above the derived factor supply S*(X) 
is equal to the sura of the change in factor rents on the remaining of the 
markets (Q^, Q^]. 
Now, we turn our attention toward the distorted markets [Q J]- The 
consumers' surplus for this market and before tax is defined in (1.2); 
the same measure, but after tax is 
(4.47) c^ = e^ + (-*3*^4) ^5' 
Again, but subtraction, we have 
(4.48) -(c^+cg) = -[e^+e^) + [a^+a^). 
Thus, the change in the area below the derived commodity demand D^fQ^) is 
equal to the sum of the change in consumers' surplus on the factor market 
plus the change in factor rent on the commodity market . In other 
words, all the private welfare effects can be measured in the distorted 
market. 
In the same market Q^, the private welfare loss (AM) is given by 
(4.37), but, at the same time, the government receives some revenue from 
the tax policy; such a revenue is represented by 
(4.49) tR = Cg+d^. 
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Subtracting the tax revenue from the private welfare loss, we obtain the 
dead weight loss or social efficiency loss. 
(4.50) w = Cj+dg. 
We have demonstrated all the relations between the areas enclosed 
under and above the demand and supply curves in a system of interrelated 
markets for both sides of the economy. What we need now is to put both 
systems together and, in doing so, we are going to get a complete multi-
commodity equilibrium model where all the equations in the system are 
fully specified, that is there are no equations which are exogenous or 
given to the system. This system of equations can be formulated as 
d*(QJ = QjPiPztPjPxtfJ] 
S*(Q2) = Q2[PI(P2)VX'^^2^^ 
D*(x) = x[p^(p^)P2(Px)Pxl 
S*[x] = x[p^(Pjj)P2(Px)Px]' 
where the star superscript means derived equilibrium demand (D*) and 
supplies (S*). 
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We are interested in the welfare significance of the areas enclosed 
between the derived demand and supply of the distorted market. This 
market is represented in Figure 4.5. 
Note that the derived demand and supply curves (Figure 4.5) do not 
shift with the imposition of a tax on the commodity; this happens 
because those curves reflect continuous equilibrium in all related 
markets or, in other words, all prices are allowed to adjust to a new 
equilibrium along both of those curves. 
The change in the money measure M or the social indicator of the 
resource allocation measured in the distorted market is given by 
(4.51) AM = [cj+cj] + (d^+d2). 
But, what does the area (cg+c^) mean? The answer is given by (4.48) by 
P 
2 
Q2 
Figure 4.5. Welfare effect of a tax under a multicommodity equilibrium 
framework 
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which we know that this area is equal to the change in consumers' surplus 
on the factor market plus the change in factor rents on related commodity 
markets. The answer for the same question, but with respect to the 
second term in the right-hand side of (4.51) is given by (4.33) from 
which we know that this area represents the change in consumers; surplus 
on the related commodity markets plus the change in factor rents on the 
input markets. 
The effect of the tax on the social indicator was defined in (4.24) 
for the supply side of the model and in (4.42) for the demand side. If 
we substitute (4.33) on (4.24) or substitute (4.48) on (4.42), we obtain 
in either case (4.51). This indicates that all the changes on private 
welfare are completely captured in the distorted market. The same 
argument implies that these welfare measures, consumers' surplus, factor 
rents, as well as the money measure M should be taken as net overall 
effects. These same results were obtained by Just et al. (44) and 
Harberger (33). but without formally demonstrating the relation between 
the relevant areas. 
Finally, note that the dead weight loss area defined by (4.35) and 
(4.50) are exactly the same. 
One point worth mentioning is that, by using compensated curves, any 
redistribution of the government revenues back into the economy will not 
affect the market curves nor the derived curves, since they do not 
account for changes on the money income. 
Lastly, the change in consumer surplus under a general equilibrium 
demand curve cannot be associated directly with the welfare of the final 
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consumers or industries using it as an input. Neither the change in 
producer's surplus under a derived supply can be associated directly with 
the welfare of producer or resource owners. Because what we are 
measuring is the overall effect, not just the consumer or producer 
welfare effect. 
The latter paragraphs have been dealing with the introduction of a 
price policy on an economy which is free of any distortion on any other 
market. This characteristic is not common in the real world. It is 
normal to find several distortions, especially in the agricultural 
sector, by which the government tries to accomplish different policy 
objectives. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze what possible 
effects of a new proposed policy will have on the different welfare 
measurements given a possible set of distortions already in place on 
related markets. Harberger (33) has analyzed this type of problem and he 
has concluded that, under certain considerations, explicit measures of 
welfare are only required in the target market. Just et al. (44), in the 
Appendix D of their book, analyzed in a rigorous way what are those 
specific characteristics. If the change in price or quantity in one 
market does not affect the level of the policy variable in the other 
distorted markets, and assuming equilibrium in all markets before and 
after the change in policy, then they concluded that for a distortion of 
the type of an ad valorem tax, subsidy, and price stabilization through 
buffer stocks, all the private effects (consumer and producer welfare) 
are captured completely in the market where the distortion is introduced, 
only if the derived curves are the ones used in the analysis. The net 
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social welfare effect (private plus government) can be obtained only if 
the change in government revenues or costs on the other distorted markets 
are taken into account. This can be done by measuring that change on 
those affected distorted markets by using their respective general 
curves. For the case of price floor or price ceiling policies with 
efficient rationing mechanism^, the effect on the private groups has to 
be analyzed in each market affected. Finally, in the case of a quota, 
all the welfare effects are captured in the market for which the policy 
is aimed. 
Welfare Measures of Single Policy Interventions 
Developing countries often use market interventions as a means to 
ensure cheap food prices for the urban population and, at the same time, 
ensure a reasonable return to the producers. 
There are several ways upon which the same policy objectives can be 
achieved; thus, it is important for the decision-maker to have different 
alternatives from which to choose the one which is most suitable in terras 
of the welfare of the society as a whole. Clearly, the final decision 
depends upon the value judgment of the decision-maker. But, the welfare 
economist can help by evaluating the different alternatives, a process 
that involves the measurements of the changes in the welfare of the 
private groups, as well as changes in the government revenue or expenses. 
Efficiency rationing is defined so that the consumer (suppliers) 
gaining access to the market are those willing to pay more (receive less) 
at the margin than those who do not (Just et al., 44). 
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In this section, we will focus on the actual measurement of those 
changes, using the compensating variation measure as reflecting the 
willingness to pay. 
Price Control 
Price ceilings the first market policy to be analyzed. Where this 
policy represents the case when the government sets the market price 
lower than the equilibrium price. The welfare effects can be measured 
under two assumptions by allowing an efficiency rationing and/or allowing 
the government to intervene in the market by supplying the excess 
quantity demanded, which, for most of the case, that quantity is equal to 
imports. Figue 4.6 reflects both cases. 
Assuming an initial general equilibrium represented by PQQQ 
(Figure 4.6), then allowing the government to put a price ceiling equal 
to P^. The producers will supply only the quantity , which represents 
the quantity available to consumers, requiring at the same time the 
imposition of a rationing system, or the other alternative is that the 
government supplies the excess demand ) by importing the same 
quantity. 
From Figure 4.6, the initial consumer's surplus is given by the 
areas a+b+c; after the price change, the same surplus is a+b+d, when 
efficiency rationing is imposed. The net effect on consumers will be the 
gain of area d minus the loss of area c. 
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Figure 4.6. Price ceiling policy 
On the supply side, the initial producer's surplus is equal to the 
sum of d+e+i; after introducing the price floor policy, the same area is 
given by the triangle i. The net effect on producers will be a loss of 
areas d+e. At this point, it is important to remember that these areas 
do not just reflect the welfare effects on the economics agencies 
involved in this particular market; rather, they reflect the net effects 
on consumers and producers in all the markets affected by this policy. 
The net welfare effect to the economy is given by the sum of the 
gains and the losses, which comes up to be a loss equal to the areas 
c+e. 
Turning to the problem of measurement, we stated at the beginning of 
this section that the compensated variation measure will be the one used 
in the welfare analysis. This measure is defined in terms of the initial 
position of the individual or firm, then the initial consumer expenditure 
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or the initial producer income earnings on the commodity in question will 
be taken as the reference point. 
To begin with, the loss in producer's surplus is represented by the 
sum (d+e) when the efficiency rationing is assumed; such area is 
estimated by 
(4.52) PS = dP X + 1/2 (dP X dQ), 
where dP = P^-P^ and dQ = QQ-OQJ^. Taking the first term of the right 
hand side or area d and dividing it by the initial income earnings, we 
have 
dP X Q 
Since + Q^Qg, then 
Transforming (4.54) into elasticity form, we have 
-33, ^  = 
d p  .  . . .  S  .  
where — stands for the percentage price change which is given and E is 
0 
the total price elasticity of supply. 
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The area e in terras of the original income is 
which, in terms of elasticity, 
(4.57) = 1/2 
^0*^0 
The sum of both areas (d+e), 
(4.58) ]Fiar- = IT ^  - 1/: B 7^ )-
0^0 0 0 
The change in consumer's surplus is given by the rectangle d minus 
the triangle c. Note that we already calculated the area d; thus, the 
area c is the only one to be defined. 
' "*^2 dQ 
where dP^ = Pg^PQ-
Since by definition, the total elasticity of demand is 
(4.60) = IL • 
ai-Z ^0 
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therefore, 
(4.61) /e". 
0 ^0 
Substituting (4.61) into (4.59) and expressing it in elasticity form, 
The net change in consumer welfare is given by both areas (d-c) 
(4.63) (1-E® ^ ) -(^) 
The net welfare effect for the economy which in this case is a loss 
is equal to the sum (c+e) . 
(4.64) 1/2 E* (iff (I+S!). 
0^0 E 
In the case where everybody can consume as much as he wants at the 
new lower price, the government has to come up with the difference to 
match the excess demand by importing the quantity it is assumed 
that the international price is equal to P^. 
The effect on the producer welfare will be the same as the case of 
efficiency rationing. But, the change in consumer's surplus is different 
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in this case, since, after imposing the price ceiling, the same area is 
given by the sum a+b+c+d+e+f+g, reflecting a change of d+e+f+g. The 
government by importing the quantity ) at a price incurs in a 
cost given by the sum of areas e+f+g+h. Lastly, the net effect on the 
economy is equal to (e+h) . 
The compensated variation for the consumer is (d+e+f+g) , where the 
areas d, e, f are already defined by (4.55) and (4.57)^. The area of the 
triangle g is estimated as 
By applying (4.60), we have 
(4.66) 
Substituting it in (4.65) 
0^0 0 
The net change in consumer welfare is thus given by 
0^0 0 0 0 
^The triangle f is equal to the triangle e. 
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The cost incurred by the government by applying this type of policy 
is the sum of areas e+f+g+h. Note that the triangles g and h are 
equivalents as well as e and f; thus, the government cost is estimated by 
adding twice (4.57) and (4.67), resulting in 
^0^0 
Finally, the net efficiency loss is estimated by adding (4.57) and 
(4.67). 
(4.70) 1/% (dPy, _ 
Note that on all these estimated areas, two parameters play the key 
roles; those are the total price elasticity of supply and demand. So, it 
is time to turn to the procedure that will be used to estimate such 
elasticities. 
But, first, it is important to recognize that this type of policy 
(price control) breaks down the equilibrium condition in the target 
market. Thus, one of the equations (demand or supply) has to be deleted 
from the system of equations (3.65). To estimate the total price 
elasticity of supply, we assumed that the price of the specific product 
is given, which is the same as assuming perfect elastic demand. In doing 
so, and assuming that the price ceiling is imposed in the ith market, the 
system (3.65) becomes (4.71). 
m 
0 \ 
X'T 
X«T-7a (-T'ï-Vî'T-îu)-
X'T-Ta 
XT. 
X 
XP 
u). 
^dP 
0 
0 ("'l+T^"'T+?u] 
0 
0 
0 
C%y\) 
U*T 
B-
X, dp dP 
T+7„ T-ÎM .. 0 •y[-
•• (T+?'%_T+rUu) ^T-X'U^_I-T'U^^ •• 0 
M'T+TaJ+T'Mu) ^T-T'T+Î3_T-T'T+T^^ .. . (rï+?^i'T+?u] 0 
T+n-VT+T'T-Tj,^ j-T-T'T-V^-T'T-Tj,^ .. 0 
("a-"u) 0 
ï+?'?3 T-V-Fg, l'?a_ T 
^+?d Ilk. &_ 
^"^^dP ^~^dp ^dP ^bP 
( W V )  
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By applying Cramer's Rule, we can obtain the total elasticity of 
supply, as well as the general equilibrium effects on the rest of 
endogenous variables 
(4.72) E 
iQi 
Qi.Pi 
where ] |  is the cofactor of the target variable and $  is the 
determinant of the matrix of endogenous variables. 
The estimation of the total elasticity of demand follows the same 
procedure, but, in this case, the equation deleted is the supply of the 
ith market; thus, the system is now represented by (4.73) . 
(4.73) 
dQ. dP, 
1 1 
"^i ?! 
!!izi 
Pi-1 
fi+1 
Pi+i ^n "X 
fi 
P. 
1 
X 
<. . . <• 
1,1-1 1,1+1 i.n 
.-e. 
1.3 
i,j = l,2...i-l ,i+l.. .n 
0 -k, -k. , -k. ,...-k..n 1 
1 1-1 1+1 
11 
-0<. .-e. . 
j=l...i-1,i+l...n 
k. 
1 
'jx 
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Again, solving by Cramer's Rule, we obtain the total elasticity of 
demand 
D l''i I 
(4 74) E = T . 
1 1 
Note that the determinants are not equal, since different equations are 
held constant. 
Ad Valorem Tax and Quotas 
In order to get revenue, the government follows the policy of 
putting taxes on commodities, especially those which are internationally 
traded. As it happens with all price interventions, a tax on a commodity 
will not only affect the specific market, but also will have effects on 
the production and consumption of other related commodity markets. 
For our purposes, we are most interested in the imposition of an 
ad valorem tax on an agricultural product, which is heavily traded on the 
international market. Therefore, we begin assuming that the 
international price is higher than the domestic equilibrium price; also, 
we assume that the foreign demand for the commodity taxed is perfectly 
elastic. 
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The relationship between the international price and the domestic 
price is given by 
(4.75) Pp = Pw-tPw = Pw(l-t), 
where P^ denotes the domestic price, Pw denotes the international price 
and t stands for the level of ad valorem tax. The relative change in the 
domestic price may be represented as 
U  W  
If there is not an initial level of tax, then (4.76) can be rewritten as 
dP„ dP 
(4.77) - t. 
D w 
By assuming the small country case which implies that whatever the 
policy the domestic government undertakes it will not affect the 
international price, then we can assume that the relative change of P is 
w 
equal to zero, resulting in the relative change of the domestic price 
being equal to the negative of the ad valorem tax. 
dP 
(4.78) = -t. 
D 
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Note also that this assumption implicitly indicates that the whole amount 
of the tax is borne by the domestic producers. 
The welfare effects of an ad valorem tax are represented in 
Figure 4.7 where D^* and S^* represent the compensated equilibrium demand 
and supply, respectively. The foreign demand is shown by the horizontal 
line P -P ; at this price, the domestic quantity consumed is Q and the 
WW 1 
quantity produced is Q^. Thus, the excess supply or quantity exported 
would be given by the distance 
P 
n 
P, 
w 
p. 
D 
P, 0 
Q2 
Figure 4.7. Ad valorem tax or quota on exports 
168 
The imposition of the tax will reduce the domestic price by its full 
amount, which is shown by the distance then, at this new domestic 
price, the quantity consumed will increase by the amount and the 
quantity produced will be reduced by the distance Qg-Q^. Therefore, the 
quantity available for exports is then Q^-Q^. But, this quantity is sold 
at the international market at a price P^, giving to the government a 
revenue equal to 
The welfare effects of an ad valorem tax can be calculated by 
analyzing Figure 4.7. The change in consumer's surplus is represented by 
areas b+c. The change in producer welfare is the sum of areas b+c+d+e+f. 
The government tax revenues are shown by area e and finally, the net loss 
to the economy is given by areas d+f. 
The consumer compensating variation is estimated by 
(4.79) Ocs = dP°Q^ + 1/2 dQ^, 
where dP = P^^-P^ = t and denotes the quantity demanded before the 
imposition of the tax and the change in the same variable due to the tax 
policy is dQ = Q^-Q^. Equation (4.79) can be rewritten as a proportion 
of the pre-tax expenditure. 
which, in elasticity form is 
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(4.81) ^.(1.1/2.° , 
W  1 W W  
where E^is the total price elasticity of demand. Now, by applying 
(4.78), the above equation can be conveniently expressed as 
(4.82) = (t + 1/2 E° t^) . 
VQi 
The compensated variation for the producers is estimated as a proportion 
of the pre-tax income 
where represents the quantity supplied at free-trade prices. This 
equation in elasticity notation and by applying (4.78) then becomes 
(4.84) = t - 1/2 E® t^ . 
w ^ 2 
The government revenue can be estimated as the difference between the 
change in the producer welfare minus the change in consumer's surplus 
minus the triangles d and f. 
170 
where d and f can be calculated as 
(4'SS) 
w 1 w 2 
Then, by substituting (4.82), (4.84) and (4.86) into (4.85), 
(4.87) g.R = "(t)^ [e® + E°) 
The efficiency loss (d+f) is estimated as 
(4.88) w = 1/2 t^ (e® + E°) . 
Now, we turn to the problem of how to estimate the different total 
elasticities coefficients from the matrix system (3.65). In doing so, we 
have to realize first that the market for the export product is not in 
equilibrium, since an excess supply exist, quantity which is exported. 
Also, we mentioned before that the demand price is given to the domestic 
economy and any change of that price within the domestic boundaries 
should be equal to the tax imposed by the government. Following these 
lines, the total elasticity of supply will be estimated by deleting the 
domestic demand. The resulting matrix system is exactly the same as the 
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one presented for the price ceiling program or the matrix system (4.71), 
with the only difference that the exogenous variable dP^/P^ should be 
rewritten as dp^/P^ = -t. By the same token, the total elasticity of 
demand is estimated by using the matrix system (4.73) where again the 
exogenous variable dP^/P^ has to be transformed as stated above. 
The last market intervention that we are going to analyze is the 
export quota. This is the case when a fixed export quantity is imposed 
on the supplier country. This type of quantity intervention is very 
common on agricultural exportable commodities, such as the sugar and beef 
quota imposed by the U.S. and the coffee quota imposed by the Coffee 
International Agreement. 
Figure 4.7 also will help us to understand the effects of such a 
policy on the domestic economy. For simplicity of exposition, let us 
assume that the quota level (k) is such that it has the same effect on 
the domestic price as was the case of an export tax. That is, there will 
be an excess supply in the domestic market due to the imposition of the 
quota, which will drive down the domestic price to the same level as an 
ad valorem tax. 
The introduction of a quota on exports then will reduce the domestic 
price from P to P^, which will cause an increase in the domestic 
^ w D 
quantity consumed from to ; at the same time, the amount supplied 
will be reduced from to . The quantity given by the distance 
is the imposed quota on exports. From these changes in quantities and 
prices, the consumers will end up with a net gain of areas b+c, while the 
producers will lose areas b+c+d+e+f. 
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The quota system will establish a preferential market and those able 
to get into it will acquire extra benefits. That is, the quota or the 
quantity is bought at the domestic price P^, but it is sold at the 
international price P^; therefore, an excess profit (area e) is produced. 
If the government is the only one that has the right to export the 
commodity in question, then the area e will represent a revenue, but, at 
the same time, will also show a loss to the domestic producers. Another 
possibility is that the government distributes export licenses among the 
producers without charging. In this case, the ones with the license are 
those producers who are going to get the quasi-rent, but under this 
scenario, it is easy to see that a black market for licenses will be 
developed, allowing the inefficient producer to get part of that quasi-
rent . 
The last distributional alternative which is the one that we are 
most interested in is when the Commodity Boards are the only ones allowed 
to export. As in the case of Costa Rica, they are in charge of 
discounting the export tax, transportation and administrative costs from 
the international price and then, by established mechanisms, the remnant 
is distributed among the domestic producers. Therefore, under this 
scenario, the area e will be considered as a part of the producer 
surplus. Even though an explicit measure of area e will be developed 
below. Finally, the efficiency loss produced by the quantity constraint 
is given by the areas d+f. 
The sum of the areas b+c or the net change in consumer's welfare is 
estimated. 
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(3.89) Acs = (q^ + 1/2 dQ ) dP, 
where stands for the domestic pre-quota quantity consumed and dP 
states the change in the domestic price caused by the quota. According 
to the definition of total elasticity, we have 
(4.90) dP = E , k'P , 
p»k w 
where is the equilibrium effect of the quota on the domestic price 
and k is the level of the quota as a percentage of the initial 
production. Also, from the same definition, we may write the change in 
quantity demanded as 
D Qi 
(4.91) dQ = Ej.p-^dP, 
w 
where is the total price elasticity of demand. 
Substituting the last two equations into (4.89), we obtain the net 
change in consumer's welfare as a percentage of the initial expenditure. 
P&r • Sp.k'k * "2 J' • 
W 1 r 
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On the other hand, the net change on the welfare of the producers 
will be estimated by the sum of the areas b+c+d+e+f, or by the equation 
(4.93). 
(4.93) APS = (Qg - 1/2 dQ) dP, 
where expresses the quantity supply at the pre-quota price. Then, by 
applying (4.91) along with (4.90) on the equation (4.93), we obtain the 
net change in quasi-rent as a fraction of the pre-quota income 
w L 
The quasi-rent accrue to the exporters (area e) can be estimated as 
follows ; 
where the area d is equal to 
(4.96) d . 1/2 k^) P„Qj. 
Then, by substituting (4.92), (4.94) and (4.96) into (4.95), we have 
(4.97) e . - E=.p k') 
Gq.p (Bp.k) ^ ^ 
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Finally, the efficiency lost (d+f) is then estimated as 
(4,98) - 1/2 (S%.p P„Qi * S^ .p P.Q;). 
The set of parameters to be estimated in order to have all the required 
information to calculate the above areas are the total elasticities 
coefficients. But, we have to recognize two things; the quantity 
supplied is determined by the domestic quantity demanded plus the quota 
S D 
or foreign demand; thus, Q = Q +k, and second the domestic price is 
still determined by the interaction of the market demand and supply. 
Keeping this is mind, the effect on the domestic price by the 
introduction of an export quota can be estiamted by solving the matrix 
system (4.99), assuming that the quota is imposed in market one. 
(4.99) 
dpl 4^2 dP n k 
dX 
?! P2 . . . P n X 
(nii-eii) ^^12~®12) • • • • (lln-Gin) 0 -1 ®1X 
^'^22~®22^ • • ' • ^^2n"®2n^ 0 0 ®2X 
^\2~®n2^ • • ^\n ®nn^ 0 0 =nX 
-kl -V.2 . . 1 0 0 
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By applying Cramer's Rule, we are able to estimate the total effect 
on the price by the quota level 
IdP./P. 
(4.100) i=l ... n. 
The total price elasticity of demand is given by the interaction of 
the compensated market demand elasticity and the general equilibrium 
adjsuted price 
(4.101) Eq.p = n.. Ep.t i=l ... n. 
By the same token, the total price elasticity of supply is estimated by 
the interaction of the respective elasticities 
(4.102) E® „ = e.. E , i=l ... n. 
Q«P 11 p "k 
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CHAPTER V. 
THE ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
It has become increasingly apparent that effective policies for 
agriculture require a comprehensive view of the sector. Such policies, 
whether private or public, must account for interrelationships within the 
agricultural sector, as well as with the rest of the economy. For Costa 
Rica, these interrelationships are of crucial importance, since the agri­
cultural sector plays one of the most important roles in the national 
economy. Policies that fail to incorporate them may be highly sensitive 
to the changing nature of the sector and national economy. 
Producer supply and consumer demand for agricultural products are 
the obvious more important components of the structure within which the 
sector must operate. Since the demand for those products is, in general, 
price inelastic and the production or supply somewhat variable, accurate 
estimates of the corresponding parameters are important as inputs in the 
development of national price and/or quantity intervention policies, 
stabilization policies, trade, storage, and the like. Another point that 
complicates a little more the policy analysis is that the demand, as well 
as the supply, of agricultural products are highly interrelated within 
themselves. Thus, estimates of cross-elasticities are also important in 
the formulation of agricultural policies. 
The economic theory provides a useful framework for analyzing 
problems related to the demand and supply of agricultural products, by 
indicating plausible types of assumptions that make the estimation of the 
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parameters statistically tractable. In particular, the economic theory 
offers a means by which own and cross price elasticities can be estimated 
in a consistent and complete logical framework. 
The estimation procedure that we are going to explain and use is one 
that requires minimal or no assumptions about the functional forms of the 
underlying utility or production function. Most of the demand and supply 
systems are based on specific functional forms of the objective function, 
which, in turn, implies further restrictions on the parameters, as well 
as nonparametric estimation by the most cases. 
The Demand Systera 
As it was explained in Chapter III, the main hypothesis about 
consumers is that they maximize the utility obtained from the consumption 
of a bundle of goods subject to the income constraint. This maximization 
problem was solved by the Lagrangian technique from which we obtain the 
set of implicit demand functions (3.46). 
The subject of this section is to explain how that set of demand 
functions will be estimated and how restrictions indicated by the theory 
are incorporated in the estimation procedure. Recalling from Chapter 
III, we know that by differentiation of the FOC (3.44) the set of 
behavioral restrictions is obtained, which are 
n 
(5.1) 1 w. n. =1 [Engel condition] 
•••=1 ^ 
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1 w. n..= -w. 
i=l 1 IJ 
[Cournot condition] 
ill 
[Homogeneity condition] 
n.. n.. 
—^ + n. = —^ + n. 
Wj ly jy [Symmetric condition] 
If the individual maximizes his utility, these four conditions 
should be satisfied regardless of the functional form of the utility 
function. The first two conditions are derived from the budget con­
straint; therefore, they depend solely on the definition of income as the 
sum of expenditures. They apply automatically in any demand system where 
the income variables is equal to the sum of expenditures on the 
individual commodities (Court, 24). The last two conditions, homogeneity 
and symmetry, are obtained from the utility function. The symmetry 
condition may be expressed in matrix form by using the compensated 
substitution terra or what is also called the elasticity of substitution 
between commodities 0 .  .  = ri../w. + ri. . 
ij J ly 
(5.2) (a..) 
1] 
oil 012 ... oln 
021 o22 ... a2n 
OAl (Jn2 otin 
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This matrix is symmetric, as well as negative semi-definite, which 
implies that its principal minors will alternate in sign, with the 
exception of (ouj), which is zero (Samuelson, 63). 
The system of demand equations (3.46) can only be estimated if a 
specific functional form relates the independent variables with the 
dependent ones. The functional forms that we assume approximate the 
true function are the lineal in variables and the double logarithmic 
functions. The reason we choose these two is because they are the most 
widely used in empirical analysis. Even though we are aware that, if a 
complete system is specified entirely by one of the equations, the budget 
constraint or the Engel aggregation condition is not satisfied 
(Goldberger, 31). However, as Court (24) has expressed, the economic 
theory does not indicate that all the functional forms have to be of the 
same nature, so a complete demand system may have equations of the type 
stated above as well as some other forms, such as the complete set will 
satisfy those adding-up conditions. Furthermore, not all the demand 
systems satisfy those conditions, where the linear expenditure and the 
indirect addilog systems are among the very few that satisfy the Engel 
condition (Yoshihara, 80). 
The demand system will be estimated under any of the following 
functional forms. 
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(5.3) Linear 
n 
Q. = oc.„ + y a..P. + a. y + u. i, i=l ... n 
1 lO ij J ly 1 
logarithmic : 
n 
log Q. = a. + y a., log P. + a. log y + u. 
^ 1 1 ij J ly 1 
where 
= per-capita consumption of the ith commodity; 
Pj = price paid by consumers; 
y = per-capita income 
= parameters to be estimated 
u. = random error. 
1 
Court (24) has proposed a procedure that helps to decide which of 
the above functional form is more suitable for estimation, such that the 
symmetric condition will have a better probability to show an acceptable 
fit. He stated 
If quantities consumed are more highly correlated with one 
another than are reciprocal proportions, the symmetric 
restrictions apply better to the linear demand functions, if 
other wise, they are more appropriate to the lineal double 
logarithmic functions. 
The choice between these two statistical functions will be made by 
examining the characteristic roots of the respective correlation matrix. 
The demand system can be expressed in matrix form which for 
simplicity of presentation the linear model is used and the constant term 
(<|iio) is omitted. 
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(5.4) Q = Za + U, 
where 
Q = (nxt)xl vector of quantities consumed, n = number of 
commodities, t = time period; 
Z = (nxt)x[nx(n+l)] matrix of independent variables; 
ot = [nx(n+l)] X 1 vector of parameters; 
U = (nxt) x 1 vector of random errors. 
This system in its full expression is shown below. 
Before including the restriction in the system (5.4), we have to 
mention that some of the restrictions are not lineal on the parameters, 
since they include budget shares which are also a function of the 
parameters. In order to linearize them, the elasticities will be 
evaluated at a specific value which as it is common in applied economics 
that figure will be the mean values of the parameters involved. 
The first restriction to be analyzed is the Engel condition, which 
imposes just one constraint on the system. Applying such a condition to 
the linear system and realizing that then, 
(5.5) % - 1, 
1=1 ^ 
Qii P21 • •I'nl ^*1,1 "11 
^12 ^12 ^22" 'I'n2 ^2 "1,2 "12 
Q It P2t 'nt "l.n+l "it 
Q21 ^21" '^nl ^1 «21 "21 
^22 ^12 
4t 
^22"'^n2 
^2f ••^nt 
"22 
"2,n+1 
"22 
^2t 
• • 
Qln ^1 P21'''Pnl ^1 "n,l "nl 
Qn2 ^12 ^22''Pn2 ^2 "n,2 \2 
Ont Pit ft 
a .. 
n,n+l "nt 
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For the double log model, the same conditions will be 
n 
(5.6) I w. a. = 1, 
i=l ^ 
where and w^ are evaluated at mean values. This aggregation condition 
stated in matrix notation is 
(5.7) Rj^xa = 1, 
where = lx(n(n+l)) row vector of zeros and mean prices. 
Its full representation would be 
[°11°12 ••• °ln^l°ll®12 ••• °ln^2 °11°12 °ln^n^ I"'" 
The homogeneity condition will impose n constraints on the system, 
one for each equation. This condition applied to the linear model and 
again using the definition of elasticity would appear as 
(5.8) Linear: 
.1 ^  "ii ^ Q J "i, • 
Logarithmic : 
n 
I  a . .  +  a .  = 0 .  
j=i 'y 
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In matrix form, the same condition is given by (5.9) 
(5.9) R^xa = 0 
where 
= nx[n(n+l)] matrix; 
0 = nxl vector of zeros. 
Its full representation is shown below. 
Il fz 
Qi Qi 
_ii y_ 
Qi Qi 
Qz Qz Qz Qz 
Il fz 
Qn Qn 
P 
On On 
X a = 0 
The symmetric condition states the restriction between pair of 
2 
commodities : thus, the condition imposes (n -n)/2 independent 
restrictions on the system. This symmetric condition applied to the 
linear model would look like 
P. P. 
(5.10) • «y * ^  »iy - qT'"i »ji - q: »jy - "• 
P. 
but recognizing that ^ /w. = ^ at the mean values, then (5.10) can 
^i ^ ^j^i 
rewritten 
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»•"> "ij " ^  % - qTq: 'ji -i)T 
riie same condition, but applied to the logarithmic model is 
(5.12) 
a. 
1 
a.. 
_ —Li _ + a. •' a. = 0. 
Wj ly jy 
In matrix notation, the above condition would be 
(5.13) Rgxa = 0. 
where = nx(n(n+l)) matrix of cross equation restrictions; 
0 = nxl vector of zeros. 
For simplicity of exposition, we will show only one restriction in 
its full expression. Taking, for example, the relation between the first 
and third commodity, then the symmetric condition would be 
'°11°12 ••• ®ln ^  °21 ••• 02'"+l °32 Sn ^  °n,l'' 
°n,n+l' • ' " ' " 1° '• 
Having described each restriction separately, we can pull all 
together in just one matrix equation. 
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(5.14) R-a = T 
where R = (2n+l)x(n(n+l) matrix of restriction; 
a = (n(n+l))xl vector of parameters; 
T = (2n+l)xl vector of zeros and one. 
We can include the whole set of restrictions in our original system 
(5.4) given the final model (5.15). 
Q Z U 
(5.15) 
T R 
a + 
0 
where 
= [n(t+2)+l]xl matrix of dependent variables and 
constant values of the constraints; 
= [n(t+2)+l] X [n(n+l)] matrix of independent variables 
plus the restraints within equations; 
= [n(n+l)] X 1 vector of parameters; 
= [n(t+2)tl] X 1 vector of random errors and zeros. 
Before getting into the supply side of the model, we want to mention 
that the Cournot condition is not explicitly included in the system of 
constraints, because once the Engel aggregation is satisfied, then the 
Cournot condition is implicitly satisfied, too (Wold and Jureen, 79). 
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The Supply System 
The supply side of the model, according to its development in 
Chapter III, is based on the assumption that the country maximizes its 
revenue out the production of the commodities included in the model, 
subject to a given technology represented by the multiple-output 
production function. By solving the FOC obtained from the maximization 
problem, we get the derived supplies and the derived demand for the 
composite factor. The derived supplies will be estimated by applying the 
linear and double logarithmic statistical models. The problem 
encountered in the demand side with respect to the type of the functional 
form is less restrictive in this case, since in the supply side the firm 
does not have a budget constraint to satisfy. 
The supply equations will be expressed 
(5.16) Linear; i,j=l ... m 
"i • ho * X «ijfj + X + "i 
Double log: 
n 
log Bj^jlog Pj + B^^log X + U^, 
where 
= quantity produced of the ith commodity; 
= price received by the producers of the ith commodity; 
X = quantity of the composite factor. 
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The composite factor conforms all those factors of production v^ich 
are used in the production of Q^, and this variable, according to the 
theory, should be one that reflects the level available of those 
resources. Ideally, it would be the aggregate physical units of those 
factors, a task which is impossible to satisfy due to the lack of 
information on the amounts of the individual inputs, as well as for 
aggregation problems. For our purpose, a proxy variable for X will be 
used and that is the sum of the individual commodities value added at 
constant prices, with the hope that it reflects the changes in the 
amounts of primary inputs used in production. 
In Chapter III, we also established the four constraints on the 
elasticities of supply; they are 
n 
(5.17) I k.e. = 1 [Aggregation] 
i=l ^ 
1 k.e.. = 0 [Cournot ] 
j = l ^ 
I e.. = 0 [Homogeneity] 
3=1 
k.e.. = k.e.. [Symmetric] 
1 iJ ] ' 
We called Cournot condition with the purpose to keep the similarity 
with the demand side, but note that they are different. 
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It is interesting to compare the symmetric condition on both the 
demand and supply models. In consumer theory, the compensated cross 
price slopes are symmetric. For the individual, the income effect of a 
price change has to be subtracted from the total effect to obtain the 
symmetric condition. Unlike here, the total effects of a price change 
are symmetric. This is because price changes do not have income effect 
to the firm; the scale variable in the supply side is the volume of fixed 
factors, and this is invariant to price changes. For given inputs, the 
firm response to a change in output prices is constrained to movements 
around the transformation surface and these are symmetric (Clements, 
19). 
As we mentioned before, the aggregation condition as a long-run 
characteristic, since to be held, it requires that the average revenue 
product be equal to the marginal revenue of product X, otherwise, the sum 
of income shares (k^ = ^i^i^XR] will not be equal to one (Silberberg. 
67). 
The elasticity constraints in terms of the linear models mentioned 
above will be 
(5.18) Aggregation i,j=l ... n 
n ^ 
Linear: I k. — g. = 1 
i=l ^i 
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n 
Double log: ^ k. g. = 1. 
1=1 ^ 
(5.19) Homogeneity 
n y. 
Linear; \ ^ 3.. = 0 
j=l ^i 
n 
Double log: ^ 3.. = 0. 
j=i 
(5.20) Symmetric 
Linear:^ 3.. - S.. = 0. 
Double log: 3-• w. - 3-.w. = 0. 
1 Ji J 
As it was the case for the demand side, we have to linearize the 
restrictions by evaluating the elasticities at the mean values. 
The method to incorporate these restrictions in the supply model is 
exactly the same as it was proposed for the demand case with the only 
difference the absence of income effects. 
Interest now turns to the statistical estimation procedure to be 
applied on the demand and supply systems. This statistical method is the 
seemingly unrelated least square (S.U.L.S.) (Zellner, 81) by which the 
^It is equivalent to restricting 
"i " "j qT 
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coefficients in all the equations are estimated simultaneously by 
applying Aitken's generalized least square method. The gain in 
efficiency of the estimates comes out whenever the independent variables 
are not highly correlated and if the disturbance term in different 
equations are highly correlated. Another advantage of this procedure is 
that it allows to make linear restrictions across equations which are 
taken into account on the simultaneous estimated coefficients. Also, 
under certain characteristics, this statistical method becomes exactly 
the same as the Restricted Least Square estimation procedure (R.L.S.). 
For exposition purposes, we will present the general lines of the 
latter method, since it is easier to see the role of the restrictions in 
the estimation procedure, beside the demand system, for its own 
characteristics, is estimated by using it, that is, by applying the 
Restricted Least Squares method. 
According to Johnson (42) , from which the remainder of this section 
is based upon, the exact linear restrictions can be represented as it was 
in (5.14), where the main characteristics are that the matrix R should 
have a dimension (2nxl) x (n(n+l)), which says that the number of rows 
are less than the number of columns, otherwise it would imply that the 
coefficients were known apart from the sample information. Further, it 
is required that the same matrix has a rank (2n+l) indicating that the 
equations do not contain any redundant information about the 
coefficients. 
The assumption on the model (5.4) are those of the classical linear 
hypothesis, namely, the matrix Z is nonstochastic and of full rank, the 
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random erorrs U are independently distributed with zero mean and variance 
2 
a . Under this assumption, the parameters a are estimated by 
(5.21) a = (Z'Z)~^Z'Q 
where a is a linear unbiased estimator. 
The process of obtaining the R.L.S. estimator is simple to minimize 
the sum of square residuals, subject to the condition T = Ra. So, it is 
possible to form a Lagrangian for this minimization problem. 
(5.22) L = (Q-Za)'(Q-Za)-2X'(Rot-T) 
where X is a (2n+l)xl vector of Lagrangian multipliers. Setting the 
partial derivatives to zero gives 
(5.23) Y = -Z'Q+Z'Za*-R' X = 0, 
or 
a* = a + (Z'Z)~^RX. 
By algebraic manipulation, the unobservable Lagrangian can be eliminated, 
ic 
where those manipulations make use of the condition Ra=T. Premultiplying 
(3.23) by R yields 
(5.24) Ra* = Ra + R(Z'Z)"^R'X. 
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If the condition that the restrictions must hold for the estimated values 
is imposed, then 
(5.25) T = Ro* = R&+ R(Z'Z)~^X R^X. 
Solving for X 
(5.26) A = [R(Z'Z)~^R']~^(T-R0) . 
Substituting (5.26) into 5.23) 
(5.27) ôt* = a + (Z'Z)~^R'[R(Z'Z)"^R']~^(T-R0). 
Note that, if the restrictions are in agreement with the sample data, 
then a*=a, which is, for most cases, highly unlikely. A more reasonable 
assumption is that the expected value for the restrictions is equal to 
zero. 
(5.28) E(T-R&) = 0. 
Johnson (42) concluded; 
The result is then that whenever unbiased information is added 
to a standard least square problem and such information is not 
redundant, the result is an improvement in the sampling 
variance. That is, the R.L.S. estimator has a smaller sampling 
variance than the O.L.S. estimator, even if the restrictions 
happen to be biased. 
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We stated above that the actual estimation procedure to be used in 
this research will be the S.U.L.S., where the coefficient estimator is 
given by (Zellner, 81) 
(5.29) â = (Z'n~^Z)"^Z'n~^Q, 
where 0 is the Aitken's variance-covariance matrix of random errors. 
But, as he has expressed, if is a diagonal matrix or the set of 
independent variables is the same for each equation, then the generalized 
Aitken's estimator will yield exactly the same results as the single 
equation O.L.S. estimator. Further, if the latter condition is present, 
the results also will be the same, even if the disturbance terms in 
different equations are correlated. By extending this result into the 
linear restriction framework, the R.L.S. equation (5.27) holds for any 
case when one of the conditions explained above is present. As we will 
see in the next chapter, this situation happens to be the case of the 
demand system, specifically, the set of independent variables in each 
equation is the same. Unlike the demand case, the set of independent 
variables on each supply equation is not the same; thus, the R.L.S. 
estimator (5.27) still hold, but realizing that the vector of 
coefficients (a) is now given by (5.29), whose properties are at least 
asymptotically more efficient than those obtained by equation by equation 
application of O.L.S. (Zellner, 81). 
Lastly, we want to test if the restrictions are in accordance with 
the sample data, or, in other words, that the restrictions are unbiased. 
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The general linear hypothesis is Rex = r, where R contains the (2n+l) 
independent linear hypothesis to be evaluated. This test can be handled 
by applying an F statistic (Johnson, 42); thus, we have 
[SSE(op^)-SSE(a)]/. 
(5.30) ^j,t-k" SSE(0)/^_^ 
where j = (2n+l) independent restrictions; 
t = (nxt) number of observations on Q; 
k = (n(n+l)) number of independent variables on Z; 
SSE(a*) = calculated sum of squares for the restricted 
estimator; 
SSE(â) = calculated sum of squares for the unrestricted 
estimator. 
This test should be taken as an approximation in the case when ofi is 
given by the Aitken's generalized least square estimator (Zellner, 81). 
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CHAPTER VI. 
STATISTICAL RESULTS 
The statistical method described in Chapter V is now applied to 
obtain all price and income elasticities for the group of agricultural 
products mentioned in Chapter I (corn, rice, sugar cane, coffee and 
beef) . 
The demand system was estimated separately from the supply system, 
then it is reasonable to explain one at a time. The consumption of each 
of these five products per head of population is explained in terms of 
the retail price of each product, the per capita consumption expenditure 
in each of them and a random error 
Q. = total domestic consumption of the ith product 
N = population 
RP = retail price of rice 
SP = retail price of sugar 
CFP = retail price of coffee 
BP = retail price of beef 
CP = retail price of corn 
Ml = the sum of the per capita consumption expenditures in each of 
the products 
U. = random error. 
The Demand System 
i^CP' CP' CP ' CP' CPxN 
^ CFP BP U.) i=l, 2 ... 5 
where 
1 
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M 
Since Ml = P.Q., one of the equations is redundant, therefore it 
i=l ^ ^ 
is required to express the system in relative terms, here the price of 
corn was chosen as the numeraire. Before proceeding with the estimation 
it is desirable to choose the type of function for the d^ that appears to 
provide the better fit to the restrictions according to the criterion 
suggested earlier. This criterion determines whether the actual 
quantities consumed are generally more highly correlated with one another 
than are the budget proportion reciprocals. 
Correlating these sets of quantities using a time series of 21 
observations from 1960 to 1980 inclusive, the following two matrices of 
simple correlations are obtained. 
Table 6.1. Simple correlations of per capita consumption 
Corn Rice Sugar Coffee Beef Roots 
Corn 1.00 .92 .91 .81 .33 3.76 
Rice .92 1.00 .99 .82 .16 .96 
Sugar .91 .99 1.00 .87 .18 .20 
Coffee .81 .82 .87 1.00 .40 .08 
Beef .33 .16 .18 .40 1.00 .01 
Table 6.2. Simple correlations of the budget proportion reciprocal 
[l/w^J 
Corn Rice Sugar Coffee Beef Roots 
Corn 1.00 .13 -.03 .29 -.57 2.20 
Rice .13 1.00 -.11 .07 -.67 1.09 
Sugar -.03 -.11 1.00 .02 -.31 .98 
Coffee .29 .07 .02 1.00 -.50 .71 
Beef -.57 .67 -.31 -.50 1.00 .03 
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The first set of correlations appears to be generally higher. All 
the coefficients except for those of beef are greater than the 5 percent 
significance value of .413 (for 21 d.f.), whereas only three coefficients 
of the second set are greater than this value. A better idea is given by 
the size of the largest characteristic root of each matrix. By analogy 
with the concept of principal components, whereby the matrix with the 
largest root is said to contain the largest component of variance (Court, 
24), the first matrix (Table 6.1) has the largest value of 3.76 which can 
be said to have the larger component of correlation. 
As it seems that closer linear relationships exist between actual 
per capita consumption than budget proportional reciprocals, then a 
linear in variables formulation of the set of demand functions gives a 
greater likelihood to the restrictions than does a logarithmic functional 
form. 
Even though the proceeding test indicates the use of linear in 
variable function form, we also estimated the double logarithmic formu­
lation and in each case, the previous result was confirmed on the grounds 
of the expected sign of the coefficients as well as the statistical 
significance of them. Several different specifications of the demand 
system were estimated. The first attempt was the estimation of the 
demand system with the income variable as the national per capita income 
and all monetary variables were deflated by the consumer price index. 
The symmetric and homogeneity conditions were imposed on both the value 
of the parameters or on the value of elasticities. In neither of these 
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cases were the results satisfactory, the expected signs; particularly 
those on the own price and income elasticities, were not as expected, 
further the statistical significance of most of the coefficients were 
well above the 5 percent confidence limit. 
Having these kind of results, we decide to close the system in the 
sense of making the income variable equal to the sum of the specific per 
capita consumption expenditure. As it was mentioned before, under this 
specification of the system one of the equation is redundant. The choice 
of the numeraire was based on the performance of each of the products 
which by turn were chosen as the numeraire. Again, the symmetric and 
homogeneity conditions were imposed on the value of the parameters or on 
the value of the elasticities. The former procedure was the one with the 
better results. 
The value of the estimated coefficients, both with and without the 
homogeneity and symmetry conditions imposed are given below. The per 
capita consumption of corn, rice, sugar cane, coffee, and beef are 
denoted by C, R, SC, CF, B respectively and the price and income 
variables are as before. 
The corn coefficients were calculated by using the set of 
restrictions discussed in Chapter III. 
The estimated coefficients by ordinary least square or the first 
step of the simultaneous estimation, without imposing the restrictions 
were as follows. 
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Table 6.3. Estimated demand coefficients by OLS without restrictions 
R SC CF B Ml 
R 7.3 -14.2 -1.7 1.4 .06 93 
(5)* (1) (3) (27) (19) 
SC 7.1 - 9.8 -2.7 2.5 .03 92 
(11) (9) (1) (10) (63) 
CF -.46 - .40 - .08 - .22 .02 81 
(54) (67) (59) (39) (7) 
B -5.2 1.9 .45 -1.42 .05 67 
(1) (37) (21) (2) (3) 
^The numbers in parentheses are the significant level of the 
estimated parameters. 
The same set of coefficients but subject to the homogeneity and 
symmetry restrictions are presented below. 
Table 6.4. Estimated demand coefficients subject to homogeneity and 
symmetric conditions 
C R SC CF B Ml 
G - .83 .5 .07 -2.2 - .64 .07 
R -2.6 -6.3 -8.7 - .35 - .73 .12 
(1) (1) (13) (6) (1) 
SC -3 
-7.7 -9.6 - .36 -1.1 .14 
(1) (1) (10) (1) (1) 
CF -3.7 - .97 -1.5 .25 - .73 .04 
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
B - .49 .21 - .11 - .33 - .26 .02 
(45) (73) (1) (21) (4) 
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The imposition of the restrictions give the right sign for the own 
price effect for rice, sugar cane and beef, but not for coffee. Also, 
they produce some changes in the magnitude of the slopes, where the most 
notorious is the change on the beef coefficient which changes from -1.42 
to -.26. The level of statistical significance also was increased for 
almost all the own price effects, except for beef which decreases from a 
level of 2 percent to 21 percent. With respect to the income effect the 
restrictions show a big improvement in the level of significance since 
all of them are lower than the 5 percent. The magnitude of the income 
effect coefficients also presents some changes where the most important 
are on rice and sugar cane. 
Comparing the cross price coefficients we can see that they are the 
ones that present the most drastic changes in both the magnitude and 
sign. The relevant changes are presented by the coffee and beef demand 
equations. The former presents an increase in the magnitude of all of 
its coefficients as well as in the level of significance, but on the 
other hand the beef demand equation shows a decrease in the magnitude and 
in the level of significance of all its estimated parameters. Further, 
it is the equation that presents the most changes in the signs of the 
cross price effects. 
In order to avoid future problems on the stability condition of the 
model, a problem that will be discussed later, it is necessary to have 
the right sign for all the own price effects. Therefore, the negative-
ness assumption was imposed on the coffee own price effect, where the 
results are presented below. 
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Table 6.5 Estimated demand coefficients subject to homogeneity. symmetry 
and negative coffee own price effect 
C R SC CF B Ml 
C -9.1 2.2 .33 -7.2 .43 .05 
R -2.4 -10.6 -10.9 + .6 -1 .14 
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
SC —3.2 — 8.6 - 9.7 - .34 - .48 .13 
(1) (1) (11) (1) (1) 
CF -7.8 .6 - .7 - .25 - .22 .02 
(1) (2) (1) (3) (1) 
B - .39 - .27 - .33 - .12 - .87 .03 
(31) (29) (3) (1) (1) 
Forcing the coffee direct price coefficient to be negative brings 
about significant changes on the magnitude of the direct price effect 
particularly for corn and rice. Also, this restriction increased the 
statistical significance of the beef direct price coefficient from 21 
percent to 1 percent. The effects produced on the income parameters are 
minor, where most of them presented a slight decrease. 
The significant effects on the cross price coefficients were the 
changes in the sign of some of them. Thus, the corn-beef cross price 
effect became positive, also the rice-coffee and coffee-rice cross 
effects became positive. Lastly, the beef-rice cross effect turned out 
to be negative. 
2 2 
The weighted R for the system is .98. This R corresponds to the 
approximate F test on all nonintercept parameters in the system. 
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The homogeneity restrictions imposed were specified as follows 
2.27 f 1.36 * 8.75 6,,, * 9.11 » 313 «,^1 > 0 
i - 1 ... 4 
The figures before the coefficients represents the average relative 
prices of rice, sugarcane, coffee, beef and the average relative income 
expenditure, as they were explained by (5.8) but recognizing that what we 
are restricting in this case are the parameters and not the elasticities. 
The symmetry conditions imposed for each pair of product combinations 
were as follows. 
where the . represents the cross product first derivative of the 
demand function and stands for the income effect slope. The symbol 
defines the average per capita quantity consumed of the corresponding 
commodities. The values of this latter variable for the different 
products were for rice, 28.51 kilos; sugar, 43.48 kilos; coffee, 4.11 
kilos; and beef, 12.1 kilos. 
A test on the restrictions was performed to see if the information 
provided by them was bias, or in other words if the homogeneity, symmetry 
and negativeness conditions were in accordance with the sample data. 
Because the independent variables in each of the demand equations 
are the same, the estimation procedure used (S.U.L.S.) turns out to be 
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the same as the restricted O.L.S. Thus, the system satisfied the 
conditions required by the F test, the results are presented in the table 
below. 
Table 6.6. F test on the demand restrictions 
Restriction DF F 5% 1% 
Homog. 4, 60 4.68 2.53 3.65 
Symm. 6, 60 3.55 2.25 3.12 
Homog., Symm. 10, 60 3.57 1.99 2.63 
Negat., Horn., Symm. 11, 60 3.26 1.96 2.57 
According with the test performed all the restrictions imposed on 
the model in a single way or any combination are highly significant. In 
other words, the restricted model is significantly different from the one 
without restrictions. 
The main objective of estimating the demand slopes is to apply them 
on the welfare calculations and to do this we need them in compensated 
terras as is required by the consumer welfare theory. By applying the 
Slusky equation (3.62) to the last demand system, the compensated slopes 
were obtained. 
Table 6.7. Compensated demand coefficients 
C R SC CF B 
C 
-6.96 3.64 24.9 -1.96 1.03 
R 3.64 -6.72 -4.96 1.16 .66 
SC 2.49 -4.96 -4.16 .19 1.07 
CF -1.96 1.16 .19 - .17 .02 
B 1.03 . 66 1.07 .02 - .49 
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As it is expected all the compensated direct price slopes are lower 
or less responsive than the Marshallian type. 
The Supply Systems 
The supply system was specified as the quantity produced as a 
function of the lagged set of prices, the quantity produced lagged one 
period and the sum of the value added at constant monetary units. 
,e 2) 0 - s !Vl !!Vl iVl- „ X e 1 ( . 6 . 2 )  S^ WPI^ WPI. ' WPI. / WPI ' ^i,t-l' t' t'' 
t-1 t-1 t-2 t-1 t-i 
i=l, 2 ... 5 
where 
= domestic production of the ith commodity 
WPI^_^ = wholesale price index lagged one period, as a proxy for the 
price paid by farmer index 
= the sum of values added at constant Costa Rican currency 
(year base: 966) 
CP^ RP^_^, SCP^_2, CFP^ BP^_^ = average price received by 
farmers lagged one period for corn, rice, coffee and beef 
respectively and lagged two period for sugar cane. 
The statistical functional forms applied to the supply system were 
as before the linear invariables and the double logarithmic formulation. 
The characteristic roots procedure used on the demand system as a guide 
to choose between both statistical forms was not applied here since the 
symmetric conditions on the supply side gives no indication of the types 
of relation between the variables » particularly for the linear in 
variables model. Thus, both types of linear equations were fitted for 
each one of the different specifications applied and the choice was made 
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on the base of statistical significance of the supply price coefficients 
as well as the expected sign. In general terms, the linear invariables 
formulation presented the best results. As mentioned previously, differ­
ent specifications of the model were tried, when the key issue was the 
use of nominal, deflated, or expected lagged prices. Therefore, and 
because of the lack of any guidance, each of these price formulations 
were fitted under two alternatives—the first one was just using the 
price variables and the second alternative was to use both the price and 
the respective quantities lagged one period. The best results were 
obtained by applying the linear invariable formulation to the lagged 
prices and the lagged quantity produced for corn, rice, coffee, and beef, 
but for sugarcane the best result was obtained by lagging the producer 
price two years, which may reflect the long production period that sugar­
cane requires since the harvesting time takes place 14 to 16 months after 
the planting period. 
The next step was to choose the set of constraints to be applied. 
The most appealing set were the homogeneity and the symmetry. The aggre­
gation condition was disregarded because it requires that total revenue 
be equal to total factor income condition which is satisfied just for a 
close system which is not the case considered here. Further, this condi­
tion is related to a variable that is not just considered exogenous to 
the supply system but also in the multicommodity equilibrium 
formulation. 
Both constraints, homogeneity and symmetry, were applied jointly as 
well as separate to the estimated coefficients, where the former 
procedure gave the best results. 
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The homogeneity conditions were specified as follows 
439.4a. ^ + 997.5a. „ + 491a.+ 4639.2a. + 1861,3a. ^ = 0 
ijC i,R iSC ijCF i,B 
i = 1 ... 5 
The values that appear in front of the estimated coefficients 
represent the average deflated producer price of corn, rice, sugar cane, 
coffee, and beef, respectively. 
The symmetry conditions were applied as follows 
a .  . - a .  . = 0  i ^ j = 1 . . . 5  
The algebraic derivation of these specifications used for the 
homogeneity and symmetry conditions were presented in (5.19) and (5.20) 
but keeping in mind that what we are restricting over here are the supply 
slopes or its first derivatives. 
The value of the estimated supply coefficients without restrictions 
are presented in Table 6.8. The same set of coefficients but applying 
both conditions are presented in Table 6.9. 
The results obtained when the restriction were imposed gave the 
right sign for the direct price effect and their level of significance 
are fairly good for corn, rice, and beef but not for sugarcane and coffee 
where both have a significance level well above 5 percent. Comparing the 
supply system with and without restrictions we can say, in general terms, 
that the magnitude of the estimated coefficients are reduced. For 
209 
Table 6.8. Estimated supply coefficients without restrictions 
C R SC CF B X Qt-1 R^ 
c 133.3 44 38 -3.9 - 8.4 .11 .23 . 66 
(16) (31) (61) (28) (51) (12) (36) 
R -232 6.3 -70.8 -8.6 -59 .25 ,11 .96 
(1) (85) (14) (1) (1) (1) (49) 
SC 170.7 -10.6 84.8 3.3 20.7 .11 .52 .97 
(7) (79) (12) (28) (7) (21) (5) 
CF - 63 - 1.4 -22 - .5 3.8 .12 -.18 .99 
(1) (87) (13) (52) (11) (1) (27) 
B 177.3 15.9 58.4 6.2 20.4 .09 .50 .96 
(1) (61) (13) (1) (1) (10) (10) 
Table 6.9. Estimated supply coefficients with restrictions imposed 
C R SC CF B X Qt-1 
C 140.9 16.1 - 6.18 -7.9 -20.5 .09 .25 
(1) (51) (80) (1) (1) (6) (7) 
R 16.1 57.7 -12.3 -1.6 -27.6 .27 .3 
(51) (2) (51) (38) (1) (1) (1) 
SC - 6.18 -12.3 28.3 -3 8 .09 .57 
(80) (51) (26) (10) (14) (10) (1) 
CF - 7.9 - 1.6 - 3 .26 2.9 .10 .002 
(1) (38) (10) (21) (1) (1) (80) 
3 - 20.5 -27.6 8 2.9 10.3 .08 .18 
(1) (1) (14) (1) (1) (1) (16) 
example, the magnitude of the direct price coefficient for the export 
crops , sugar. coffee, and beef are reduced significantly but at the same 
time the coefficients for corn and rice are increased, particularly for 
rice. 
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The restrictions also made some changes on the sign of the estimated 
slopes. The direct price coefficient for coffee turns out positive, 
which is the one expected, but some cross effects changed their signs 
too, notorious are the rice-corn, sugar-corn, and beef-corn cross effects 
where the first become positive and the last two negative, and showing 
also a drastic decrease in the magnitude of their respective 
coefficients. 
A test on the restrictions imposed were made by applying the F test, 
which has to be taken as an approximation, since different sets of 
independent variables are used in each equation, specifically tVie lagged 
quantity produced. 
As was the case for the demand system, the homogeneity and symmetry 
conditions did not pass the test as indicated in Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10. F test on the supply restrictions 
Restriction DF F 5% 1% 
Horn. 5, 64 5.52 2.36 3.31 
Sym. 5, 64 5.55 1.98 2.61 
Horn., Sym. 15, 64 4.11 1.84 2.30 
The Multicommodity Model 
By adding the system of compensated demand with the system of supply 
coefficients, we would obtain the general equilibrium matrix of first 
derivatives implicitly described in (3.65). We are now in the position 
to get back to the problem of stability of the model, a problem that we 
are going to address by showing the effect of forcing the coefficient of 
the demand for coffee to be negative. 
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We have said before that the key issue for the model stability is 
that the characteristic roots of the excess supply matrix have to be all 
positives. Another important characteristic that the model should 
satisfy and, which depends solely on the stability condition, is its 
ability to predict the right sign for both the change on the quantity 
demanded and on the quantity supplied. These two characteristics will be 
examined when the coffee demand coefficient is forced to be negative and 
for the case when the same coefficient is not forced. 
The characteristics roots for both excess supply matrix are 
presented in Table 6.11, where the matrix without forcing the coffee 
coefficient shows two negative latent roots, especially for rows four and 
five. 
Table 6.11. Characteristic roots of the excess supply matrix 
Characteristic roots 
Row No forcing coffee Forcing coffee 
1 147.5 155.7 
2 69.1 72.6 
3 29.6 31 
4 - .92 .17 
5 - 5.13 - 3.66 
Yet, the excess supply matrix with the restriction on the coffee 
coefficient presents just one negative root. This improvement is more 
evident when the predicted signs for the change in quantity demanded and 
supplied are examined. To do this, we submitted both matrix to 
individual market intervention (a price increase) and allowing the rest 
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of the market to adjust to the new situation. Because we are most 
interested, at this point, in the predicted signs and not in the 
magnitude of the change, the former are the results that are presented 
in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.12. Predicted signs for the changes in quantity demanded and 
supplied 
Product No forcing coffee Forcing coffee 
D S D S 
C — — — + 
R - - - + 
SC + - + 
CF + + - + 
B + - + + 
For a raise in price we expect that the quantity supplied will 
increase and the quantity demanded will decrease even when the other 
markets are allowed to reach a new equilibrium. The predicted signs of 
the excess supply matrix without forcing the coffee demand coefficient 
does not match the expectation in three out of five cases on the supply 
size and in two cases on the demand side. On the other hand, when we 
forced the coffee coefficient, the predicted signs were the correct ones, 
except for the demand of beef which has a positive sign. This error may 
be the reflection of the changes on the cross effects of the demand of 
beef caused by the imposition of the negative condition on the coffee 
coefficient, particularly the corn-beef and beef-rice cross effects. 
Based on the results presented above, the excess supply matrix with 
the coffee condition enforced appears to be the best choice, even though 
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we recognize that the matrix does not satisfy in full the stability 
condition and that we have to assume that the change in the quantity 
demanded of beef would be the same but with the proper sign. Under these 
circumstances, the multicommodity equilibrium matrix which will be the 
framework for all the welfare analysis is presented in Table 6.13. 
Table 6.13. The multicommodity equilibrium matrix 
dCP dRP dSCP dCFP dBP dPX dX 
147.9 12.5 - 8.7 -5.9 -21.5 0 .09 
12.5 64.5 - 7.3 -2.7 -28.3 0 .27 
- 8.7 - 7.3 32.4 -3.2 7 0 .09 
- 5.9 - 2.7 - 3.2 .43 2.9 0 .10 
- 21.5 -28,3 7 2.9 10.8 0 .08 
.04 - .11 - .1 - .48 - .27 1 0 
The above matrix is formed with the compensated slopes of the excess 
supply functions and the factor income shares of the different product 
markets. The submatrix of excess supply functions must be symmetric 
since its elements are, as we said before, the compensated slopes. 
The Partial Equilibrium Results 
To have a point of reference for comparison purpose, the demand and 
supply for each commodity were estimated under the partial equilibrium 
assumption. Cross commodity price effects were included in the initial 
specifications, but in many cases these terms were of the wrong sign or 
not significant. 
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The linear invariables and the double logarithmic functional forms 
were fitted under different sets of independent variables. The final 
choice was made on the basis of the statistical significance of the 
coefficients as well as on the expected signs. 
The double logarithmic formulation gave the best results for the 
demand and supply for corn. 
Demand of corn: 
(6.3) LC = 5.57 - .12 LCP + .68 LM + .22 DC 
( 1 )  ( 1 0 )  ( 1 )  ( 1 )  
= .99 
DW = 1.90 
where 
LC = per capita consumption of corn in logarithmic form 
LCP = retail price of corn deflated by the CPI 
LM = deflated per capita income 
DC = dummy variable accounting for the change in the retail price 
(1971-80=1) 
The numbers in parentheses represent the level of significance of 
the respective coefficient and since it is a logarithmic formulation 
those coefficients also represent the partial equilibrium elasticities. 
Supply of corn: 
(6.4) LC = 5.14 + .94 LCP _ + .96 LY + .02 L + .18 DCA 
(2) (1) (4) (3) 
2 P -= .75 
DW =1.45 
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where 
LC = the current quantity produced of corn in logarithmic form 
LCP^ ^ = the deflated price of corn received by the farmers lagged on 
period 
LY = the current yield of corn per hectare 
Lt = a trend variable 
DCA = dummy variable accounting for those years reporting a higher 
than usual are planted (1973, 75, 80=1) 
The double logarithmic formulation also presented the best results 
for both the demand and supply of rice. 
Demand of rice: 
(6.5) LR = 1.13 - .94 LRP + .6 LM + .37 DR 
(1) (1) (1) 
R^ = .96 
DW = 1.63 
where 
LR = per capital consumption of rice in logarithmic form 
LRP = retail price of rice 
LM = per capita income 
DR = dummy variable representing the change on the basic grain 
policy (1971 - 80 = 1) 
Supply of rice: 
(6.6) LR = 4.31 + 1.28 LRP + .91 LShP + .25 LR + .40 Lt 
(4) (15) (16) ~ (1) 
R^ = .98 
DW = 1.45 
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where 
LR = current quantity produced of rice in logarithmic form 
LRP^ ^ = the deflated (WPl) price of rice received by farmers lagged one 
period 
LShP^ ^ = the deflated price of sorghum received by farmers lagged one 
period 
LR^ ^ = the quantity of rice produced lagged one period 
Lt = trend variable 
The sugar case is represented by a double logarithmic demand 
equation and a linear invariables supply equation which was corrected for 
autocorrelation. 
Demand of sugar : 
(6.7) LSC = 1.55 - .32 LSCP + .65 LM + .02 Lt 
( 1 )  ( 1 )  ( 8  
= .99 
DW = 2.13 
where 
LSC = per capital consumption of sugar in logarithmic form 
LSCP = retail price of sugar deflated by the CPI 
LM = deflated per capita income 
Lt = a trend variable 
Supply of sugar: 
(6.8) SC = 6274.4 + 61.4 SCP % + 4.14 CFP , + 22.3 ISCP , 
( 3 )  C D  ( 1 )  
+ 1.67 St 
(1)  
= .91 
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where 
se = current quantity produced of sugar 
SCP^_^ = deflated (WPI) price of sugar received by farmers lagged one 
period 
CFP^ ^ = deflated price of coffee received by farmers lagged one period 
ISCP^_^ = deflated world price of sugar lagged one period 
St = beginning of the year stocks of sugar 
The linear invariable formulation was the one that presented the 
best results for the demand and supply of coffee even though the demand 
price coefficient is just significant at the 25 percent level. 
Demand of coffee: 
(6.9) CF = 2.99 - .10 CFP + .0004 M + 1,71 DGF 
(25) (7) (1) 
= .90 
DW = 1.21 
where 
CF = per capital consumption of coffee 
CFP = retail price of coffee deflated by the CPI 
M = deflated per capita income 
DCF = dummy variable which take account of the change in the retail 
price policy (1973-80=1) 
Supply of coffee 
(6.10) CF = 32563.8 + .78 CFP , + .52 CF , 
t—1 t-1 
R^ = .80 
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where 
CF = current quantity produced of green coffee 
CFP^ ^ = the price of green coffee received by farmers lagged one year 
CF^_^ = lagged quantity produced of green coffee 
Finally, the demand of beef is explained by a logarithmic equation, 
unlike the supply where the best results were obtained by the linear 
invariable formulation. In both cases, the price coefficient were not 
highly significant. 
Demand of beef: 
(6.11) LB = -.42 - ,22 LBP + .42 LM - .27 DB 
(28) (4) (1) 
= .70 
DW = 1.80 
where 
LB = per capita consumption of beef in logarithmic form 
LBP = deflated retail price of beef 
LM = deflated income 
DB = dummy variable accounting for those observations out of the 
price trend (1973, 75, 76 = 1) 
Supply of beef 
(6.12) B = 6415.6 + 5.51 BP + .86 , 
( 2 6 )  ( 1 )  "  
= .90 
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where 
B = current live weight beef cattle supplied to the market 
BP = average price received by the beef cattle growers for the live 
weight cattle, deflated by the WPI and lagged one period 
B^ ^ = the quantity supply of beef cattle lagged one period 
The set of relevant partial equilibrium elasticities is presented in 
Table 6.14. In the next chapter, these are compared to the elasticities 
derived by the multicommodity equilibrium model. 
Table 6.14. Partial equilibrium elasticities 
Demand Supply 
Product Pr M Comp.^ - - - Price - - -
SR L.R 
Corn -.12 .68 -.11 .94 N.A. 
Rice 
-.94 .60 -.93 1.28 1.7 
Sugar -.32 .65 -.31 .33 N.A. 
Coffee 
-.17 .33 -.17 .08 .18 
Beef -.22 .42 -.21 .10 .71 
^Compensated elasticities. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
WELFARE MEASURES OF COSTA RICA 
MARKET INTERVENTIONS 
From Chapter I, we can deduce what have been the most important 
price policies in the last decade for the five products included in this 
study. As a matter of a brief review, we will point out these policies, 
the levels set by the government, and the time period on which the policy 
in question is relevant. 
The price support policy has been the key market intervention in the 
basic grain subsector with the idea of reaching the national self-
sufficient level. Thus, for corn, the average support price during the 
period 1974-77 was 719.2 colones ($85.6) per metric ton, above the inter­
national market price and for the period 1978-80 the level was 1365.9 
colones ($166.3) above the corresponding international price. In 
relative terms, and for the first period mentioned, it would mean that 
the domestic price support for corn was set 74.4 percent above the free 
market price, and 146 percent for the second period. Despite these huge 
differences between prices, the country has not been able to obtain its 
self-sufficiency on corn. 
The same kind of policy has been applied to the rice industry and 
the results obtained have been completely different from those in the 
corn industry, because the country has become a rice exporter since the 
mid-1970s. Removing the years when the international price of rice 
increased dramatically (1973-74), the support price of rice has been, in 
general, set above the international market level. Thus, for the period 
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1975-77, the domestic support price was 319 colones ($38) per metric ton 
higher, which corresponds to a 12.5 percent relative to the free market 
price. In the second period (1978-80), the average level was higher on 
455.8 colones/ra.t. or 14.3 percent above its international opportunity 
cost. 
The sugar market has been influenced by two types of market 
policies, taxes on exports and a ceiling price policy at the domestic 
wholesale level. In general terms, the wholesale price of sugar has been 
lower than the international price except during 1977-78 when the inter­
national market suffered a significant decrease. Thus, the domestic 
wholesale price of sugar was on average 2486 colones ($230) lower than 
the export price during the period (1974-76) and 418.6 colones ($50) per 
metric ton during the more recent period of 1979-80. 
The second policy of interest on the sugar industry has been the tax 
on exports. Two major taxes have been imposed on sugar, the export right 
in 1961 and the ad valorem export right in 1974. According to their 
respective schedules presented in Chapter II and jointly with the average 
export price of 3228 colones/m.t. ($384.3) during the period 1974-80, the 
export right tax would be 5 percent and the ad valorem tax would be 1 
percent on average, making a total of 6 percent tax on sugar exports. 
This would mean a total amount of 190 colones/m.t. ($22.6) based on the 
average export price. 
The coffee market also has some export taxes that are its major 
market policies. The ad valorem tax on production which was reviewed in 
1974 and its final schedule was presented in Chapter I; the other tax is 
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the ad valorem export tax which has been 8 percent of the export price 
since 1976 and raised to 13 percent in 1980. The average export price 
for the 1974-80 period is 22685.7 colones/m.t. ($2,700.7), therefore and 
according with the schedule the average tax on production has been 10 
percent which added with the export tax makes a total tax of 18 percent 
on the coffee industry. This relative figure represents an amount equal 
to 4006.8 colones/m.t. ($477) that the government will take per metric 
ton of coffee. 
Finally, the beef market has had an export tax of 1 percent since 
1974. The average export price for the 1979-80 period is 13536.4 
colones/m.t. ($1,587.7) then the 1 percent tax would represent an amount 
equal to 133.4 colones/m.t. 
The policy objective of the tax policies reviewed above is to 
generate revenue that the government will administer as a regular income 
to support its normal functions. 
This set of policies can be analyzed in different ways. For 
example, one can take the chronological path and see what would be the 
effect of a specific policy on the target market but recognize the 
existence of distortions on the other markets at the time that such a 
policy was implemented. This can also be analyzed by assuming no distor­
tion at all on the target market before the implementation of the policy 
in question or considering as a new policy the change on the level of an 
existing distortion. 
For our purpose, we will assume that no predistortion exists in the 
target market, which implies that the level of the policy variable will 
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be the difference with respect to the free market level and it will not 
reflect the change between different levels of the same policy variable. 
Another issue that we have to decide is the time framework one which 
the different policies will be analyzed. We considered that the most 
recent level of variables set by the government would be the best 
representative of the policy pursued by it. Thus, the set of policies to 
be analyzed for the different markets are the following: 
Table 7.1. The set of market policies chosen for the welfare analysis 
Average 
level 
Market Policy (%) Year 
Corn Pr. Supp. 146 1978-80 
Rice Pr. Supp. 14.3 1978-80 
Pr. Ceiling 12 1979-80 
Sugar Exp. taxes 6 1974-80 
Both 18 1979-80 
Coffee Exp. taxes 18 1976-80 
Beef Exp. tax 1 1974-79 
This set of policies can be analyzed in all possible combinations. 
For example, taking one, two, three, and four markets at a time. The 
most logical combination would be the last one, since it is the one that 
will reflect better the markets' reality. To make this possible for all 
markets, we need a specific year when all the policies are implemented; 
otherwise, some markets will not present the required characteristics for 
the necessary combination of policies. For example, and according with 
the table above, the tax policies on the coffee and beef markets were 
implemented in 1976 and 1974, respectively, but at that time only the 
224 
sugar tax policy was in place, therefore constituting their only combina­
tion possible. In order to avoid this type of problem and looking for 
the same set of policy combination for each market, all the elasticities 
will be evaluated at 1979 prices and quantities, year in which all the 
policies stated in the table above were implemented. Finally, the single 
market case will also be analyzed, which will be compared with the 
results obtained from the partial equilibrium assumption and with the 
rest of the policy combinations. 
Basic Grains 
The analysis of the support price policy on corn is presented in 
Table 7.2. The welfare analysis was carried out by using the formulation 
presented in the Appendix. Comparing the results obtained by using the 
partial equilibrium elasticities with the results from the multicommodity 
equilibrium model, where all the markets are allowed to adjust to the new 
price of corn introduced by the government, the results show that they 
are quite different since the estimated private effects using the more 
general model are just about 60-65 percent of those obtained by the 
common method of partial equilibrium. This difference indicates the 
effect that the interrelated markets have on the target market when they 
are allowed to adjust. 
The single policy case (corn only) indicates that imposing a price 
support level of 146 percent above the free market price of corn and 
assuming that all other markets are free of any intervention would 
produce a net loss of 82.1 percent of the initial consumer expenditure 
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Table 7.2. Welfare effects of the support price on corn in 1979 
percentage change^ 
Effects 
Partial 
equilib. 
ODm 
only 
C^e 1 (SC) 
Sim. Adj 
case 2 (B) 
Sim. Adj. 
Case 3 (CF) 
Sim. Adj. 
Case 4 (R) 
Sim. Adj. 
C.S. (-) 134.3 82.1 119.4 124.7 70.9 - 1.08 - 57.7 113 73.4 
P.S. (+) 246.2 159.9 324 273.9 321.2 183.3 160.4 321.8 301.5 
E.L. (-) 77.9 73 142.3 103.4 104.5 189.8 171.3 181.32 147.4 77.4 
G.R.(+) 104.7 94.8 233.6 194.6 157.8 243.1 291.6 301.6 243.6 173.6 
G.R.R. + 8.04 + 60.6 + 34.5 
G.R. SC. 
-.7 - 31.3 - 33.1 
G.R.CF. 
- 39 + 25.4 - 30 
G.R.B. - 8 + 6.6 - 6.5 
Net - 39 + 85.3 + 10 - 70 
AC.S.SC. + 53.8 + 56.6 + 39.6 
AP.S.SC. + 47.3 - 22.9 - 20.3 
E.S. .94 ,13 1.67 1.20 .35 1.65 
E.D. - .11 - .6 - .25 - 2.0 - 1.38 - .31 
^Of the five commodities, corn (C), rice (R), sugarcane (SC), 
coffee (CF), and beef (S), one must always be free of government 
intervention and allowed to adjust to the other commodity policies. In 
each case the commodity in parentheses is the one free of government 
intervention. 
^Unadjusted welfare effects. 
^Adjusted welfare effects for government revenues (losses) in the 
other markets, and from price control policies, as follows: Adj. C.S. = 
Sim. + AC.S.SC., Adj. P.S. = Sim. + AP.S.SC., Adj. G.R. = Sim. + Net, 
Adj. E.L. = the residual. 
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that is 159.9 percent higher than their initial producer income. This 
benefit is just a little higher than the institutionalized price level of 
146 percent. The interesting part is that the government by importing 
corn to satisfy the domestic demand and selling it at the established 
level will receive an income of about 94.8 percent of the initial 
consumer expenditure. The implementation of this policy will result in a 
loss for the society as a whole of 73 percent of the consumer expendi­
ture, a figure that is about 77 percent of what the government gets as a 
revenue. 
The next four cases refer to the possible combinations of the 
different agricultural policies. These cases have to be understood as 
the analysis of the effects produced by introducing the support price 
policy on corn when three of the other markets already have a certain 
type of intervention. Hence, Case 1 (SC) means that the corn support 
price is implemented when the rice market has been intervened by a 
support price, the coffee and beef markets by export taxes and the sugar 
market is considered free of any intervention. 
To understand the meaning of the figures in the columns, take 
Case 2, which is the combination of corn, rice, coffee, and sugarcane 
policies. So, the implementation of the corn support price at a level 
146 percent above the international price would produce the following 
welfare effects without adjustments (Sim.) or without taking account of 
changes in government revenues on the related markets, neither accounts 
for changes in consumer and producer surplus due to the presence of the 
wholesale ceiling price in the sugar market. Under these circumstances. 
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the corn support policy would result in a net consumer loss of 124.7 
percent of the initial consumer expenditure. The producers, on the other 
hand, will receive a gain of 274 percent of their initial income. The 
government through imports will get an income which is about 157.8 
percent of the initial consumer expenditure and the net efficiency lost 
would be 104.5 percent of the same consumer expenditure. 
The corn support policy will have effects on the government revenues 
or losses that are not taken into account by the above figures or by the 
welfare analysis of the target market. Specifically, the government 
revenue obtained from the corn market has to be adjusted by the change in 
the government losses on the rice market and by the changes on tax 
revenues on the coffee and sugar market. These adjustments are included 
in the (Adj.) columns, and they have to be calculated in terms of the 
initial consumer expenditure of corn in order to be added or 
subtracted.^ Hence, the corn support price policy will decrease the 
losses in the rice market (G. R. R.), change that has to be taken as an 
increase in the revenues from the corn market and this increase is about 
60.6 percent. The revenues on the sugar market (G.R.SC) suffer a 
decrease of .7 percent in terms of the corn market, figures that have to 
^The change in government revenues on the related markets was 
estimated by taking account of the direction and magnitude of the cross 
effect predicted by the model on the supply and demand side. And these 
changes were then calculated in terms of the corresponding initial base. 
The general formula was 
i j = 1 ... 5 . 
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be subtracted from the corn government income. The last adjustment in 
this income comes from the change on the tax revenue of coffee (G.R.CF.) 
which increases about 25 percent. 
Taking all this adjustment together will give the net adjustment 
effect (net) on the corn government revenue, which is an increase of 85 
percent. 
We mentioned in Chapter IV that the private effects (C.S., P.S.) on 
the target market do not capture the changes on the same effects in those 
markets with price ceiling or price floor. In our case, the sugar market 
presents a wholesale ceiling price whose changes on the private effects 
also have to be considered. As was the case for the government revenue, 
those changes have to be estimated in terms of the corresponding base.^ 
The change on the corn consumer surplus, then has to be adjusted by the 
change on the same effect but in the sugar market (AC.S.SC.) which was 
estimated to increase about 54 percent. Also, the producers (AP.S.SC.) 
will enjoy a 47 percent increase. Considering all these adjustments, 
the net effects of the support price on corn are presented in column 
(Adj.) \Aiere we can see that the adjustment effects are quite 
^The change on C.S. of the sugar market in terms of the initial 
consumer expenditure of the target product was estimated by 
X fix ac j = 1 ... 4 
The same formula can be used for P.S. by changing the respective 
parameters. 
229 
significant. For example, the loss in consumer surplus is reduced in 57 
percent, the producer surplus is increased in 17 percent, the government 
revenue is also increased in 54 percent, and, finally, the net efficiency 
loss presents an increase of 82 percent. 
In terms of the efficiency loss to the society, the best alternative 
is presented when all other markets are assumed to be free of any inter­
vention. Because we have to deal with more than one market price policy, 
the best way to analyze the problem is to compare all the possible 
combinations and find that one that minimizes the losses to the country 
as a whole as well as to the particular private group for which the 
policy is biased against. In the case of the corn support price, the 
consumers are the ones most hurt by this policy. Looking throughout the 
different cases, the one that presents the better results for the 
consumers is Case 3 or the combination corn, rice, beef, and sugar, 
because under this set of policies the consumers will not only eliminate 
their losses but also a gain of about 58 percent. The producers, which 
are the beneficiaries of the corn policy, will not enjoy as much as the 
other combination suggested. The government revenue generated by this 
set of policies is the highest, and the efficiency loss produced is also 
the highest. The corn support price policy has been implemented mainly 
to reach the domestic self-sufficiency on corn. In view of this policy 
goal and the results obtained on all the combinations, it seems possible 
that the government can compensate the consumers by covering their net 
losses and still get some income. 
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The last point worth mentioning before leaving the corn market is 
the kind of results obtained for the demand and supply total 
elasticities. The interesting point is that they present significant 
differences according to the set of distortions included in the model, a 
fact that has deep repercussions on the welfare analysis. 
The other basic grain involved in the analysis is rice for which a 
traditional support price policy has been applied throughout the period. 
The policy has the same goal of reaching self-sufficiency. The results 
obtained in the rice market have been quite different from those in corn 
because the country has become an exporter of rice since 1976. The main 
point in the rice policy is that the support price generally has been 
above its international price, therefore, what the government is doing is 
to subsidize domestic producers. The only two possible reasons for this 
economic behavior are the difficulty of the government to lower the level 
of the support price due to pressures from the rice producers, who are 
very well-organized. The other reason, which jointly with the last one 
could explain the government's reluctancy of lowering the price, is the 
need of foreign exchange caused by the balance of payment problems. 
The welfare analysis for the rice policy is presented in Table 7.3; 
where those areas were estimated by the formulas presented in the 
Append ix. 
As in the case for corn, the partial equilibrium results are quite 
different from those obtained by the single policy equilibrium case (rice 
only). Particularly different are the results for the government and net 
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Table 7.3. Welfare effects of the support price on rice in 1979 
percentage change^ 
Effects 
Partial 
equilii. 
Rice 
only 
Case 1 (SC) 
Sm. Adj.c 
Càse 2 (B) 
Sim. Mj. 
Câse 3 (CF) 
Sim. Mj. 
Case 4 (C) 
Sim. Mj. 
C.S. (-) 7.7 14.02 8.7 11 12.9 13.8 17.1 9.3 13.8 
P.S. (+) 23.5 15.02 22.2 16.4 17.9 21 16 22.4 20.6 
E.L. (-) 15.8 1 13.4 10.9 5.7 16.1 73 13.1 13.1 16.3 
G.R.(-) 31.6 2 26.9 24.4 11.3 21.1 14.6 12.1 26.2 23.1 
G.R.C. - 1.3 - 9.4 + 2.2 
G.R. SC. 
- .4 + .20 - .3 
G.R. CF. + 3.4 - .3 + 3 
G.R.B. + .42 + .18 
- .4 
Net + 2.5 -10.1 + 2.6 + 3.1 
AC.S.SC. 
- 1.9 - 3.6 - 4.5 
AP.S.SC. + 1.5 - 5 - 1.8 
E.S. 1.28 .10 - .29 .95 1.13 
E.D. - .93 - .04 - .50 .07 - .70 
^Of the five commodities, corn (C), rice (R), sugarcane (SC), 
coffee (CF), and beef (B), one must always be free of government 
intervention and allowed to adjust to the other commodity policies. In 
each case the commodity in parentheses is the one free of government 
intervention. 
^Unadjusted welfare effects. 
^Adjusted welfare effects for government revenues (losses) in the 
other markets, and from price control policies, as follows: Adj. C.S. = 
Sim. + AC.S.SC., Adj. P.S. = Sim. + AP.S.SC., Adj. G.R. = Sim. + Net, 
Adj. E.L. = the residual. 
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efficiency losses, which are just about 6 percent of the figures obtained 
from the partial equilibrium analysis. The consumer surplus doubles 
while the producer surplus is 65 percent of the corresponding figures on 
the traditional method. 
The results from the single policy case indicate that the consumer 
will suffer a loss of 14.02 percent of the initial equilibrium 
expenditure, which is almost the same, in relative terms, as the increase 
in price. On the other hand, the producers will have a gain of 15 
percent of the initial equilibrium income, which by assumption is the 
same as the equilibrium expenditure (see the Appendix). The government 
would have a loss of 2 percent and the society would have to pay 1 
percent of the initial equilibrium income with the implementation of this 
policy. These figures are the result of the low demand and supply price 
elasticities obtained under the specified characteristics. 
Quite different results are obtained when we analyzed the rice 
policy joined with three other market price policies. The adjustment to 
the government revenues in this case comes from the corn, sugar, coffee, 
and beef markets. And the private adjustment effects still come from the 
sugar market. One difference in the adjustment process of the G.R. is 
that in the case of rice we are dealing with government losses, so, any 
G.R. increase in any other market has to be considered as a reduction of 
the government losses in the rice market. It is confirmed again that the 
adjustment effects are quite significant. 
In addition to being difficult to justify the rice market price 
policy, we would analyze it by looking at that policy combination that 
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minimizes the domestic consumer losses as well as the net efficiency 
loss. The set of policies that gave the best results is the corn, rice, 
coffee, and beef or Case 1, which after the adjustments only allows 8.7 
percent on consumer losses and 11 percent on Che efficiency loss. If the 
government wants to minimize its loss by transferring the burden to the 
domestic consumers, the best choice would be Case 3, because it just 
allows 12 percent on government losses but at the same time increases the 
consumers' burden up to 17 percent. 
Sugarcane 
The sugarcane market has two price policies, the wholesale ceiling 
price and the export tax. The welfare effects of the former are 
presented in Table 7.4. It is remarkable the similarities of the results 
from the partial equilibrium and those from the multicommodity model. 
Each method of estimation indicates that this type of price policy, 
particularly when the government does not receive any income directly 
from its implementation, it is merely a transfer of resources from the 
producers to the consumers in an amount more or less equal to the level 
of the price ceiling. The estimated efficiency loss for all cases 
analyzed is very low. It ranged from .13 to .25 of 1 percent of the 
initital consumer expenditures. A result quite different from the one 
obtained on the basic grain analysis is that it does not matter what type 
of policy combination is in place, the results would be quite similar. 
This price ceiling policy does not produce any government income by 
itself, but some changes on it come from the other interrelated markets. 
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Table 7.4. Welfare effects of the sugar wholesale ceiling price 
in 1979 percentage change 
Partial Sugar Câse 1 (B) Case 2 (CF) Case 3 (R) Case 4 (C) 
Effects equilib. only Sim. Adj.^ Sim. Mj. Sim. Mj. Sim. Mj. 
C.S. (+) 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.1 12.2 12.2 
P.S. (-) 12.5 12.5 12.4 12.3 12.4 12.4 
E.L. (-) .22 .25 .21 .13 .2 1.8 
G.R. 1.1 .87 -.44 
G.R.C. 
- .37 + 1.7 - 1.1 
G.R.R. + .58 - .65 + .36 
G.R.CF. + .85 + .67 + .55 
G.R.B. 
- .14 + .01 + .01 
Net + 1.1 
00 +
 
- .44 + .91 
E.S. .33 - .07 - .18 - .04 - .22 - .22 
E.D. - .31 .36 .29 .17 2.8 .74 
^Of the five commodities, corn (C), rice (R) , sugarcane (SC), 
coffee (CF), and beef (B), one must always be free of government 
intervention and allowed to adjust to the other commodity policies. In 
each case the commodity in parentheses is the one free of government 
intervention. 
^Unadjusted welfare effects. 
"^Adjusted welfare effects for government revenues (losses) in the 
other markets, as follows: Adj. G.R. = Net. 
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thus, Case 1 will bring about 1.1 percent increase in the government 
revenue from the corn, rice, and coffee markets. On the other hand, the 
set of policies included in Case 3 would produce a decrease on the G.R, 
of about one half of 1 percent. 
The second sugar cane policy is the tax on exports (6 percent) where 
the welfare analysis is shown by Table 7.5. As with the wholesale price 
ceiling case, the results obtained from the partial equilibrium analysis 
and those from the single policy raulticommodity model (sugar only) are 
very similar. 
The results from the single policy case indicates that an export tax 
of 6 percent would produce an increase in the consumer suplus of about 
6.1 percent of the initial consumer expenditure, the producers would 
report a loss of 6.0 percent of the free trade income. Tlie government 
would receive an income tax, which is .16 of a 1 percent of the initial 
producers' income. Tlie country as a whole will suffer a net efficiency 
loss of .08 of 1 percent in terms of the same producers' income. 
The analysis of the different policy combinations indicates that 
quite similar nonadjusted results are obtained despite the set of market 
price policies included in the estimation. 
The adjustment to the welfare calculations came from the corn 
(G.R.C.), rice (G.R.R.), coffee (G.R.CF.) and beef (G.R.B.) markets. 
These adjustments made the difference on the final welfare estimation for 
the net efficiency loss as well as for the government revenue. 
Judging from the principal goal of the sugar export tax of just 
producing an income to the government, the best set of policies is given 
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Table 7.5. Welfare effects of the sugarcane export tax policy 
in 1979 percentage change 
Partial Sugar Càse 1 (B) (kse 2 (CF) Case 3 (R) Càse 4 (C) 
Effects equilib. only Sim. Adj.^  Sim. Adj. Sim. Adj. Sim. Mj. 
C.S. (+) 6.1 6.1 6.05 6.03 6.05 6.04 
P.S. (-) 5.9 6.0 5.97 5.99 5.96 5.96 
E.L. (-) .12 .08 .09 .69 .04 .51 .09 -.13 .08 
G.R. (+) .23 .16 .17 .77 .03 .55 .18 -.04 .17 
G.R.C. - .17 + .90 - .56 
G.R.R. + .33 - .40 + .16 
G.R. CF. + .44 + .33 + .27 
G.R.B. - .03 + .01 - .0001 
Net + .60 + .47 - .22 + .43 
E.S. .33 - .07 - .18 - .04 - .22 - .22 
E.D. - .31 .36 .29 .17 .28 .24 
^Of the five commodities, corn (C), rice (R), sugarcane (SC), 
coffee (CF), and beef (B), one must always be free of government 
intervention and allowed to adjust to the other commodity policies. In 
each case the commodity in parentheses is the one free of government 
intervention. 
^Unadjusted welfare effects. 
^Adjusted welfare effects for government revenues (losses) in the 
other markets, as follows: Adj. G.R. = Sim. + Net, Adj. E.L. = 
the residual. 
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by Case 1, because it would produce an income tax of .77 of 1 percent. 
At the same time, the net efficiency loss to the country would be about 
the same magnitude. On the other hand, the worst set of policies in 
terms of the income tax produced would be Case 3, which would produce a 
loss of .04 percent of 1 percent in government incomes, but the country 
will enjoy an increase in efficiency of .13 of 1 percent. 
Coffee 
The welfare analysis of the coffee market price policy is presented 
in Table 7.6. These areas were estimated by applying the formulas 
presented in Chapter III as was the case for the sugarcane export tax. 
Again there is not much difference between the results from the 
partial equilibrium and the single policy case under the multicommodity 
model (coffee only). The latter analysis indicates that an 18 percent 
tax on the coffee international price would result in an increase of 18.3 
percent of the consumer surplus (C.S.) in terms of the free market 
consumer expenditure. The same policy would also produce a loss to the 
producers of about 18 percent of the free trade farmers income. The 
government will accrue an income tax which is lower than 1 percent (.68 
percent) of the initial free trade producers revenue and the country 
would lose .34 of 1 percent of the same quantity. 
According to the results for the different combination of policies, 
there is not much difference among the consumer and producer nonadjusted 
estimated surplus areas. The same is not true for the government revenue 
and the efficiency loss areas, where the former presents a gain that 
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Table 7 .6. Welfare effects of the 
percentage change 
coffee set of taxes in 1979 
Effects 
Partial 
equilib. 
Coffee Csise 1 (SC) 
only Sim.^ Adj 
Case 2 (b) 
Sim. Aîj. 
Case 3 (R) 
Sim. Mj. 
Case 4 (C) 
Sim. Mj. 
C.S. (+) 18.3 18.3 18.6 18.7 18.9 18.5 18,5 19.0 18.2 
P.S. (-) 17.9 18 18 17.8 16.6 17.9 17.1 20.0 19.2 
E.L. (-) .41 .34 .60 3.42 .86 - 6.7 .54 3.67 1.0% .188 
G.R. (+) .81 .68 1.23 4.03 1.72 - 4.28 1.07 5.07 2.008 1.2 
G.R.C. + 3.5 - 5.8 + 3.9 
G.R.R. - .66 - .3 - .96 
G.R.SC. + .10 + .09 + .20 
G.R.B. - .04 - .02 - .03 
Ifet + .28 - 6.0 + 4.0 - .80 
ÛC.S.SC. + .30 + .03 
- .75 
AP.S.SC. + 1.22 + .84 + .77 
E.S. .08 - .03 .01 .11 - .04 .02 
E.D. 
- .17 .18 .37 .42 .29 .10 
^Of the five commodities, corn (C), rice (R), sugarcane (SC), 
coffee (CF), and beef (B), one must always be free of government 
intervention and allowed to adjust to the other commodity policies. In 
each case the commodity in parentheses is the one free of government 
intervention. 
^Unadjusted welfare effects. 
^Adjusted welfare effects for government revenues (losses) in the 
other markets, as follows: Adj. C.S. = Sim. + AC.S.SC., Adj. P.S. = 
Sim. + AP.S.SC., Adj. G.R. = Sim. + Net, Adj. E.L. = the residual. 
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ranged from 1.07 percent to 2.01 percent of the initial producers' 
revenue and the latter shows a range of .54 to 1.0 percent of the same 
quantity. 
When we include the adjustment effects, these two areas show the 
most significant changes, unlike the private adjusted areas which just 
have minor changes. 
The best combination of policies in terms of the income generated 
would be Case 3, because it would generate a revenue that is 5.1 percent 
of the initial producer income, but the net efficiency figure indicates a 
loss of 72.4 percent of that government income. In terms of society, the 
best combination would be given by Case 2, because the government would 
suffer a loss of revenues of 4.3 percent and the country would gain an 
increase in efficiency of 6.7 percent. 
Beef 
The last market policy analyzed is the beef export tax (1 percent) 
whose welfare results are presented in Table 7.7. As was the case for 
the other tax policies studied, there are no differences between the 
results of the two methods presented here. The more general model under 
the single policy assumption (beef only) indicates that the producers 
would suffer a loss of 1.03 percent of the free trade revenue. The 
consumers, on the other hand, would perceive a gain equal to 1.03 percent 
of their pre-tax expenditure on beef. The government would get an income 
which is equal to .014 of 1 percent of the free trade producers revenue 
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Table 7.7. Welfare effects of the beef export tax policy in 
1979 percentage change^ 
Partial Beef Case 1 (SC) (kse 2 (CF) Case 3 (R) Càse 4 (C) 
Effects eqiiilib. only Sim. Sim. Mj. Sim. Mj. Sim. Mj. 
C.S. (+) 
P.S. (-) 
E.L. (-) 
G.R. (+) 
G.R.C. 
G. R.R. 
G.R. SC. 
G.R. CF. 
Ifet 
AC.S.SC. 
AP.S.SC. 
E.S. 
E.D. 
1.03 1.036 1.037 
1.03 1.029 1.028 
.006 .007 .009 
.003 .014 .018 
- .10 
- .10 
- .04 
- .24 
1.035 1.065 1.032 1.192 1.033 .823 
1.028 1.128 1.03 1.04 1.028 1-058 
.008 -1.22 .0024 - .45 .005 .07 
.0048 - .295 .010 - .17 
- .34 
.10 .14 .43 
.21 -1.17 -1.29 
-.227 .016 -1.28 
- .16 
+ .30 
- .01 
-1.3 
+ .03 
- .10 
.45 
-1.01 
- .13 
+ .20 
- .30 
+ .16 
- .01 
.09 
- .36 
- .10 
+ .02 
- .10 
- .18 
- .21 
- .03 
,37 
- .61 
^Of the five commodities, corn (C), rice (R), sugarcane (SO), 
coffee (CF), and beef (B), one must always be free of government 
intervention and allowed to adjust to the other commodity policies. In 
each case the commodity in parentheses is the one free of government 
intervention. 
^Unadjusted welfare effects. 
^Adjusted welfare effects for government revenues (losses) in the 
other markets, as follows: Adj. C.S. = Sim. + AC.S.SC., Adj. P.S. = 
Sim. + AP.S.SC., Adj. G.R. = Sim. + Net, Adj. E.L. = the residual. 
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and Che country would have an efficiency loss equal to .007 of 1 percent 
of the same producers revenue. 
The different combination of policies analyzed indicate the 
importance of the adjustment effects, particularly for the government 
revenue and the welfare efficiency. For all the policy combinations, the 
government would suffer an income loss, which ranges from .17 to 1.28 
percent of the free trade beef revenues. So, in terms of the government 
income loss, the combination that minimizes it is the R, CF, B, SC, or 
Case 4 with a .17 of 1 percent. However, society still would suffer a 
loss of .07 of 1 percent. The same set of policies also presents the 
lower consumer surplus loss after the adjustment from the sugar wholesale 
ceiling price. 
As a final analysis of these different agriculture price policies 
that have been applied to the Costa Rican agricultural sector, we want to 
mention that the results obtained from the model indicate significant 
differences between the partial equilibrium analysis and the general 
equilibrium, particuarly for the price support policies. Also, the 
results indicate that under this kind of price policy there will be major 
differences on the estimated welfare areas depending on the set of market 
interventions on the related markets included in the analysis. Policies 
like the price ceiling on the sugar market and the export taxes on sugar, 
coffee and beef did not present the same characteristics mentioned above. 
In fact, the results showed a great deal of similarity on the magnitude 
of the estimated areas. Lastly and for all the markets and all sets of 
policies, the adjustment effects on the government revenue and on the net 
social welfare loss were highly significant. 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main concern of this study is a comparison of techniques to 
measure welfare effects of commodity policies. A multicommodity 
equilibrium technique is developed and used to analyze the welfare 
implications of the different price policies that the Costa Rican 
government has persued in the agricultural sector. A comparison is made 
with measures from the simplest partial equilibrium technique. Five 
major commodities were chosen which together would have a good 
representation of the mentioned economic sector. Corn and rice 
represent agricultural production that goes mainly to the domestic 
consumers, while sugarcane, coffee and beef cattle represent the export 
agriculture subsector. 
The task of evaluating the different price interventions in those 
markets were performed by first determining and characterizing the 
relevant government policies and then by developing a theoretical 
economic framework to evaluate those policies could be evaluated. About 
the first topic, the Costa Rican economy has been dominated by the 
performance of the agricultural sector during the period analyzed (1960-
1980) even though its performance has not been smooth or stable during 
those decades. Much of this variation comes from the change in the 
government development policies. During the 1960s, when the Central 
America Common Market (CACC) was just being implemented, the agricultural 
sector was the government's principal focus, particularly agricultural 
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export crops. During this decade, this sector showed a healthy growth 
rate of 6.4 percent. However, with the development of the CACC, which 
basically opened and enlarged the markets for industrial products and 
excluded agricultural commodities, a new opportunity occured for Costa 
Rican economic development to make some important changes in the policy 
objectives. During the later 1960s and most of the last decade, the 
sector that has enjoyed most of the government support through different 
production and export incentives has been the manufacture-industrial 
sector. However, the primary sector did not enjoy the same type of 
support as it was in the decade before. The result was a sharp decrease 
in the rate of growth, down to 2.7 percent as well as a reduction on the 
export share of agricultural products. Based on the five most important 
export crops, the primary sector represented about 73 percent of the 
total exports of the country in 1970, but that figure fell to 55 percent 
by the end of the 1970s. Meanwhile, the modern sector showed an increase 
from 25 percent to 35 percent of its share in exports. 
Looking at the government policies through the different agricul­
tural markets, we realized that those policies were pretty much stable 
during the 1960s and early 1970s; but a turning point occured during the 
years 1973-75 for all the commodities involved in this study and for that 
matter to the agricultural sector. This important change in the 
government market interventions was prompted by an increasing deficit in 
the domestic production of basic grains, which jointly with problems in 
the balance of payment forced the government to increase substantially 
the level of price support for those grains. To take advantage of some 
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price advantages in the world markets, the government introduced or made 
significant changes in the rate of export taxes. 
The relevant government market intervention on the grain markets has 
been the price support policy, which in general has been set above the 
assumed free market price or the international price. The average 
support price levels chosen for corn and rice were 146 percent and 14.3 
percent, respectively a level that was implemented during the years 
1978-80. 
In addition to all the discussions that occurred in the middle 1970s 
about the implementation and enforcement of the basic grain ceiling price 
at the retail levels, we did not find much of an incidence of variation 
in the grain consumer prices. In general, they displayed the same trends 
as their respective free market prices. Their price levels have been 
traditionally higher than the reference prices pushed by the domestic 
support level and the marketing cost. This lack of incidence is also 
explained by the way that retail ceiling price is administered, because 
the fixed price just affects a specific quality of grain which by the 
most part is just found on the government retail outlets. 
The sugar market presented two relevant price policies. The first 
one is directed to the domestic market by the imposition of a price 
ceiling policy at the wholesale market. This policy kept the domestic 
price above its international market price for most of the 1960s, but 
this relationship was reversed during the last decade. Representing this 
characteristic of the sugar market, an average level of 12 percent below 
its opportunity cost was chosen. This level took place during 1979-80. 
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There are no concrete figures about the percentage share of the domestic 
consumption of sugar, which is demanded by the industrial sector. 
According to the most recent figures from the LAICA, an estimated 25 
percent is consumed by that sector. This immediately implies a factor 
subsidy to those industries that use sugar as an input of production 
because there is no price differentiation between sugar as a final good 
and sugar as an intermediate product. The quantity of sugar exported has 
been about 50 percent of the domestic production which recently has 
showed a decreasing tendency. Like any other export crop, this product 
has some export taxes. The export right tax was established in 1961 
followed by the ad valorem export tax implemented in 1974. The level of 
both taxes together added up to 6 percent of the average f.o.b. price 
(1974-80). 
The most significant market policy for the last two export products, 
coffee and beef, has been the tax on exports. The coffee industry 
faces the highest rate of taxation. The domestic production has been 
taxed since 1952 by the ad valorem tax based on the f.o.b. price. The 
tax rate has been 10 percent of the average f.o.b. price during 1976-80. 
The exported quantity also is taxed by an advalorem tax established in 
1974 at a level of 8 percent of the f.o.b. price. Lastly, the beef 
cattle industry faced an export tax of 1 percent of the average f.o.b. 
price during 1974-79. This product is also included in the consumer 
protection law which controls and fixes the retail prices. The important 
question is how well this law is enforced and how deep is its effect on 
the market price mechanism. According to the price series gathered by 
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EsCadisticas y Censos for a beef cut similar in quality to the exported 
beef which is the second cut in popularity, the domestic retail price 
level displays the same trends as the export price but at a higher level. 
This characteristic reflects the lack of efficiency in the domestic 
marketing system, particularly when comparing the wholesale price and the 
retail price that in some instances has shown a price differential of 
about 90 percent. 
This set of government policies needs to be analyzed under a sound 
and logical theoretical framework, which would enable us to perform the 
primary goal of this study. The main core of the model building process 
was to get a theoretical model capable of incorporating the cross-
commodity relationships not just in the estimation procedure but also in 
obeying the behavioral relations among the set of key parameters. This 
was done with the idea that farmers and consumers do not just look at 
market signals from a specific commodity, rather they base their decision 
on all the information available in all related markets. This basic idea 
led us Co a multicommodity approach to the problem. 
The set of demand functions was obtained under the assumption that 
the consumers maximize a utility function subject to a budget constraint. 
The set of behavioral assumptions or constraints was also obtained under 
this framework. This set is constituted by the standard theoretical 
restriction of Engel Aggregation, Cournot Aggregation, homogeneity, and 
symmetry, which have to be satisfied by any form of utility functions. 
The system of demand equations was specified as a function of all 
prices and income. By following the Goldbergen methodology, each demand 
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equation was explicitly described in terms of elasticities. This system 
of demand equation was estimated by the restricted ordinary least square 
procedure, because the set o£ independent variables (prices and income) 
was the same for each equation. Basically, two sets of independent 
variables were fitted under the linear in variables and the double 
logarithmic functional forms. The first set was defined as real prices 
(deflected by CPI) and the real per capita personal income, in the second 
group the price variables were defined as relative prices (the price of 
corn as anumeraire), and the income variable was defined as the sum of 
the personal expenditures on each of the commodities involved, of course, 
it was also specified in relative terms. 
The sets of behavioral restrictions applied to this system were the 
homogeneity and symmetry constraints. They were applied specifically to 
the slopes of the demand equations rather to the elasticities with the 
idea of having more flexibility on the estimation of the changes of areas 
(welfare measurements) and to have the specific conditions for testing 
the stability of the model. 
The best results obtained were given by the second set of 
independent variables and fitted with the linear in variables functional 
form, where the statistical results were rather encouraging in terms of 
statistical significance and the expected signs; The only exception was 
the direct price response of the demand for coffee, which resulted with a 
positive sign. In view of the time constraint, and in order to have the 
right sign for stability purposes, the direct price coefficient of coffee 
was restricted to be negative. This additional restriction brought about 
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significant changes basically in the magnitude of the direct price slopes 
of the basic grains and at the same time improved the significant level 
of the beef price slope. Also, this constraint made some changes on the 
signs of the cross effects, particularly the corn-beef, rice-coffee, and 
coffee-rice, which became positives and the beef-rice effect to be 
negative. 
To conform with the welfare theory, the estimated demand coef­
ficients were transformed to compensated demand slopes by applying the 
Slusky equation. Interestingly, the model assigned the lowest direct 
price coefficients to the two major export commodities (coffee and beef) 
and the highest ones to the basic grain coefficients. This result was 
not expected and should be analyzed in more detail because rice and corn, 
particularly the latter, occupy an important place in the national diet. 
The sets of restriction, homogeneity, symmetric and negativeness of 
the slope of the demand of coffee were tested against an F statistical 
test: They were submitted as singly as well as jointly and in either 
case they did not pass the test at 5 percent of significance; implying 
that the restricted model is significantly different from the model 
without restrictions. 
Turning to the supply side of the model, the systems of supply 
functions were obtained under the assumption of total revenue maximi­
zation by the country subject to the constraint imposed by the jointly 
product transformation surface. The implicit production function was 
assumed to be linear homogeneous. This was assumed to avoid the 
estimation of the factor demand, which by its nature and the lack of 
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information make this function so difficult to estimate. Under this 
linear assumption the factor demand is taken as perfectly elastic. With 
the same kind of constraints on the estimation process, the factor supply 
was assumed to be perfectly inelastic. These constraints on the model 
will have an effect on the estimated slopes and constitute an area where 
the model can be improved. 
The system of supply equations were specified as a function of the 
set of real^ lagged prices, the respective quantity produced lagged one 
period, and the factor supply constraint represented by the sum of the 
value-added of each product at constant monetary units. 
The homogeneity and synmetry conditions were imposed on the estima­
tion procedure. The functional forms were again the linear and double 
logarithmic, where the latter gave the best results. The estimated 
coefficients displayed the expected signs with statistical significance 
levels that were good for corn, rice, and beef, but not for sugar and 
coffee, which showed a level well above the 5 percent significance level. 
The positive sign for the sugar supply coefficient was obtained by 
deleting two periods the producer price. This may reflect the fact that 
this crop takes between 14 to 16 months to be harvested. 
The model assigned the highest values to the estimated direct price 
slopes of corn and rice, which may reflect the cash-flow nature of these 
crops. The sugarcane coefficients follow in magnitude, which is not a 
surprise because of the increasing share of the domestic consumption of 
^ The deflected factor used was the wholesale price index in view 
of the lack of producer price index. 
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the country's supply. The lowest values were assigned to coffee and 
beef. This reflects the perennial nature of coffee, the rigidities 
associated with the stock of animals on the farm, and the structure of 
the international markets for those products. 
The constraints imposed on the supply system were also tested which 
in this case has to be taken as an approximation. The results indicated 
that the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions imposed a significant 
difference. 
The general equilibrium system was developed by pulling together the 
demand and supply systems under the equilibrium assumption of excess 
supplies equal to zero in each product market. Thus, a matrix of six 
excess supply equations and six endogeneous variables (product prices and 
the factor shadow price) was obtained, where the level of factor supplied 
is taken as given. The stability conditions applied to this system of 
excess supply equations are those conditions required by the•Walrasian 
dynamic model. These conditions have to be taken as a good approximation 
because the model developed is not a close system. The key condition for 
stability is that all the characteristic roots of the excess supply 
matrix have to be positive. This condition was fulfilled partially, even 
by forcing the coefficient of the demand of coffee to be negative. 
Significant improvements, though, were obtained on the stability 
conditions of the model. By submitting this matrix of excess supplies to 
different policy shocks, the general equilibrium slopes or those that 
consider the price adjustments on the related markets, generated 
coefficients that are crucial for the welfare analysis. 
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The model so developed is not just capable of generating the direct 
effect (change in the quantity demanded or supplied) of a single policy 
on the target market by assuming as given the market demand or supply 
equations but also is capable of estimating that effect when some other 
markets are out of equilibrium, a relevant characteristic for the more 
than one price intervention welfare analysis. 
A theoretical background for the general equilibrium welfare 
analysis was developed and explicitly demonstrated the relation between 
areas by means of using the dual properties of the demand and supply 
models. Thus, we demonstrated that all the private welfare effects are 
captured in the target market, but the net social effects (Just et al., 
44) have to be adjusted through the government income (losses) when there 
are policies that generate that kind of income in some other inter­
related markets. Also, by Just, we know that the private effects have to 
be adjusted \rtien pricing control mechanisms (ceiling or floor price) 
exist in those related markets. 
The estimation of the changes on the welfare areas caused by the 
market intervention is based on the general equilibrium or total 
elasticities of demand and supply. In order to have the same set of 
market policies combination for each market, the estimated slopes for 
both function were evaluated at the respective 1979 international prices 
and quantities, because the reference point is the assumed free market 
situation: In that specific year, all the relevant price interventions 
were in place. For comparison purposes, the set of demand and supply 
equations also were estimated following the simplest method of partial 
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equilibrium, where the demand elasticities were compensated by the income 
effect. Significant differences were found between the partial equilib­
rium estimated areas and those of the multicommodity equilibrium-single 
policy case. This discrepancy just showed up for the basic grains price 
support analysis. For example, the areas estimated by using the partial 
equilibrium results for corn were in general 30 to 40 percent higher than 
the ones obtained by using the single policy-total elasticity measures. 
Talking about the basic grain price support as a market intervention, it 
is also the only one that presented great dissimilarities between the 
welfare results from the different policy combination, which indicates 
that the transfer of resources between the relevant private and public 
groups would depend finally on the existing set of price distortions. As 
a result of the changes in government revenues on the related markets and 
the changes caused on the private effects of the wholesale ceiling sugar 
price, the adjustment process was demonstrated to have a significant 
effect on the estimation of the final net welfare measures on the target 
market. 
Based on the welfare results after the adjustments, the best set of 
policies from the point of view of consumers, which is the group most 
hurt by the corn pricing policy, is given by the combination of price 
support on rice, ceiling price on sugar, and taxes on the exports of 
sugar and beef. This set would not just eliminate the consumers' losses 
but rather will produce a net gain of about 58 percent of the initial 
consumer expenditure on corn. The rest of policy combinations also found 
253 
that the government can compensate the domestic consumers and still 
accruing some revenue. 
The other basic grain policy analyzed was the support price on rice, 
which by the policy levels had made the country a rice exporter, impli­
cating a subsidy to the foreign consumers. The best set of policies was 
found to be the corn, rice, coffee, and beef market distortions, bacause 
it presented the lowest figures for the consumers and net efficiency 
losses. 
As previously stated, the results obtained for the sugar ceiling 
price were very similar between all the combinations of policies studied. 
If we take any reduction on the government revenues as gain to society, 
then the set of corn, coffee, beef and sugar policies will be the one to 
be chosen. The similarities of the welfare results were also present on 
the export tax analysis for sugar, coffee, and beef, but the adjustment 
effects made the difference among the different sets of policies. 
Because the major goal of this kind of distortion is to produce a 
government income, then the best results on the sugar market are obtained 
by the set corn, rice, coffee, and sugar. For the coffee market the best 
results were given by corn, coffee, beef, and sugar. Finally, for the 
beef market, the best choice is the rice, coffee, beef, and sugarcane, 
because it is the one that minimizes the losses on the government 
revenues. 
It is our hope that this research effort would accomplish at least 
two objectives. The need of recognizing that the presence of market 
inter-relations, as well as the presence of a set of price distortions. 
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would mean different conclusions about the welfare effects of a proposed 
change or new price intervention. We also recognize that the model, as 
it is presented, has several shortcomings. We believe that it is worth­
while to put more research efforts to improve the performance of the 
model, particularly in the areas of factor demand and supply specifi­
cation, since the factor demand was assumed to be perfectly elastic and 
factor supply perfectly inelastic. One possible avenue would be to 
investigate the possibilities of endogenizing factor supply and demand. 
Another area of improvement would be on the stability of the model. We 
think that more attention has to be put on the estimation procedure, so 
the system itself would give the proper expected signs. Another possi­
bility is to estimate the model for more homogeneous groups of commod­
ities, homogeneous in the sense of being more market related. This has 
to be done for each side of the economy. A limitation of this method is 
that it is more difficult to evaluate two-price policies. It can be done 
wioth this model but it requires a step by step procedure. 
The economic theory and the econometric tools were put to work 
together under this model, resulting in a less complex estimation 
procedure whose estimated coefficients have a sound and tractable 
economic background we hope this research effort will serve as a base for 
further improvements in the policy analysis field. 
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Derivation of the Welfare Measurements 
Price support on corn 
Effective supply 
WP 
Q2 Q Q, Q 
Consumer loss: a+b+c+d+e 
Producer gain: a+b 
Gov. import rev. gain: d 
Efficiency loss: c+e 
Change in consumer surplus as a percentage of the initial expenditure. 
Acs _ a+b+c+d+2e _ e 
WPxQ^ PwxQj^ PwxQ^ 
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The change in producer surplus in terms of the initial revenue: 
^ [i + 1/2 —1 
WPXQQ WPXQQ WP I ' WP-* 
The net efficiency loss in terms of the initial consumer expenditure 
Government import revenue in terms of the consumer expenditure: 
d _ Acs ( a+b) _ c+e 
WPxQ^ WPxQ^ WPxQj^ WPxQ^ 
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Support price on rice 
P 
Effective demand SP 
WP 
Q 
Consumer loss: b+c 
Producer gain: b+c+d 
Gov. Exp. Rev. loss: c+d+e 
Efficiency loss : c+e 
The change in consumer welfare 
Acs _ b+c _ AP I" , D-| 
WPxQq WPXQq WP I ' 
The change in producer welfare 
266 
Government revenue losses 
g-R _ c+d+e _ Ap.S b AP fgS ^ gD\ 
WPxQq " WPXQq WPXQq WPXQq WPXQ^ ^ 
The net efficiency loss 
Wholesale ceiling price on sugar 
P 
Effective demand WP 
WhP 
Q 
Consumer gain: b+c 
Producer loss: b+c+f 
Efficiency loss: f 
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The change in consumer surplus : 
= -^ fl + 1/2 E° —1 
WPxQj WPxQj WP ' WP'"' 
The change in producer surplus : 
APs b+c+f ÛP (. n ÛP 
WPxQ^ WPxQ^ WP ^ WP-
The net efficiency loss: 
w 
WPxQ, WPxQ, ' W 1/2 E: 
